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A voyage 4161f7tikerrerr In 1958, at the time of the abortive European 'Free Trade Area negotiations. perfidious Albion was accused by the continental Euro- peans of attempting to wreck the Common Market by not wanting to join it. Ten years later, if the British government continues its resolute and virtually unconditional march towards Europe, there is an outside chance teat Britain will succeed in wrecking the Common Market by wanting too hard to join it. But to suppose that even this, the ultimate risk, the strongest card that those who want to see Britain within the Community can pos- sibly play against France, will be enough to force de Gaulle's hand, is to ignore every- thing the General has said and done since this country's intention to apply for member- ship was made clear. and to misread his- character and priorities utterly.
No doubt the meeting of the Six at Luxem- bourg in ten days' time will agree that nego- tiations with Britain can begin —although oven here, by one means or another, the French are likely to be able to secure a delay before they do. But prolonged negotiations, with the overwhelming likelihood of eventual failure, can only lead to demoralising uncer- tainty (and a rising wave of popular anti- European sentiment) at home as well as creating strains between France and her part- ners within the Community. There is little Profit for anyone in this.
Nor, on the other hand, having come so far. can Britain abjectly withdraw if she has any self-respect, sense of loyalty to her Euro- pean friends, or genuine belief in her Euro- destiny left. Certainly, it might have far better had the Government decided et is country's own economic house in can only lie in one direction. That is to begin, alongside the official Common Market talks which are inevitably conducted in the full glare of publicity, a separate Anglo-French dialogue at the highest level and in the utmost secrecy. While the official talks concern them- selves with institutional integration, the pur- pose of the bilateral discussions would be to hammer out something far closer to de Gaulle's heart: meaningful cooperation be- tween the two countries in the field of foreign policy and international affairs.
In concrete terms, Britain would need to make two specific proposals. First, an offer to 'coordinate the British and French nuclear deterrents. involving the joint production of future delivery systems. a full exchange of nuclear know-how, but the preservation of separate national control of the respective nuclear triggers with provision for an even- tual .McNamara-type consultative commit- tee embracing the other members of the Community. And, second. an offer to co- ordinate Anglo-French monetary policies (within the Group of Ten and the Interna- tional Monetary Fund) in preparation for the eventual emergence of a European reserve currency which could--and would -dispute the primacy of the dollar.
In return for this France would have to commit herself to the immediate' acceptance of Britain as partner in an enlarged indus- trial free trade area for a fixed period of ,years, at the end of which, provided we had fully satisfied the rules of the Rome Treaty, we would automatically accede to full
It was always unlikely that the American reaction would have been as emotional—or as unmixed with feelings of relief at .being rid of something of an incubus —as .the offi- cial British objection implied. But now we have it on the authority of Lord Chalfont (and no more senior minister has contradic- ted him) that in any event we no longer lay claim to any special (political) relationship. with the United States: that there is. in other words, nothing there to jeopardise. If that is so--and it surely is so, as this journal has fre- quently pointed out--then let us go ahead on, this basis. Let the Government demonstrate. that it means what Lord Chalfont said by attempting to negotiate, with France, a germ- ine Anglo-European special relationship— . above all in the key fields of defence and monetary policy—in place of now offi- cially-declared mythical Anglo-American special relationship.
Of course, there can be not guarantee that even this approach would bring success. But it is, at least, the only course that offers any prospect of success at all. And even if it fails, it may still assist this country further along attempting to negotiate, with France, a genu- outstanding value of Mr Wilson's European venture to date. Already rVe have learned, according to Mr Callaghan, that the sterling area system is not immutable. The Common Market Commission has taught us, in the politest possible terms, that our economy is in 4disequilibrium.' And now Our. principal European negotiator has discovered, and in turn revealed to the world, that the 'special relationship' is dead. If it does nothing else, the present attempt to join Europe is provid- ing our rulers with an invaluable and king- overdue edncation in the facts of life, as necessary if country remains outside the Community as it would be within it.
