VIETNAM
Who and how after Ho?
P. J. HONEY
Resolutions to rule through collective leadership fail to convince. An under- developed Communist state, by its very nature, must be ruled by one man if it is to function, and North Vietnam will have to throw up a successor to Ho if the Com- munist regime is not to disintegrate. Ho created Vietnamese Communism and himself selected and trained his lieutenants, none of whom could challenge his greater experience or authority. During his periodical absences on the business of the Comintern these lieu- tenants quarrelled among themselves, com- mitted costly errors, and damaged the Com- munist party, but in the past Ho always re- turned to resolve their differences and restore the party. Now they must manage alone, and one of them will have to assume the role of leader. Can they meet the challenge?
Advancing senility and recurring illness had progressively reduced Ho's active participation in the leadership since 1964, and it was ariparent in recent months that this had ceased altogether. The conduct of North Vietnam's affairs since last winter has been the responsibility of the party Politburo, that all-powerful oligarchy whose numbers have now been reduced by Ho's death to nine, so that a criterion does exist by which to judge the probable future per- formance of the Vietnamese Communist leadership. The period has been both event- ful and revealing. Perhaps its most signifi- cant feature was the emergence of deep divi- sions among the oligarchs in a fashion reminiscent of Ho's earlier absences from the Vietnamese scene.
All North Vietnamese leaders are solidly united in their determination to drive the United States from Vietnam, annex South Vietnam, and establish Communist rule over the whole country. To categorise them into 'hawk' and 'dove' factions, as some pro- minent American commentators do, is simply to attribute domestic United States political alignments to North Vietnam, and is ^wirely Tho Aicagreements currently splitting the North Vietnamese oligarchs into two schools of thought are all concerned with the means of achieving the agreed objectives.
War has imposed enormous strains on North Vietnam's economy, and military service has seriously depleted her labour force. As the man directly responsible, party First Secretary Le Duan has subordinated socialist ideology to pragmatism in meeting the overriding need for increased production. In agriculture he has tolerated the con- tracting of collectivised land to individual families to farm for their own profit since this system has significantly raised food out- put. Higher production in industry has been encouraged by payment of cash or material benefits to workers: where such incentives have not been introduced, labour slackness, absenteeism, and low pro- ductivity prevail. Le Duan has also turned a blind eye to the activities of experienced party cadres known to engage in corrupt practices, presumably because they would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace at short notice.
Back in 1965 Le Duan concluded that the Vietcong would be overwhelmed by massive United States military intervention unless it were heavily reinforced. He there- fore dispatched to the south large numbers of North Vietnamese army units with their artillery and even some tanks to counter the enemy's increased firepower. But such a conventional army cannot engage in guerrilla warfare. So, of necessity, the Communist forces fought pitched battles. Believing that terms satisfactory to the Communists could be negotiated only when they had established military superiority in the field, Le Duan urged his forces to attack constantly.
Truong Chinh is the principal spokesman for the other viewpoint. His basic premise is that success can be achieved only through ideological orthodoxy. He called publicly for the re-establishment of strict party disci- pline, for the replacement of material incen- tives by political indoctrination to maintain production, and for a return to collec- tivised agriculture. Le Duan, he has inferred, has been undermining socialism and paving the way for a reversion to capitalism in North Vietnam, just as he has deviated from Mao's teachings on revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam. To engage in set-piece battles against an enemy superior in numbers, with superior fire- power, and having the monopoly of air power, was suicidal. By concentrating on military action Le Duan was ignoring the more important half of what was essentially a politico-military struggle. Truong Chinh has therefore prescribed an immediate return to protracted low-cost warfare coupled with increased emphasis on the political struggle.
The extent to which Truong Chinh's views have won acceptance in recent months is striking. Not only has Communist military strategy in South Vietnam substituted stand- off rocket or artillery attacks and small commando raids for the earlier pitched battles, but the change has been officially endorsed by a high-level North Vietnamese military conference. Political warfare has assumed a new importance, with the forma- tion of the Provisional Revolutionary government, increased subversion in the South, and a stepped-up campaign to en- courage the protest movement overseas, particularly inside the United States itself. It cannot be denied that these changed tactics have achieved greater success at a far lower cost for the Communists. In domestic affairs a decree published last month ordered the immediate re-collectivisa- tion of all agriculture (though it seems that this had in fact already taken place in June), and a campaign for strengthening party discipline is now in progress.
Two such mutually incompatible view- points cannot exist side by side for long, and one or other will have to prevail. Ho Chi Minh's mantle will descend on the leader of the faction whose policy wins acceptance. The outcome is still far from certain for, despite Truong Chinh's obvious success, it is already apparent that the new collectivisa- tion of agriculture is going to result in one of the worst rice harvests on record, and the deprivation this will cause is bound to raise doubts about the efficacy of the policy. Truong Chinh is still highly unpopular because of the disastrous agrarian reforms for which he was held responsible some years ago, and his undoubted lack of charisma would damage the Communist regime. Moreover Le Duan personally con- trols the party apparatus and, as First Secretary, could conceivably fulfil the role of leader without changing his office, leav- ing the chairmanship vacant out of respect for the dead Ho. Some such tactic would greatly increase the difficulty of Truong Chinh's task in imposing himself on the party, and through it the country.
What transpires within the meeting of the Politburo during the coming weeks is rt wm determine the future course
of North Vietnam and of the war in South Vietnam, and the prospects of peace. Collective leadership cannot endure. The identity of the new leader, when he finally emerges, will indicate what that course is likely to be.
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