Showdown for the Alliance?
By JULIAN CRITCHLEY
THE showdown is traditionally the climax of all good Westerns. The champions of good and evil walk warily towards one another down Main Street. The only certainty is the one that matters, the knowledge that if not God, then at least the producer, is on the right side. Can as much be said for what promises to be the most exciting production of 1965, the state of the Western alliance? For the clash between Johnson, fresh from re-election as Sheriff, and de Gaulle threatens the fabric of the alliance. It is a drama in which Mr. Wilson is cast as a reluctant deputy, about whom the audience already has its doubts. The battle will be joined over the MLF, a device designed to further one of two rival and fundamentally different concep- tions of the form the alliance should take.
President Johnson wishes to .preserve and per- fect a closely integrated military alliance under American leadership. He is a supporter of European unity and would prefer Britain in Europe, not simply, for its own sake, but as a bridge across which may be built a wider Atlantic partnership based eventually Won convergent European and American economic, political and military policies. To achieve this he is prepared to dilute, if not to share, control over the Ameri- can nuclear deterrent, and to support, provided certain conditions are met, the creation of a European nuclear force.
President de Gaulle wishes to build the Europe • des Patries; that is, a coalition of the Common Market countries based upon a co-ordinated de- fence and foreign policy, and no longer dependent Upon American nuclear weapons, or upon Ameri- can military or political tutelage. Only by severing the links • that bind Europe to America will Europe gain independence—a condition that would not necessarily exclude an alliance with America. To de Gaulle, the force de frappe is an indispensable element in a European 'third force,' for which he requires German support. He might also welcome nuclear collaboration with Britain if we would abandon our 'special rela- tionship' and join the Six on French terms.
Both conceptions, that of Johnson as well as that of de Gaulle, are based on the fact of Euro- pean resurgence, and as a consequence, upon the need to qualify America's nuclear monopoly. It is the paradox of nuclear-weapons that, whereas they are widely believed to be 'obsolete' in strictly military terms, they are far from obsolete as in- struments of policy. The inhibitions that sur- round their use have made their acquisition even more desirable. American inhibition about using nuclear weapons to counter non-nuclear aggres- sion has called into question the value of her allies depending exclusively upon an American response. Soviet reluctance to follow policies that would risk nuclear war has given European countries room to manceuvre.
President de Gaulle's veto of January 1963 made his political intentions only too plain. Britain had chosen America in preference to Europe and was, in consequence, 'not yet ready' to join the Common Market. The American. 1-e- sponse was to pass from exploring to promoting the MLF as the means of stopping the spread of 'Gaullism' by neutralising what they feared might have been the effects of the Franco-German Treaty.
The rival conceptions of Europe bear upon the great practical question of the place of Ger- many in Europe. It is here that the Gaullist and American strategies conflict: Washington defends its advocacy of the MLF on the grounds that the Germans prefer it to any alternative. Those Germans who support the MLF do so because they see it as an obstacle to the creation of a German national nuclear force and to a joint Franco-German force, in which Germany could take part without infringing her, treaty obliga- tions for as long as warheads were not manu- factured in Germany. There is no evidence that anyone in Germany is in favour of an indepen- dent nuclear force; there is plenty of evidence, however, of support for Gaullist policies, the strongest supporters of which are Adenauer, Strauss and von Brentano. To Chancellor Erhard and the bulk of the CDU, and to the SPD as well,.' the MLF is not simply a means of frustrating de Gaulle. It is seen as the way in which America will .remain committed to the defence of Ger- many, and also as a means of bringing influence to bear on the policies of the United States.
Paris sees things somewhat differently. De Gaulle can offer unyielding hostility towards any Russian attempt to legitimise East Germany or- weaken West Berlin, as protection against the prospect of a deal between Russia and America- at Germany's expense. He has hinted at the possi- bility of trading Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and even the reunification of Germany, in return for the removal of American power from Europe. He could offer a half share in the force de frappe. He would certainly be more accommodating over the price of cereals.
While de Gaulle has something to offer both with regard to reunification and to Europe— both important German objectives--he cannot pretend that his force dc frappe is adequate com- pensation for the removal of 'American protec- tion. In an attempt to prevent the setting up of the MLF, de Gaulle is now threatening the Common Market, and has hinted at the likeli- hood of French withdrawal from NATO. In view of all that has happened, it would be unwise to dismiss threats such as these simply as bluff : nevertheless, it would appear that President
Johnson has little choice but to call it. If he is to succeed, then Johnson must carry Erhard with him, for de Gaulle's tactics are designed to weaken the Chancellor, who is already under fire in Bonn, and to discredit both him and his pro-American policies. Dr. Adenauer's visit to Paris this week was a part of this process. If de Gaulle fails to do so, then there would be little point in carrying out his threats. The Common Market has proved to be very much to France's advantage, and withdrawal from NATO would isolate France before her overtures to the 'third world' have borne fruit.
What part will Britain play? Mr. Gordon Walker, while in Washington, took care not to repeat the unkind things both he and the Labour Party have said about the MLF. 'We are opposed to the MLF on grounds that we find conclusive,' said Mr. Walker in the House this summer. Mr. Wilson is to make the journey to Washington in December. He will attempt to re- assure the Americans and to show that his defence and foreign policies are constructive ones. A great deal of the suspicion with which Mr. Wilson was once regarded has disappeared. I remember a senior member of the administration saying at a dinner party in Washington on the evening Mr. Wilson had been preferred to Mr. Brown: 'I see Wilson is to visit both Moscow and Washington. But which one first?' Today Mr. Wilson is certainly regarded as an ally; how 'good' an ally will depend on his attitude on the MLF.
Labour fought the election with a defence policy that was anti-nuclear in the sense that the American deterrent was to be preferred to the British on the somewhat curious grounds that the .British deterrent, though not the American, encouraged the spread of nuclear weapons. Defence is the issue most likely to put strain upon the unity of the Labour Party. There is only one Labour Government, but there are, in matters of defence, two Labour Parties. While there is agreement that the 'independent' deter- rent be abandoned, a British nuclear contribution to the alliance—whether it be multilateral, or multinational; through the V-bomber force, or Polaris—remains the policy of the party. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which fought the election in alliance with Labour, has concentrated its opposition upon the MLR There are four unilateralists in the Cabinet, and the unilateralists on the back benches have- been substantially reinforced.
Mr. Wilson, whose government is dependent upon unilateralist support, has never had a good word to say for an idea which lies close to the heart of President Johnson. Mr. Wilson is in some spot. He will need to draw heavily upon his talent for prevarication.
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