TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE WOLF BY THE EARS. THE Germans have got the Russian wolf by the ears. That sums up as correctly as any such metaphor can the situation in the Eastern theatre of the war. The position is, no doubt, a very unpleasant, even a very danger- ous. one for the wolf, but it notoriously presents an almost insoluble problem for the would-be wolf-slayer, especially if that individual is in a desperate hurry to get away from the wolf and deal with an enemy at his front door. The crux of the whole problem of -what to do next when you have only two hands, and both of them are fully occupied, lies, of course, in the fact that catching the wolf in the way indicated can never be the bunter's essential objective. That is the slaying of the wolf. But if you have both hands full of ear, how are you to reach for your dagger in order to cut the wolf's throat? If you try to get both ears into one band in order to reach for the cold iron the wolf will soon shake free. Per contra, if you do nothing you may find the process of holding the wolf exceedingly exhausting. In a word you are stuck. You cannot let go. That, of course, does not prove that it was necessarily unwise to seize the wolf by the ears. It may have been in the circumstances the only thing possible to do in order to prevent the wolf biting your head off. In the last resort, having the wolf by the ears, the dilemma which appealed so strongly to the ancient world, shows the weakness of all defensive tactics. If you tackle the wolf in that way you are in effect admitting that you cannot destroy your enemy and are obliged to fall back upon defending yourself from his attack. Of course, if you have got powerful friends outside who will come to your assistance while you are holding the foe, and will cut his throat, well and good. If you have no such hope, you have obviously not only accomplished very little, but may have got yourself into a very des- perate position. This is a truth which, we venture to say, the Germans will find out before long, if indeed they have not discovered it already. In spite of their triumph in taking Warsaw, in driving the Russians back from the line of the Vistula, and in spite of their new gigantic move on the north-east, all they have yet accomplished is to get a firm hold of the wolf's ears. No doubt the Germans would reply that we are forgetting the tremendous strength of the Teutonic superman. "Your puny French- man or Englishman might be unable to deal with a situation such as has been described. The strong man of the Mark and of Prussia is, however, so potent that give him time he will ultimately be able to throw the wolf on to his back and then kneel on him and break his spine."—Well, we shall see. Meantime, we back the wolf.
In spite of the answer we have just set forth, it is pretty obvious that the German Headquarters Staff fully realize the difficulties of their position, and are at the moment furiously busy trying to find a solution of the old problem. That is how we read the tremendous movement which the Germans are making to the north, and their passionate struggle to seize Kovno no matter what the cost. That, too, is the reason which has induced them, reticent and thrifty as they are as a rule in naval war, to send out the gigantic squadron which they sent in the past week to attack Riga by sea—the biggest battle squadron which they have yet employed. It contained no less than nine battleships, twelve cruisers, and a full complement of lesser craft.
Telegrams from Petrograd published in Thursday's papers show that an important section of Russian military opinion holds that Germany's action in the north and in the Baltic has for its object not, as had been previously thought, a vast envelopment scheme for the destruction of the retreating Russian armies, but a. determined advance upon Petrograd by the coast road. The Germans, it is suggested, are intending to make full use of their local command of the sea and the protection thus afforded to their left flank, and mean to try to carry the capital by a sudden rush. From where they are now it is less than three hundred miles to Petrograd. They believe, also, that there is no very great Russian force in front of them, and, further, they are possessed of the notion—a false one, we are certain—that things have changed very much since 1812, and that, if they can seize the Russian capital, they will paralyse Russia's administrative machine, destroy her sources of supply for shells and other munitions, and force her to accept an ignominious peace. In spite of the formidable appearance of these plans, we are not the very least alarmed by them. Indeed, if they are seriously entertained and pushed forward, they must, in our opinion, mean a huge German failure, from which recovery will be impossible. To begin with, the German scheme comes too late. It is just possible that if this were the middle of June instead of the middle of August, and if Germany were already in possession of Riga and Kovno, the plan might succeed. But this is not June, but August, and neither Riga nor Kovno have yet fallen. Be the Germans never so pushful and never so successful, and should both cities fall within the week, it is impossible that an advance from Riga =Petrograd could begin in serious earnest before the first of September. No doubt only two hundred and sixty miles would then remain to be accomplished, but when people talk of its being "only one night's railway journey" they are losing all sense of proportion. The two hundred and sixty miles are, for military purposes, some of the most difficult in the world, and will of course be stubbornly contested. Putting things from the most optimistic German point of view, they are not likely to be able to advance, even if they keep the railway line well mended behind them, at a greater rate than forty miles a week. This means that it will take them six weeks to get to Petrograd—that is, the middle of October. But that is too late. Unless they are very lucky, the winter will begin early in November, and with winter and frozen ports will come the extreme difficulty of keeping open their communications. When it eomes to a question of snow fighting, they will find that the Russians are their masters. That, at any rate, is how the scheme for a dash at Petrograd strikes us. So mad a proposal is it, indeed, that we do not believe that it is being really contemplated by the Germans. They may think it good business to let the Russians imagine that their intention is to strike at the capital, but that they harbour such an intention is, we fear, much too good to be true. The German position would have to be desperate indeed before the military chiefs embarked upon such an adventure as a winter campaign against Petrograd. It is too late to be ambitious on such a scale as this. Those who desire to invade Russia must begin with the flowers of spring, with the violet, if not indeed with the crocus, and not with the first falling leaf. If we mistake not, the next fortnight may see autumn beginning to lay its fiery finger upon the pale-leaved underwood that fringes the Dwiva and the Neva.
So much for the wider aspects of the situation in Poland. If these are not hopeful for Germany, no more so is the local situation. The abominable proclamation to the inhabitants of Warsaw, with which we deal elsewhere, shows that the Germans may not find it altogether an easy task to hold the great city. At any rate, the occupation will waste a good many troops. Again, it looks as if the fortresses that still remain to be mopped up would account for a good many German effectives. Novo Georgievsk is still holding out in spite of the violent German attacks, and all along the line of retreat the Russians are fighting fierce rearguard actions which cause the Germans very serious losses. Most important of all, however, is the magnificent stand being made by the Russians at Kovno. In spite of the most determined German attacks, they have made little progress and their losses have been terrific. No doubt the Germans will continue these assaults, for the possession of Kovno is obviously essential to their plans, and most probably they will ultimately succeed, but it will be at a price which may paralyse their efforts. It is, however, also possible that Kovno may hold out and prove that after all we have assumed too hastily that every fortress must succumb to attack, provided that the guns used against it are sufficiently big. That has always seemed to us a very rash assumption, and we fully expect that before long we shall hear of the successful resistance by a fortress. We must break off our discussion of the new develop- ments at their most interesting point. Another week, it• may be, will show whether our forecast of the trend of events is likely to prove correct.
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