THE FIGHT FOR TIME
By STRATEGICUS
TIME is an important factor in all military operations. Today it has become a vital factor. The Germans make no secret of the fact ; and it is more than a little difficult to understand how any purely military significance can be given to the contention that it is the one thing necessary. Some justification can be found in the reflection that it is the last lap that counts ; and it is interesting to note how the Germans have attempted to ape our traditional methods. They hearten their people by pointing to the stubborn resolution with which we faced their armed forces at the zenith of their power. They have even begun to find a sort of mystical meaning in our history of losing all but the last battle. They have, in fine, no sound military foundation for anything better than a compromise peace ; and even for that, on an objective view, there is little to be said.
But there is no other hope. Terror weapons are being developed with some urgency. Aircraft of the most modern type have already been identified, and it is not impossible that the Nazis have ground for hoping that a new and more powerful Luftwaffe might be con- structed, given the time. There are also possibilities of stronger concentrations of troops. The eleven divisions in Norway may be brought into the European battlefield. The nine which are lingering still in Finland may join them. There is not so much chance for the eighteen in Yugoslavia and Greece ; and the twenty-seven in Italy cannot disengage. Where the divisions are available they appear to be withdrawing, if at all, with every indication of leisure ; and perhaps one might interpret this reluctance as suggesting that the command think that their withdrawal now would mean the abandon- ment of valuable pawns without adding much to the chance of securing the invaluable time.
The margin has become narrower ; and presumably the command think that at this point the battle must be fought out on the ground it now holds. If the time is gained, there will be some reserves to place in the field next spring ; and even if they are the last combings of German man-power, and mere youths, they may provide some sort of nucleus for a counter-stroke in the spring when—as they hope —the Allies are weakened and disheartened by a winter campaign. The command have further to consider that to secure time, in the sense that it may be advantageous, it will be necessary to fight these defensive battles with the bare minimum that will suffice. Finally, they have, to reinforce their policy, the actual fact that they have done remarkably well on the defensive already.
It is, indeed, somewhat startling to cast one's eye over the various Allied operations. It is now clear that the Japanese have been driven out of Indian territory. After some vicissitudes, the Fourteenth Army has achieved a notable success in the greatest ground clash that has yet taken place with this formidable enemy. In the Pacific, too, there is abundant evidence of a versatile skill and daring that has torn aside the outer fringe of Japanese sea and air bases and pressed in to the core of the enemy position. The more- this campaign is studied the more interesting and encouraging it seems ; but, even there, it can be noted that the enemy has succeeded in securing time for consolidating his power in the larger and more essential of his conquests. He has secured time because the Allies, with immensely superior resources in men and every sort of material, and with a skill in generalship and stubborn daring among the troops that are at least the equal of his own, have been compelled to take this as a secondary theatre. Europe is inevitably the main theatre of the war. Hitler fights there the campaign that must decide Japan's fate as well as his own. The time he gains strengthens Japan while it postpones the day of reckoning.
No one can deny, though it is disconcerting, that the Germans have so far won many almost priceless weeks. The Baltic campaign has held the Russians off German territory which instructed opinion thought they would have long ago entered. It is astonishing @hat the German command could have felt such faith in its own powers of resistance as to suggest the army of Schoerner holding its ground in the Baltic provinces ; but their faith has been justified. For, in the end, it is not Schoerner's army that has proved so sound an investment. If the Russians had not suffered so severe a rebuff before Warsaw the Baltic army might have fared very differently.
But, with the Russians persuaded that a renewal of the attack on the central front would, under the prevailing conditions, be unprofit- able, the German Baltic Army came into its own It seems almost at the end of its tether now, with Russia at the Baltic, fifteen miles ntorth of Memel, Riga invested and Oesel almost overrun ; but precious time has been gained.
The German recovery between Warsaw and the Carpathians has been one of the most surprising events of the war ; and, if we must not minimise it, we must not exaggerate its implications. The incident cannot be discussed without reserve at this point. There is much that remains in need of explanation. But we need not think that the time gained by the Germans is all net gain. The develop- ments in the Balkans cannot be made to fall into any German plan. The defection of Rumania was a bitter pill ; and Bulgaria, though still to some extent on the fence, can give little more satisfaction.
It is probable that the capitulation of Italy was mainly feared because of its repercussions' on the satellite Powers ; and so the new orientation of Rumania and Bulgaria must influence the action of Hungary. If she could get out of the war on any sort of reasonable terms there is little doubt she would ; but Hitler saw to it that any change of allegiance would entail the loss of precious territory.
But now that Russia is on the Hungarian plain and the Transylvanian appendix is being pinched out, with the German divisions trying under difficulties to withdraw to the north and the British operating in Greece and Albania, will not second thoughts begin to suggest otner decisions? That seems certain ; but once again, has not Germany gained time? In Daly the Allies have fought a remarkable campaign and now appear to be on the edge of the Lombardy plain, on the fringe of great developments. But the weather has become wintry ; and though it may improve, as in normal years might be expected, is not the season late?
In the west, where the Germans believe the decisive action will take place, the Allies have historic victories to then credit ; but now, with October wearing on, they are being held to fierce battles on tactical positions that scarcly permit of more than pedestrian advances. When someone mentions Caen, a discouraging vista grows before the mind Aachen can be written off and the Americans are estab- lished in the Siegfried defences ; but they are not yet through them, and the great river Rhine lies beyond.. Patton is not yet up to the main German defensive zone. Indeed, the worst that can be said of the Allies' position and prospects at the moment must start from the fact that they have not yet begun their general engagement.
Light reports that have pictured every searching probe as on the verge of decisive development have, in effect, misrepresented the situation entirely. Before one attacks an approach march is neces- sary. Before any general engagement it is necessary to brush aside the covering forces and secure advantageous positions so that the blow may not be spent in the air.
These considerations may perhaps be obvious ; but their neglect in the recent past has not been the best preparation for the spectacle that confronts us at present. There is no doubt that the Allies have an immense superiority in men and material in the west. There is no sort of comparison between the strength of the troops en presence ; and they should decide the matter at issue. But when we remember that there is a time limit, when we remember that the protraction of indecisive action, even for some few weeks, .may mean that the war may well go over into next year, we are bound to recall what has already been gained by the resistance at the ports. How long has the Leopold Canal been figuring in the news? When did Aachen and Stolberg first make their appearance in the communiqués?
When we think of that side of the matter we are bound to reflect that the German command has done amazingly well. The Germans had suffered a defeat that must take its place as one of the greatest, if not the greatest, in history. The exploitation was exemplary ; and we cannot but recognise that pursuit under any conditions can- not continue for ever. Nevertheless, the Germans thought they were finally lost. They thought that we might follow across the defence- less frontiers and secure a decision.
Such a development was impossible under the circumstances ; and, when this is thoroughly admitted, it has yet to be recogn'sed that the Germans have recovered in an astonishing fashion. They appear to fight to the bitter end with the sweepings of all sorts of units ; and there can be not the smallest doubt that they have won time for their country. But it is easy to take this -situation too readily at its face value. The mere mention of Caen should.sug- gest the reality beneath the appearance. This defensive is mainly a crust. The mere fact that it is being carried out resolutely re- minds us that generalship still remains supreme. After Caen came the great debacle. The Allies have not yet struck in full force. They are about to do so ; indeed, the Germans have been saying that the attack is on. But battle will be joined on all fronts simul- taneously ; and then the'rigidity of the defensive may, as at Caen, play into our' hands.
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