ANOTHER VOICE

Fortunately, the IRA doesn't really believe what it teaches about British voters, even though it's correct

MATTHEW PARRIS

Asporadic outbreaks of Orange vio- knee spread across parts of Northern Ire- land early this week, two quieter sounds might have been discerned by sharper ears. From Gerry Adams, the grinding of teeth; from David Trimble a sort of suppressed, long-drawn-out 'phew!'

I do not mean that Mr Trimble was pleased at the violence. He will have been anything but pleased. Nor do I mean that Protestant misbehaviour is bad news to the leaders of the IRA. On the contrary, it helps with fund-raising in America.

No, what I mean is this: if Adams, along- side that part of the IRA which was pre- pared to do business with the British Gov- ernment, had won the argument within their movements, Sinn Fein would now be at the table at Stormont. With a good showing in the election behind them, they would be involved in the talks there. World opinion would be smiling upon them.

Ulster Unionism would be in crisis. The RUC would still have had to divert Orange marchers and Orangemen would still be rioting this week, certainly (Sinn Fein being at Stormont) with greater anger and proba- bly with greater violence. Ian Paisley would still be giving bloodcurdling interviews, David Trimble still twisting in the mangle between sympathy and condemnation. World opinion would be frowning upon them. The IRA would have held to their ceasefire and would have appeared as peacemakers. And Sinn Fein/IRA would have won the most enormous publicity coup in their battle for public approval in main- land Britain and for political support in the United States. For them, this week, lit by Orange flames, could have been a turning- point, a coming into the light. It could even have forced the Unionists out of the talks. That is why Mr Adams is grinding his teeth.

But why the long-drawn-out 'phew!' from Mr Trimble? Because the scenario I have just described must be precisely what he warned hardline fellow-Unionists might come to pass; precisely the outcome he feared: Sinn Fein at the table, Protestants fighting the police. Instead, and under his steel-nerved leadership, the Official Ulster Unionists took the gamble of staying the course with London's peace process. Some of them, and many of their supporters, wanted to derail the train before talks on the 'deliberative assembly' began. Others wanted to wreck talks at the preparatory stage. Others wanted to wait a while, pre- pared to walk out later. Few had or have any settled intention of staying on the train right through to its notional final destina- tion months, perhaps years ahead: a refer- endum on a new dispensation for Ulster, brokered behind the scenes by the British and Irish governments with help and sup- port from Washington.

But David Trimble was prepared to take a risk that it would not come to that. I can- not claim to see into Mr Trimble's mind, but if he is a rational man — and I think he is — and an intelligent man — and I think he is; and if as a Unionist Mr Trimble is at heart suspicious of London and deeply wary of change — and I think he is — then this is what he must have calculated: that Gerry Adams could not hold together his fragile internal coalition within Sinn Fein and the IRA forever; that the more willing Ulster Unionism looked to go along with London's plans, the more suspicious of them would hardliners within the IRA become; and that the best way of keeping Sinn Fein out of the peace process was therefore to support it with as ready a will as (with all their doubts) Unionists could muster.

It would be a very harsh thing to say of the leaders of Official Unionism in Northern Ireland, or of some of their supporters in Fleet Street, that they hoped Gerry Adams would not be able to hold his side together. It would be even harsher to suggest that any- one in the Unionist movement, or its claque of supporters in the metropolitan establish- ment, felt any kind of relief at the ending by the IRA of its ceasefire in mainland Britain, or took any grim satisfaction in the fulfilment of their prophecies. I make neither charge, but put it like this: that John Major's peace process represented, for Unionists, a danger- ous uncertainty. It led whither they knew not but to a place they did not really expect to like if they got there.

They did not want to go there. They did not want to be seen as the ones to block the tracks which led there. They had joined the train, therefore, unwillingly, with much dragging of feet, exhorted by their leaders

'Marry in haste, repent in luxury.'

not to be the ones to stop the journey — not yet, anyway. Their leaders remained ready to pull the communication cord and halt the train if it gathered too much momentum in too unwelcome a direction — but they hoped it would not come to that.

It did not. The IRA blew up the line ahead, and the train shuddered to a halt. Unionist passengers now drink tea in a sta- tionary buffet car at the Stormont talks, protesting (should the world doubt) that they are still on the train. It is not they who are holding it up.

Imagine if it had been different. Imagine that the ceasefire was still in force, that Sinn Fein/IRA had agreed some token decommissioning of weapons, and the talks, which included their representatives, were now proceeding. Think what petrol that would have been for the small flames which burned in Ulster this week. Think of the headlines: 'Sinn Fein talk peace: Orangemen riot'. Think how that would have played in New York.

Think, indeed, how that would be playing in mainland Britain. Think how it would be playing among the party who will probably soon form the next British government: would Mo Mowlam and Tony Blair have been able to hold the Orange-tinged bipar- tisan line among their backbenchers? I wonder.

I often suspect that the IRA lack confi- dence in their own teaching. They teach that the support of the British electorate for Ulster Unionism is fragile, is not rooted deep, and could be choked. Irish Republi- cans ought to have more confidence, for this teaching is absolutely right. Ironically it is Ulster Unionists themselves who know this best, who know the British electorate's support for Unionism cannot be relied upon. That, above all, is the argument with which David Trimble will have persuaded his own side not to let the news media cast them in the villain's role when Mr Major began his peace process.

Ulster Unionists should thank their lucky stars that they are led by David Trimble and that, grumbling, they followed. Repub- licans should weep that earlier this summer their hardliners snatched from Gerry Adams the satisfaction of watching, this week, as English and American patience with Ulster Unionism finally snapped.

Matthew Penis is parliamentary sketchwriter of the Times.