POLITICS
This time, the credit must go to Mr Mandelson
BRUCE ANDERSON
In Ulster, this is a time for detail and real- ism. Crucial decisions are imminent, and it is impossible to predict which way they will go. But it is also a time for a cautious reassess- ment of some of the leading personalities.
A month ago, Peter Mandelson was going through a bad patch, and it was his own fault; he appeared to have a frivolous atti- tude to his responsibilities. There were hints that Ulster was only a staging-post in his post-mortgage political rehabilitation, and that he would soon be returning to London to run Mr Blair's re-election team. It seemed that the real leadership on Ulster matters was not coming from the Northern Ireland Secretary, but from Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair's chief of staff.
But in the past few weeks, there has been a subtle change. Shares in Mandelson are up; those in Powell down. Mr Mandelson has addressed himself to his duties, and there is a new sense of grip in the Northern Ireland office. These days, the frivolity is coming from No. 10.
That is not Mr Powell's fault; it is Mr Blair's. On occasions, Ulster has brought out the best in Tony Blair; on other occasions, the worst. The Good Friday Agreement owed everything to his authority and his forceful, late-hour chairmanship; it was his greatest achievement. But Mr Blair learned the wrong lessons from Good Friday.
He had to intervene in such a dramatic fashion largely in order to rescue the peace process from Mo Mowlam's incompetence, so Good Friday should have persuaded him of the need to have effective ministers run- ning efficient departments. It should also have been clear to everyone involved in Ulster matters that Good Friday had left major problems unsolved, especially decommissioning, which ought to have been addressed before the Agreement lost its momentum. But none of that happened. Instead, Mr Blair seems to have persuaded himself that he had virtually achieved a solution — and that if there were any sub- sequent difficulties, they, too, could be overcome by a little touch of Tony in the negotiations.
As that stage, and despite Good Friday's imperfections, Mr Blair did convey the impression that he had given his whole mind to the Ulster imbroglio and had arrived at a depth of understanding. Since then, howev- er, there has been much more evidence of a short attention-span and a rapid recourse to petulance. Mr Blair hates being associated with failure; he is also incapable of thinking constitutional matters through. In Ulster, Scotland, Wales and London, there is a recurrent pattern. Radical new measures are introduced after wholly inadequate prepara- tion. But when events do not follow the prime ministerial blueprint, there is no attempt to make up for the original planning deficiencies — merely exasperation with the individuals concerned.
That was the recent mood in No. 10, and although Jonathan Powell does have the grasp of Ulster issues that Tony Blair merely appears to possess, the chief of staff has been unable to overcome his master's impa- tience, especially as there seemed to be no way forward in Ulster. About a fortnight ago, however, some senior figure realised that there might be a chink in the impasse. It is not clear who made this discovery; the candidates for the credit include Mr Man- delson, as well as Bill Jeffrey, the NIO's political director and Ivor Roberts, the new Ambassador in Dublin. But someone identi- fied a new development: the IRA was ready to make an offer on decommissioning.
The credit for that does belong to Mr Mandelson, for it was his decision back in February to suspend the Northern Ireland Executive which has created a new mood in Provisional circles. That suspension came as a shock to the IRA; they had never believed that it would happen (which shows how little they understand Unionist political realities). For the first time in years, a British minister had stood up to the IRA, and had told them that it was not enough to talk vaguely about possible future concessions; there had to be action, now.
The Shinners were furious, Dublin was unhappy, and the SDLP displayed its usual spinelessness in the face of Sinn Fein's polit- ical threat. All that criticism affected Mr Mandelson's morale; he wondered whether he had taken the right decision. These ago- nisings were the low point in his Ulster career; he must learn to be more thick- skinned. But though he buckled; he did not break — and as a result, Sinn Fein was forced to an unwelcome conclusion. It had enjoyed the political status of being in gov- ernment, and had hoped to use this to enhance its vote in the next Southern elec- tion. But it realised that there was no way back to the Executive without some action on decommissioning. Hence its recent demarche; hence a new spring in Mr Man- delson's step. He now feels vindicated (that should not have been necessary, for the February decision required no vindication; it was the only one he could have taken. But better the sinner that repenteth).
So it is now time to scrutinise Sinn Fein's offer. Many Unionists believe that it is just a cynical fudge aimed at getting the SF minis- ters back into government, with SF assuming that however many promises the IRA fails to honour, the Northern Ireland Secretary would not dare to re-suspend the Executive. There are good grounds for those suspicions, and there will need to be assurances and firm deadlines, both from the British government and from David Trimble.
As ever, Mr Trimble's role is crucial, and Mr Blair may not realise just how crucial, because he has no understanding of democ- racy. But the Unionist party is not New Labour. Its members and delegates are able to vote according to their conscience, and their leader must abide by their verdict. Even if Mr Trimble were persuaded to accept a new deal, there is no certainty that he could deliver his party. Unless he is given the right concessions by London, there would be no point in his try- ing. The Republican movement has not abandoned its goal of uniting Ireland; it has merely changed its tactics. Instead of bomb- ing out the Union, it intends to hollow it out, by forcing the Unionists to relinquish all the symbols which link them to the mainland, and to the Crown. The Republicans would like to ensure that no visitors to the Province would realise that it was British territory, and they have allies in Dublin, as well as in the Patten report. Mr Mandelson knows that Patten has to be modified; Mr Blair is not yet convinced. He needs to be, for there can be no deal which the Unionists could accept unless the RUC's dead are not dishonoured by the loss of the name and the cap-badge. But if the worst elements of Patten are excised, and if there are guarantees that the IRA's weapon- ry will be put beyond use, then Unionists should give their assent. But on one point they are entitled to absolute intransigence. The minority tradition in Ulster is entitled to be proud of its Irish identity. But majorities have rights too. The Unionist majority in Ulster is entitled not only to be proud of being British, but to ensure that the state s official symbolism reflects that pride.
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