THE BATTLE OF THE VOLTURNO.
THE Italians have now, we presume, amply vindicated their title to the name of soldiers. In the face of the splendid testimony of history to the fact of their bravery in battle, the strange notion had arisen that the Italians were an effeminate race incapable of the stern duties of warfare. It is a remarkable instance of the effect of repetition. Because Gauls and Germans overran a di- vided Italy, because a Championnet overset the tottering throne of Naples, just as Garibaldi has overset it in our day, because the genius of Napoleon was able to accomplish what the mere bravery of Frenchmen could not accomplish, the passage of the Maritime Alps and the defeat of the Sardinian army ; because the Italian troops under a Murat, not hearty in his cause, fled before a Bellegarde, we must not forget that there were never a nobler body of soldiers assembled in arms than the Italian divisions of Napoleon's Grand Armee. The siege of Rome, the battles of Palestro and Solferino alone ought to have destroyed a calumny which has been so profitable to Austria. It did not require Calatafimi and the Volturno to vindicate the mili- tary character of the Italians, but Calatafimi and the Volturno have proved that undisciplined Italians can successfully contend in battle against disciplined troops, composed not only of their own countrymen, but of Swiss and Germans. The same fact had been demonstrated at Castel Fidardo, where Cialdini's Piedmon- tese were opposed by representatives of every European nation, under a chief of renown like that of Lamoriciere. We trust that Italian troops will now be allowed that rank as fighting men which has so long and so cynically been denied to them. We shall endeavour to show that the Italians in both armies man- fully did their duty on the 1st of October.
As our readers are aware, Garibaldi held a strong position in front of Capua and the Volturno, partly in the plain, and partly on the rugged heights which rise above Caserta, and extend to the left bank of the river. On his left flank he held Santa Maria, a town about two miles from Capua. This post had been par- tially fortified by field works ; in its front were a farmhouse and a convent, both loopholed and garrisoned, and on the right, from the Capua gate, there were extensive gardens and enclosures sur- rounded by high walls. The position in front commanded the road to Capua. From the right of the town a road ran up to the village of St. Angelo situated on the slope of the steep hills. Here stood the centre of the patriot army. From St. Angelo two roads led to Capua, one along the river's bank, a second across the country. A trench had been dug across the river road, and a sandbag battery had been thrown up on the bye road. The railway runs between Santa Maria and St. Angelo, but nearer to the former, and proceeds Southwards by Caserta to Naples. The reserves of Garibaldi were posted at Caserta. On the extreme right of Garibaldi's position, troops were posted to guard and watch the upper fords, and especially to maintain the road lead- ing in rear of the mountain to Maddaloni, which was completely in rear of the whole position.
The object of the King's generals was to carry St. Angelo and Santa Maria by direct attacks, while small bodies of troops threat- ened the upper fords, and a strong division sought to penetrate by the rear to Maddaloni. In the mist of the morning, the enemy's columns issued from Capua. One took the main road to Santa Maria, and operated between the railway and the main road, and along the latter. The second marched up the left bank of the Volturno, separating into two parts, following the two roads. The left columns of the Neapolitans, favoured by the mist, carried at once the trench by the river and the sand-bag battery on the road, and, debouching in the open, got close up to St. Angelo in line of battle befpre Garibaldi, revolver in hand, rushed into the fight. By immense personal exertions, and by threatening the right flank of the assailants, after hours of doubtful conflict, the Neapolitans were driven back, and the battery on the cross-road was regained. In the meantime, the columns movino. on Santa Maria had carried everything. before them up to the entrances into that town, occupying every, outpost except the farm-house from which the French company could never be driven. Here the combat was close and desperate, and nothing but the stoutness of the defenders enabled them to withstand their impetuous as- sailants, who freely used even their cavalry to break in. In the heat of the combat, a body of Piedmontese infantry and artillery arrived from Naples, and, pile/wing:on to Santa Maria, save the defenders the advantage. Garibaldi brought up his reserves, and used one-half to effect a flank movement from the railway side of Santa Maria upon the _exposed left of the Neapolitans, and the combined operation resulted in the triumphant defeat of the ene- my, whose last reserves were engaged. During this combat at Santa Maria, Garibaldi had to sustain a second and more deter-
mined onslaught upon St. Angelo, wherein the assailants were aided by the guns of the fortress. But again his good fortune prevailed. The columns were forced back, and, having the ad- vantage of a reserve intact, he brought it up from Santa Maria and threw it, in a bayonet charge, upon the flank of the shattered forces still clinging to the roads from Calm°. to St. Angelo. This blow told at onee,land the enemy fled along all the roads under the guns of the fortress. A different fate befel the column whose destination was Madda- loni. Bixio, who commanded on that side, steadily resisted their advance, fighting them inch by inch with his inferior force and finally compelling them to seek a position in the hills. A; they could not reach Maddaloni, they moved upon Caserta, and here on the morning of the 2d, they were surrounded, and compelled to surrender. But a part of this force dispersed, and some of the men have no doubt found their way to Capua. The Neapolitans seem to have committed the error of attacking in front strongly defended positions. They appear to have had some idea of the stupendous effects that might be produced by an attack in rear, but they only sent a weak force upon Maddaloni. instead of expending their whole strength upon a front attack, it would have been wiser to have made a strong demonstration in front and to have staked the issue upon a real assault in the rear. Their command of the river, and the possession of Capua, enabled them to do this. Success at Maddaloni would not only have kept back reserves from Santa Maria, it would have imperilled the whole of Garibaldi's position, by interposing a victorious foe between his army and Naples. In the conduct of the battle, the Neapolitan Generals did not take care to keep up a sufficiently close communication between their two main columns, and• hence Garibaldi, gaining the slightest advantage over one, was able to use it by assailing the flank of the other. It is the merit of the Italian General that he made a most skilful use of his reserves, and proved himself to be as superior in soldiership as his men were in that spirit which enabled them to fight against such odds without the advantages of discipline. But whatever may have been the demerits of Neapolitan generalship, not one word can be said against the Neapolitan soldiers. No troops ever fought with more intrepidity or more hardihood, under every disad- vantage of position. Both sides, in spite of some flinching among the Sicilians, behaved like men, and King Francis ought to be grateful to his soldiers for having enabled him to show that he is not without every manly virtue. The victory of the 1st of October, and the capture of prisoners on the 2d, is so far decisive of the campaign, that no more appre- hension need be felt lest the King should resume the offensive. When Victor Emmanuel arrives, if not before, King Francis must leave Capua to its fate, and carry his army to defend the Garig- liano and Gaeta.
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