TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE BERLIN CONFERENCE.
IT is quite evident, whatever comes of it in the end, that this Conference of the three Imperial Chancellors at Berlin is intended to be a very serious affair. The official rank of those who accompany the Chancellors, the publicity given to the in- vitations, and indeed to all the arrangements, the very place selected for the Conference, everything points to an intention to invite the attention of the world. It is a sort of informal Conference called in Berlin, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. His own official sanctum has been selected for the scene of conversation, his own adlatus, Herr Bucher, will be Secretary to the Conference, and he himself, it is impossible to doubt, will be the leading spirit of the discussion, which has for topic, formally or informally, nothing less than the future dribibution of the European inheritance of the Sultans. Under these circumstances, politicians will do well to reflect what kind of a plan the German Chancellor is likely to ultimately suggest. It need not be a vast or a very novel plan. His personal instinct, no doubt, is to do things grandly, to discuss large plans, to throw out startling hints, and he is not likely to be daunted by any sentimentalities about the right of the peoples whose fate he is discussing, to be consulted about their own affairs. He is quite capable, if he conceives that course to be to the interest of Germany, of dis- cussing a partition of turkey in a method as complete at the old partition of Poland, nor are his allies in the Conference likely to be shocked by the proposition. Both regard Turkey as dead, both have vital interests in the distribution of her inheritance and both would be glad to avoid the deadly struggle which might spring out of a serious dispute over the reversion. They might be delighted by a proposal which solved their difficulties at any cost to international morality, but then, is such a proposal practically conceivable Prince Bismarck is a man of gigantic ideas, but he is not an Alberoni, not a political dreamer, and he serves a master who does not dream at all. Besides, for the moment at all events, he is fettered by his situation. He could, no doubt, chalk out a plan which would buy Russia, or a plan which should content Austria, but he has to agree with both, and that he should satisfy both by any grand or dreamy plan seems beyond human wisdom. He can hardly have summoned both to conference in order to announce to both that the hopes of one of them must be given up. The old difficulty faces him, as it has faced every statesman who has touched the "Eastern Question." He cannot give the valley of the Lower Danube to Russia, for fear of his own Germans, who would resent that aggrandise- ment of a Power they permanently distrust; and he cannot give it to Austria without offering Russia an equivalent, Constantinople, which lies much more at the disposal of the maritime Powers than even of the three allied Empires. There maybe a road out of the dilemma in that direction evident to the Prince, but it is not evident to outsiders, except through schemes, like the one which Castelar is said to attribute to Prince Bismarck, too dreamy for serious discussion. A partition of Turkey may, we think, be put out of the political calculation, and so may the much more attractive scheme often suggested outside diplomacy,—of leaving European Turkey as she is, but with a strong Christian Sultan seated at Constantinople. That change might be accom- plished with the consent of Europe, and might be the very best arrangement for the splendid territories now ruined by the House of Othman, but the adoption of such a plan would suppose an amount of self-sacrifice on the part of the three Empires belied by all their history. Why should Germany, Russia, and Austria spend their strength merely to benefit mankind Russia does not want a good government in European Turkey, but a bad one ; Austria does not want a strong State on her South-Eastern frontier, but many weak ones ; and Germany does not want anything in Turkey, except the means of conciliating or overawing other Powers. They certainly will not make sacrifices or embark on large enterprises without direct and visible gain to be acquired, and as their hearty agreement would be essential to the expulsion of the Sultan from Europe, we may lay that plan also aside in the boxful of political dreams.
Is there, then, any plan large enough to attract Prince Bis- marck, yet capable of discussion among Powers with such diverse views and such conflicting interests We believe that there are just two, either of which, by careful management, may be brought within this category. One, and in some ways the easiest, is the postponement of the question altogether, by the thorough and complete suppression of the revolt in Turkey.. Brave as the insurgents have shown themselves to be, they are not despairing men, who prefer death to life, and if the three Empires announced that they must submit, and that order as between Mussulman and Christian would be determinately maintained by the presence of an Italian corps d'arme'e—a compromise already suggested—they would yield, and peace would be restored. But unless peace is in- dispensable to the Empires, this solution is almost impossible. It would be most dangerous for any Czar avowedly to suppress a Slav rebellion against Mohammedan rule, and nearly as- dangerous for Austria to permit an increase of Italian influence- in provinces so near Dalmatia and her Adriatic coast-line. Dalmatia is halftItalian in sentiment already. Both Powers would consider during the occupation that Germany, which already possesses a footing in Roumania through the Hohenzol- lern Hospodar, had secured another outpost in European Turkey through its Italian ally; and when the occupation ended, affairs would be just as dangerous as before. Great new interests would have grown up, and Christian populations, protected for years, could not be handed over unprotected to Constantinople. The scheme, which, we may add, appears to be seriously con- sidered, and to be received without irritation at Constanti- nople, would be a mere palliative, altogether unworthy of Prince Bismarck, except as a step towards some much larger design, and will not, we imagine, survive any thorough dis- cussion. There remains the project of the insurgents them- selves the autonomy of the discontented provinces; and it is- this Which, as we believe, will ultimately emerge in the Con- ference as the project "which will divide the Powers the least.' No one of the three has any serious objection to the growth of little States in Turkey, which relieve the Christian populations, which are not strong enough to disturb political relations, and which, while they leave the future of Turkey undecided,. tempt the remaining Christian or semi-Christian provinces to throw off the direct authority of the Sultan. Each of them hopes that by adroit management he may acquire influence enough in such a State to render it useful in the future, and each -has some reason to think that this calculation is correct. Russian guidance is obeyed, more or less, in Montenegro, Austrian- in Servia, and German in the Principalities, and the addition of a, fourth, fifth, or sixth State will not upset violently and visibly the balance of power. At the same time, this plan will relieve populations which, until relieved, can at any moment, by in- surrection, tlikrow all Europe into commotion and alarm. The insurgents have, doubtless, their own political aspirations, and are at heart friendly to one or other ultimate solution, but their one immediate necessity is to be free of the Turk, and. safe from massacre by excited Mussulman landlords. If they are made secure, they will not fight great Empires for abstract ideas, and in a nominally vassal State, governed probably by a Prince of the House of Savoy, supported for three years. by an Italian force, they will at least be secure from
direct and violent outrage. Nor is there anything in. such a plan to excite the animosity of disinterested, Europe. The interest of England and France, and all smaller Powers, including even Greece, is that the Turk should be replaced by the Christian without a huge war, with- out massacres, and without any premature division of unwilling provinces among the military Powers. They wish oppression to terminate, without having immense efforts to make in a cause which is not directly their own, yet is so far their own that they have great difficulty in standing strictly neutral. Above all, the plan has been tried. None of the tributary Governments of Turkey in Europe are very good, or very useful, or very much calculated to inspire hope for the future ; but still they do maintain fair order, they do allow their sub- jects to keep the peace, and they do manage to maintain such establishments as they need, without pillaging the districts till cultivation ceases. The grant of autonomy to each province, whenever it claims it in arms, is the easiest, as it is the most certain, way of extinguishing the Sultan's rule.
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