TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN BASIS OF PEACE.
we arc convinced that with America's help we shall win .1 the war, we are equally certain that with her assistance, and on no other condition, shall we be able to maintain peace when the war has ended. A close understanding between Great Britain and America, long the dream of many sober people in both countries, has at last been brought about by the force of circumstances. The British people and the American people are united, aot by a written treaty of any kind but in a common purpose, to rid the world of Prussian militarism. Both peoples have always been more or less conscious that they share a whole set of historical and moral traditions which could not be destroyed by the thoughtlessness of politicians or the bickerings of newspapers. It is thus very easy for us to co-operate whole- heartedly with them in the war, for Englishmen cannot, and never could, regard Americans as foreigners, however large an influx of foreign blood there may have been into the great country where Englishmen were the first settlers. We are looking forward with confidence to the time when great American armies will fight side by aide with our forces on the Western Front, and already America has given us invaluable help in ships, munitions, and money. What we want to emphasize now is the supreme importance of continuing these happy relations with America after the war, not merely for the sake of our own security, but for the sake of the world's peace. We do not want a formal alliance. Dual Alliances and Triple Alliances were the devices of the old diplomacy to check by compacts between Governments the restless ambitions of other Governments over whom public opinion had little or no control. In the new era which will dawn if, but only if, the war is fought out to a decision in favour of liberty against despotism, peace will depend less on the statesman's whim and more on the people's will. But there must be some solid nucleus for the organization of man's pacific tendencies, and this we think can best be found, not in a League of Nations, but in an under- standing between Greet Britain and America. Let it be borne in upon every citizen of these islands and of the Empire that he Americans are our friends with whom we cannot have any cause of quarrel. Let it be the guiding maxim of every British and Dominiou Government that in no circumstances whatever must they fail to compromise any petty and passing difference that may arise between them and the Administration at Washington. Let it be the guiding instinct of every English writer to deal honestly and fairly with American problems as if they were our own. We do not doubt for a moment the willingness of the American people to respond in the same spirit. Our aims and their aims arc fundamentally the same. We all want liberty and peace—nothing more, but nothing less --and we have it in our power, if we co-operate, to attain and secure those ideals. Were the British and the American demo- cracks to make it clear to the world, after the war, that they were resolved to act on parallel lines for the maintenance of peace, they would gain the support of all other democratic nations to such purpose that no Power would dare to challenge the verdict of humanity.
We were reminded last week by Mr. Roosevelt's disclosures concerning the Venezuelan affair of 1902 that our Foreign Office had not even then realized the supreme importance of preserving the friendship of America. The Germans had of course been shrewd enough to see that they could not hope to dominate the world unless they sowed dissension between America and Great Britain. It is instructive to look back on whit they were trying to do- in that critical year when the South African War ended, leaving us, as they thought, in a state of exhaustion. In the early spring the German Emperor sent his brother, Prince Henry, to. America to conciliate American opinion, which was becoming suspicious of German designs in China and elsewhere, and was at the same time more favourable to us than it had: been for many years. We ven- tured at the time to suggest that Prince Henry had some deeper purpose than an exchange of civilities with the leading people of America, and that he went to ask Mr. RoormVelt for some- thing that Germany wanted in the shape of commercial or territorial privileges. Our remark that " the snapshots we should like to see would be those,of the President and Mi. Hay jast before and just after the Prince had made some political request " drew from Mr. Hay, as we have already- recorded, a laconio note telling the editor of the Spectator that he was " a mind reader," and events justified our expectation that Prince Henry would get nothing substantial by flattery from the shrewd men at Washington. Having failed to gain anything
