THE SAGACITY OF THE MINISTRY.
AS we entirely concur in the propriety of an immediate, though not a reckless, march upon Cabul, we may perhaps be allowed to point out what a flood of light is cast by recent events upon the sagacity of her Majesty's Ministers. The Tory idea, and indeed the idea of a great section of the people who are not Tories, has been that the Beaconsfield Ministry is composed of very able persons indeed, statesmen who are per- haps a little too enterprising, but who see very far into things, who are " up to " Bismarck, and can checkmate Russia, and are strengthening the " Empire " at all points against dangers invisible to less far-sighted persons. They have thought of Lord Beaconsfield as Frenchmen once thought of Napoleon III.,—as a Sphinx, sinister or benevolent as might be, but always with far-sighted eyes scanning the horizon, and seeing what meaner men might not see approaching. Of the merits of his colleagues in other respects there might be doubt, but their sagacity in foreign politics, in- cluding, as Lord Salisbury in his speech of August 3rd was careful to remark, Indian and colonial politics, was beyond question. The proceedings at the Con- ference of Berlin gave the first shock to this pleasant belief. It was then seen that the Ministry, by entering into the secret agreement with Count Schouvaloff, had tied their own bands for bargaining, that they had warned Europe that most of their determination was bounce, and that they had secured nothing except the dismemberment of Bulgaria, and the Sultan's military right to fortify the Balkans. Lord Beacons- field made much of this last right, declared that it was the salvation of Turkey, and talked of the " concentration" of the Sultan's Empire ; and when it was seen that the Balkans were not, and could never be, occupied, that the " grand victory of British diplomacy " was a mere blunder, that Lord Beaconsfield did not understand either Turkish strategy or Turkish political necessities, the disenchantment was very great. He had not foreseen even the events of two months. So was the disenchantment which followed the revelation of his blunder about Cyprus, a very nice estate, but no more a place of arms from which to dominate Asia than Heligoland is
a place of arms from which to dominate Germany, and it was deepened by the evidence that the Premier and his Foreign Secretary knew nothing accurately either of Constanti- nople or Asia Minor. They had guaranteed Asia Minor, and the Turks were not grateful ; and they had obtained promises of reforms in Asia Minor, and not one of them was attempted. The schemes on which they had relied to secure British influence in Western Asia, and, as they said, to protect the people from oppression, and introduce a new era of decent government, were seen to be so childish that their followers ceased to talk of them, and now hardly admit their own previous credulity. Then came the disasters at the Cape, for which the Ministry were only responsible in that they foresaw nothing, and had made no preparation for pos- sible disaster ; and when the disaster came, they who had boasted that they were ready for three campaigns against Russia, showed themselves scarcely equal to one campaign against a savage chief not a hundred miles from their own territories. •And then followed the timid blunder- ing in Egypt, in which the Government showed itself afraid both of France and of a ring of Jew financiers, and raised even in the minds of Tories a suspicion that they had misread the Ministry, that its defects were not audacity and ambition, but want of ordinary foresight and administrative power. Still, there was the grand example of Afghanistan with which to be comforted. The Government had obsti- nately insisted that they must have a scientific frontier for North-West India and an Envoy at Cabul, and after a brief and almost bloodless war, they had obtained both. The Passes were ceded, and the Ameer of Af- ghanistan had solemnly welcomed the British Envoy to his capital, his military bands even playing an intelligible imi- tation of " God Save the Queen." The greatest experts had condemned the expedition. Lord Lawrence, Lord Northbrook, Sir Richard Temple had prophesied disaster. All Liberals had predicted endless embarrassments, and even some weak-kneed Tories, like Mr. Forsyth, had refused to support the Govern- ment policy. And yet it had succeeded. How much farther the Ministry had seen than the ablest Indians,—how much farther than the Liberals, how much farther than the people! Never was. such a chorus of congratulation. Lord Cranbrook crowed with delight as he avowed, in a final despatch almost as full of blunders as paragraphs, that he en- tirely concurred in Lord Lytton's view of the " friendliness " of the Afghans. Lord Salisbury declared on August 3rd, in his speech on the unbroken historic consciousness of England and the Cecile, that " the most momentous Asiatic war that England ever waged had been brought to a triumphant issue," and went out of his way in Parliament to pronounce his showy Viceroy one of the greatest of Governor-Generals. Lord Cranbrook had previously, on June 5th, in that great speech upon his conscience, which recalled Lord Eldon's frequent reference to that cherished possession, boldly declared that " the Afghan 'war was the only war for which this warlike Government was directly responsible,"—thus admitting that it had intended the war,—" that the war had been conducted upon terms of moderation and wisdom, and unprecedented respect for the feelings of the Afghans," and that no one could doubt that out of this war, at least, " England had brought peace with honour." Sir Stafford Northcote, on June 18th, proclaimed in the Tower Hamlets that the Afghan war had been " magnificently " successful—he, bo it remembered, having throughout his previous official career denounced the idea of an Afghan war—and declared that " we have arrived, in spite of very confident predictions to the contrary, at a settlement which will, I believe, avert and put an end to the uneasiness with which we have for some time had to
contend in India, and will enable the rulers of India to devote themselves exclusively to the material interests of that country." And on August 14th, in the final debate
on the war, Mr. E. Stanhope, replying on behalf of the Government to Mr. Grant Duff's gloomy vaticinations, said : " I suppose that no one will revert to the dangers of placing an Envoy in Cabul that were mentioned in December, for all those prognostications have been contradicted by subsequent facts. Major Cavagnari has been received most honourably, not only by the Ameer, but by the people of Cabul. I will next consider whether the Treaty has alienated the people of Afghanistan. The honourable and learned Member for Oxford has said, ' You have inspired the people of that country with such a hatred towards you, that all the ground you fail to occupy will be the fortress of your foes.' The result has, how- ever, gone to show that the occupation of Candahar, which is temporarily undertaken, with the friendly feelings of the inhabitants, has gained for this country a friendly, an inde- pendent, and a strong Afghanistan. British influence is para- mount in that country ; our frontier is secure to a degree which has never before existed—at any rate, for many years past—and the Government are proud, as the country, in my opinion, ought to be proud, of the great exploits which have been accomplished by the Indian Government, mainly owing to the patient foresight and perseverance of Lord Lytton ; owing to a policy and a course of action on the part of the noble lord, the results of which it will not be possible for any politician either in or out of. the House to minimise."
