Cyprus: new initiatives
Christopher Hitchens Nicosia I have always hated journalists who begin their reports with the stale and usually in- accurate phrase: 'Bullets whistle round me hI write.' But from where I sit I can hear „e Turkish Army firing off practice fusillades of general disgruntlement. This reminder of their presence is more or less superfluous — very few Greek Cypriots can forget the dramatic way in which Anatolian soldiers arrived on the island and drew, with a fine disregard for public relations, a Partition line named Attila. That was in the summer of 1974, after the Greek Junta in Athens had instigated a military coup in Cyprus and provided the Turkish leadership with the opportunity it had craved for so long. Today's volleys, however are intended to show disapproval Of quite a different sort of Greek leader. Andreas Papandreou, the sworn enemy of the Junta and a stern critic of the American support for it, has arrived in Cyprus. He is ,the. first Greek prime minister to make the ,_triP, and the streets are full as they have not fro since Archbishop Makarios returned Pm a British-imposed exile in the Seychelles. There is a feeling abroad that the long isolation and neglect of Cyprus may be at an end.
After 1974, many self-respecting Greek Cypriots ceased to display the Greek flag. It had been, they thought, hopelessly dese- crated by the goons and thugs who ruled Athens and brought ruin to Cyprus. But to- day the blue and white banner is displayed with enthusiasm alongside the Cypriot flag. And Papandreou, who came to power by an adroit electoral mixture of pan-Hel- lenism and socialism, is in his element. Always an accomplished balcony speaker, he knows how to appeal to radical and na- tional emotional in the same breath. He promises that from now on Greece will con- sider the Cyprus cause as its own politically, morally, legally and even militarily. The stains of the junta years are to be wiped out. This is not mere sentiment on the part of Papandreou. For the last two decades, the instability and vulnerability of Greece have been directly linked with the Cyprus ques- tion. More than one government has fallen because of it. Now, with Turkey building a fleet for the Aegean and disputing Greek seabed rights while arming at an impressive rate, Cyprus provides an opportunity to draw a line.
Papandreou is fairly clearly not going to leave Nato and the Common Market, as some of his less polished supporters were led to expect. His strategy, instead, will be to remain inside and act as a permanent gadfly. Already, Nato communiques on Poland and the Golan Heights annexation have been altered, qualified or robbed of unanimous effect by the Greek delegates. This is extremely popular with the voters, who had become heartily sick of the way in which Greece was taken for granted by the Western Alliance.
Greece is extremely unpopular with the Turks, the Turkish Cypriot leadership and the Americans. Turkey, now sunk in a defensive and lugubrious military dictator- ship, already feels misunderstood by the West and is damned if it will have any more cheek from the Greeks. General Evren knows that he can always rely on American military aid — his country is now in the bracket of 'most favoured nations' hitherto occupied solely by Israel and Egypt. The Turkish Cypriot establishment feels and ad- mires this intransigence. On the other side of the line they keep Turkish time (one hour different), they circulate Turkish money, they have removed Greek road signs, con- verted Greek churches into mosques or oc- casionally lavatories, and proclaim that the Turkish army will never withdraw. Mr Rauf Denktash, viceroy of this little colony, has a few difficulties of his own — the Cypriot Turkish voters recently denied his party a majority. But with mainland support he has little to fear for the moment — and time is on his side if he wants partition to become accepted.
Finally, the United States Government does not like the new alignment of Greece and Cyprus. They never liked Cypriot in- dependence much anyway — Dr Kissinger once told the Cyprus ambassador in Washington that he considered Makarios `too big a man for so small an island'. And they are still smarting from the collapse of their political allies in Greece. Just this week, General Haig recommended the en- ding of American aid to Cyprus. The timing is probably innocent — Congress was due to consider the aid budget anyway. But the decision served as a reminder that the United States is counting its friends and enemies very carefully in the eastern Mediterranean.
Further Greek initiatives can be expected all the same. If Papandreou does allow American bases to remain in Greece, he will exact a high price for them. They will have to pass under Greek military control, which will mean that they are not available for use against what is usually termed 'a neighbour- ing country' (Libya). They will be used as a trade-off in negotiations over Cyprus, and in arguments over military parity with Turkey. Just over the horizon is a row over the British and American bases in Cyprus itself. The Cypriot Government is claiming many years' back rent, so far unpaid by the British who nominally hold the steward- ship, and if the cash is not forthcoming there is a chance that these, too, could become a political issue.
Meanwhile, Willy Brandt has been ap- proached to act as mediator between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and is flir- ting with the idea. The Turks see no need for a mediator, but Papandreou has ex- pressed a wish to see one, and there must come a time when the Turks get fed up with rejecting all initiatives. There may even come a time when they wonder if the annex- ation of Northern Cyprus has been worth it.
That time is far off. For the moment, it is clear that the Cyprus issue is back on the in- ternational agenda. This is galling to all those who thought that it had been removed from it.
If nothing is done, then the island will re- main as it is now — supporting two armies, two economies, two state bureaucracies, two airport and customs systems and two national and linguistic cultures. Because of the manifest absurdity of partition — most of the agriculture is in the south and most of the water in the north, for instance and because of the manifest unfairness of the thing — 18 per cent of the population holding, with foreign military occupation, almost 40 per cent of the territory — it can never be stable and can only poison rela- tions between Greece and Turkey. It would be interesting to know why so many foreign statesmen continue to think that it is a good idea.
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