by a direct approach to the American Government, the Germans then turned to Great Britain. They found an oppor- tunity in Venezuela, where both Governments- had trumpery disputes with that arbitrary little Dictator, President Castro. Germany suggested with an air of the greatest goodwill that the two countries might arrange the troublesome affairs more easily by joint action. The German Emperor himself came over to England on November Sth, ostensibly to shoot pheasants at Sandringham, very much as Prince Henry had gone to America to pay compliments and review Volunteers. The Emperor's real purpose was to lure confiding Ministers into the Venezuelan trap, and within three days he had succeeded. On November 11th, the day after he had met the Emperor at Sandringham, Lord Lansdowne informed our Minister in Berlin that Great Britain had agreed to act with Germany in Venezuela, and had bound herself not to come to terms with President Castro until Germany also had made a satisfactory agreement with him. The consequences of this amazing blunder were soon apparent. British and German warships bombarded Venezuelan forts and seized Venezuelan shipping, and America at once took alarm. It seemed to the American public that, though the Germans wore only acting as every one expected them to act towards a weaker people, we were depart- ing from our sober traditions, and were perilously near to violating the Monroe Doctrine, of which our own statesman Canning was the true author. Germany at once profited by the suspicion thus cast upon our good faith to renew her proposals at Washington, and vaguely but unmistakably suggested that she would like a concession after the Chinese model in Venezuela. Mr. Roosevelt has told the world how he politely but firmly shelved the idea by threatening to send Admiral Dewey to Venezuelan waters if Germany did not quickly come to terms with President Castro. Nothing was publicly known of the German threat, and the incident was soon forgotten. But if it had come to the public car, there would have been in America an explosion of righteous wrath from which we should certainly have suffered far more than Germany. Our Foreign Office was saved from the conse- quences of its blazing indiscretion by the firmness and wisdom of the American President. It is only one among debts of gratitude that we owe to Mr. Roosevelt, but this debt in particular should never have been incurred. The Foreign Office had risked our friendship with America and our reputa- tion as the upholders of a sane and honest foreign policy to gain a smile from the German Emperor and a few thousands from defaulting Venezuelans.
The Foreign Office may like to inform the public concerning the inner history of that Venezuelan business, and other dubious intrigues in which Germany was active for years before the war. To the interesting revelations made of late by the State Department at Washington our extremely uncommuni- cative officials in Whitehall might add a good deal, if they cared to do so. They have at any rate no need to respect the suscep- tibilities of the enemy, and their own past mistakes Would readily be forgiven them in return for sonic new light on German diplomacy in regard to South America, China, and the Near East. That, indeed, is preciselv the kind of "secret diplomacy " which needs to be exposed as a warning to man- kind. However, the facts are known well enough in outline to enable the public to draw their own conclusions. The main purpose of Germany was, as we have said, to set America and Great Britain by the ears in the Western Hemisphere, just as she stirred up all the latent jealousies between us and the other Powers in Europe and the Near East. She failed ultimately in all her efforts, but she only failed in the case of America through the good sense of the American Government. Our statesmen had concentrated their attention on the affairs of Europe, and had not troubled to think out the still greater questions con- fronting them in America. That was the reason why Germany was able to entrap us into the mad Venezuelan adventure. Our Foreign Office had come to regard the Monroe Doctrine as an axiom, and did not trouble to understand Germany's view of it as a mere hypothesis which might be discarded at the dictate of events. This easygoing attitude is, we believe, no longer favoured in Whitehall. Our relations with America had, before the war, come to be regarded as a really important part of our diplomacy. We are not sure, however, that even yet the full significance of a thorough and cordial understanding with America is appreciated by the officials or by the average citizen, although America's entry into the war has had a tremendous educational effect. For our part, we regard the continued co- operation of the English-speaking peoples as absolutely vital to the peace and progress of the world. To the maintenance of our friendship- with America we should subordinate every development of foreign policy, however tempting its momentary
advantages might appear. With American assistance, the British Empire can preserve civilization from a repetition of the horrors of this war. With American support, we may look forward to a lasting improvement in the relations between nations, and to a diminution of the blood-tax that has weighed so heavily on all Europe. The British and American peoples, acting together, may do much to convert the dream of a universal and lasting peace into a reality. There would be little hope of that if the two peoples, united in war, were to fall apart again when the war comes to an end.
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