The tone of non.official supporters was even higher. The Times daily trumpeted its exultation in the magnificent frontier policy, and with the wonderful contempt for its readers which it sometimes exhibits, and which certainly of late has not been undeserved, declared that the war had " turned India into an island." The Telegraph raved, after its half-delirious fashion, against the unpatriotic few who would not see the grandeur of the achievement ; and so late as Saturday last, six hours before the Afghan uprising and the massacre of the Mission were known in London, the Saturday Review contemptuously assured the world that the reception of Major Cavagnari had at least ended the profitless discussion on the merits of the Afghan policy. And to-day no man doubts that the war is just begun. This sagacious, far-sighted, and most competent Ministry could not see even a few days ahead, had not the faintest idea of the character or feelings of the people they were dealing with, and did not even know what Yakoob Khan was like, or what was his position in his own country and among his own people. Bismarck would dismiss a tenth-rate agent who showed such crass incompetence to discern the most patent phenomena around him. They were so convinced either of Afghan friendliness or fright, so confident in their scientific frontier, and so elate with the notion that they had secured a visible triumph at last, that they took no precautions whatever, kept together no transport, and when the disaster arrived could not move without a risk greater than any involved in the original war. We ask sensible men, not blinded by party spirit, or hatred of Mr. Gladstone, or fear that with a Liberal. Ministry a now
couche sociale will rise to the top, whether such are the marks of intelligence, whether the present Ministers are more or less sagacious than the Radical Cassandras who showed whither they were drifting, more or less informed than the Old Indians who told them that in Afghanistan the true embarrassment would be success, more or less wise than the commonalty which they profess to guide, and which, with the curious political in- stinct of huge masses, had throughout an uneasy sense that " some- thing might happen in Afghanistan." It cannot be said that they blundered in common with the whole people. Their error was pointed out to them by friendly experts, by enemies, by mere critics, until they were weary of warnings, which were to them like warnings from the barometer to unscientific captains of colliers sailing into the storm under a clear sky. Nor can it be said that they had to decide without aid from experience. In every Indian question, the Ministry has the aid of multi- tudes of experts,--men who know all the facts that can be known, and who, as a rule, speak freely, even though they see that those who, like Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir James Stephen, and Sir L. Cavagnari, see, on this subject, eye.to eye with the Ministry, are trusted, and promoted, and believed wise. It was under the light that the Ministry stumbled, because their feet were weak. The Afghan war has always appeared to us, and appears still, a wicked war, a wilful war against a people who had not provoked it ; but it is not of any moral offence that we accuse the Ministry,—unless it be, in the case of Sir Stafford Northcote,,of the suppression of convictions which it is evident, from his speeches and writings, as well as from his character, must have been very deep.. Our accusation is that the Ministry is incompetent to lead, wanting in foresight, in perception of facts, and in administrative skill,—so wanting, as events one after another demonstrate, as not to be entitled to be believed ordinarily able men. Of course there is one exception. The Premier is entitled to the credit of having seen, without help, by the flickering light of his own phosphorescent genius, that the English people, surfeited with prosperity, were anxious, just as prosperous English bourgeois usually are, for higher position in the world. He saw that, and saw it accurately, and his perception of the truth made him Dictator ; but then it was because he saw it, while lacking the administrative power to prepare the moans for the realisation of his dreams, that England is suffering from these incessant misfortunes, and the greater misfortunes which yet may be at hand. Every Govern- ment obeys the law of its being, and the law of this Govern- ment is to seek fame andp owes by trading on the English pride in India and English timidity about her safety, and con- sequently it is from India that the destruction of this Ministry should arrive. May the danger not come ; but we are aware, and the India Office is aware, and we trust that the Secretary at War is aware, of an Indian danger, underlying all this business, before which Afghan fury would matter very little.
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