Correspondence
Roosevelt's Foreign Policy
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] sm,—The Europe that had hoped the United States would return to the Wilsonian foreign policy as a result of the victory of Mr. Wilson's party in the November elections is likely to be disappointed. It is probable that the present P° • licv of the American Government will in one way or another be modified over the course of the next several years. But this will be the product of a normal evolutionary process and not of a deliberate decision by the Roosevelt Administration to break with the immediate past. At the moment, largely because of the continued gravity of the economic situation, nationalism, that is, isolationism, has American public opinion in its grip. It is to be doubted that Mr. Roosevelt could successfully defy this nationalist opinion on any important question, even if he so desired, and there is no evidence that he entertains any such desire.
The President will, on the other hand, unquestionably employ new tactics and adopt a fresh approach to the problems commonly affecting Europe and the United States. What value this change will have remains to be seen, for there are few questions dividing Europe and this country that can be adjusted by a " fresh approach." There may also be expressed in the near future a desire for increased co-operation with the other major Powers, especially on questions of general inter- national importance, but it must not be understood that this will involve departure from the fundamental policies of the American Government. Mr. Roosevelt has already shown this in his reply to the League of Nations Assembly, which had invited the United States to co-operate with the Advisory Committee designated to take up the Japanese question. Through his Secretary of State, Mr. Roosevelt replied " that the American Government is prepared to co-operate with the Advisory Committee in such manner as may be found appro- priate and feasible "—but—" as it is necessary that the American Government exercise independence of judgement with regard to proposals which may be made and/or action which the Advisory Committee may recommend, it would seem that the appointmentby it of a representative to function as a member of the Committee would not be feasible."
Here, it may safely be presumed, is the keynote of the Roosevelt policy on all similar questions. In brief, the United States will not join the League of Nations, join in any binding, consultative pact, or in any other way commit itself in advance to an international programme or course of action whereunder it would compromise its " indepen- dence of judgement." To put the matter in the language of the popular Press, " We will in no circumstances use our navy to fight a League war." Of course, this does not preclude American adherence to a general consultative agreement, based on the Kellogg Pact, which might facilitate and expedite an exchange of views between the leading Powers when the Pact is violated or violation is threatened. Former Secretaries Kellogg and Stimson suggested the necessity of some such arrangement. It is understood that the new Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, is likewise convinced of the need for erecting machinery of this sort. But the consultative arrangement to be agreed upon must explicitly state that the United States is maintaining a free hand. Into this category fall all of the various peace and security plans that have been put forward since 1919, the security pact proposed by France, the Anglo-American maiitime police force suggested in England, the so-called Mussolini plan, and all the rest. Only with regard to membership in the World Court may the Roosevelt Administration modify this policy, but in doing so it will have to set at defiance the advice and counsel of its chief journalistic supporter, the Hearst Press.
Mr. Roosevelt will probably be found more rather than less nationalistic on the disarmament question. He will, no doubt with utmost sincerity, do what he can to preserve the Present naval treaties and promote land disarmament in Europe. He may even propose a general disarmament plan of his own precisely as did Mr. Hoover. But many of his advisers and subordinates have lost confidence in the Geneva Conference-and in all other efforts-to promote peace through disarmament. Upon his departure for Europe the other day Mr. Norman Davis, the American delegate at Geneva, told his friends that he frankly felt that he was returning, not to save the conference, but to help bury it. It is easy to see that no really vigorous or wholehearted help can be expected from Washington in this connexion. Indeed, Mr. Roosevelt himself has indicated that he is more ready than was Mr. Hoover to build what the American Admirals call an adequate " navy. In the interest of government economy he would like to defer the naval construction programme. But considerable pressure is being brought to make him approve the programme to build the navy up to the topmost limits permitted by the London Treaty, and there is sound basis for believing that he has been won over to this plan with the argument that resumption of activity by the shipyards would help to relieve unemployment. It the Geneva Conference fails definitely and finally, there can be no question that the American Government will launch a naval programme involving expenditures for new construction totalling no less than $1,000,000,000.
Russia and the Far East will engage much of the State Department's attention, at least through the early part of the Roosevelt Administration, It is generally supposed that as soon as he finds time to turn from the more pressing domestic problems to look at the foreign field, Mr. Roosevelt will move to recognize the Government of the Soviet Union. If he does recognize the Moscow regime, it will be done almost solely in the hope of stimulating trade with Russia. The political angle of this question, that is, the necessity as many people see it of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union in order to check Japanese aggression on the Asiatic mainland, will probably play a very minor rok. The new President tends to emphasize the economic or commercial aspects of foreign policy at the expense of its more purely political aspects. That there will be no change in the American attitude toward Japan or China Mr. Roosevelt has already made clear.
On the economic side of international affairs Mr. Roosevelt is bound to display a great deal of vigour and persuasiveness. He will not sponsor outright cancellation of the War debts, for public opinion will not permit this. Yet the public attitude toward this question has in the last few months undergone a very subtle change. By and large the people have awakened to the necessity of some sort of adjustment of internal debts both private and public, and are beginning to perceive the need for similar action with regard to the War Debts. Whether or not the President insists upon payment of the instalments due on June 15th, it is morally certain that he will entertain any proposal looking toward a major adjustment of the European obligations. It is probably, though by no means a foregone conclusion, that he and his party in Congress will be found willing to approve an adjustment that all but wipes out the indebtedness, but they will very likely expect a quid pro quo of sufficient substance to disguise effectively the real purpose of the debt adjustment. The compensation can, for example, take the form of announced willingness to enter into reciprocal tariff treaties.
Mr. Roosevelt has a positive interest in the lowering of trade barriers. He has stated that other international ques- tions must, at least for the time being, be subordinated to this all-important task. He is ready to experiment in the field of the tariff, to scrap the traditional and very rigid protective tariff policy, and to ask Congress for autocratic power to negotiate separate tariff treaties with America's best cus- tomers on terms that will be mutually beneficial. The State Department is now exploring the field with unusual thorough- ness, and before these lines appear the results of its survey, to be written into the President's tariff programme, may have been presented to Congress. Mr. Roosevelt, moreover, has every intention to press for reduction of trade barriers at the World Economic Conference. The American delegates will not be permitted to discuss War debts, but they will be explicitly instructed to go as deeply as possible into every proposal looking toward facilitation and improvement of international trade. This the new President has marked out as his first objective in the foreign field.—I am, Sir, &c., MAURITZ HALLO REM Washington, D.C., March 25th.
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