THE CAUCASUS CRISIS
By STRATEGICUS In the end it can matter little whether the three towns have been
actually captured already ; but it is important to recognise what the withdrawal to them implies. The most westerly of the three is Krasnodar, which lies only x to miles from Kerch and is connected by a single-track line with the Russian naval base of Novorossisk, only 65 miles to the south-west. As far as one can see, a Russian force of unknown dimensions remains as a buffer between the advancing enemy and the part of Caucasia which runs to within a few miles of the Crimea. The dimensions of the small irregular quadrilateral in which this force is manoeuvring have been suffi- ciently indicated, and it is certain that the Germans intend if they possibly can to cross the strait and link the Crimea with western Caucasia. The design includes the ejection of Russia from the bases and ports which serve the Black Sea fleet. Maikop, which according to unofficial Russian sources is still in their hands, lies a little over 6o miles to the south-east of Krasnodar and is connected with the port of Tuapse by a first-class road and single-track railway. Tuapse is the terminus of a pipe-line and Maikop is the centre of an oilfield, and they are separated by only 6o air miles.
The third place, Armavir, is 118 miles from Tuapse and is con- nected with it and Maikop by rail. The Russians announce a with- drawal in this direction, and it seems that their position traces a curve, with its western support hanging precariously to some point on the Sea of Azov and its deepest point about Maikop, tending to rest upon the Caucasian foothills. At this juncture the loss of the oil about Maikop is of less importance than the possibility of main- taining a position west and north of Krasnodar. It does not seem over-strong ; but of the many inexplicable features of the present phase of the campaign below the Don not the least is this stubborn stand. But it is not the critical point of the front. It is merely taking a realistic view of the situation to imagine the occupation of western Caucasia, with or without the naval base and Tuapse, as among the immediate possibilities. Novorossisk and Tuapse are favoured in their position, but their capture is not necessary. Besieged, they are lost, so far as the Black Sea fleet goes.. Neither can it be ignored that the pipe-lines to Rostov and Tuapse are no longer of value to Russia. The Batum pipe-line is only of local use ; and, in fact, the Grozny deposits and the vastly larger ones in Trans- Caucasia are only available via the Caspian.
It is in this direction that the major problem now lies ; and it
must be admitted, that it is far from easy to understand Timoshenko's strategy. He is said, even by the enemy, to have strong reserves in eastern Caucasia ; but he has fought rearguard actions to a point beyond which the gravest issues present themselves. The stubborn resistance across the bend of the Don to somewhere about Kotel- nikov guards Stalingrad and the lower Volga ; and if that should fail, not only would the bulk of the oil from Baku cease to reach central Russia but the bulk of the supplies which are at present passing across Persia would be cut off. The Chapayev route and the oil-deposits in the Urals would still be available, and there are roundabout routes also for the Allied supplies. But roundabout supplies are short supplies, and grave damage would be done.
It is obvious that the course of the lower Volga is of immense importance ; but it is also clear that the Caspian route to the Volga
and Chapayev must be protected, and the danger at present is that the Germans may be able to press to the Caspian and there establish airfields from which to make the crossing a desperate risk. They claim to have captured Nevinnomsk and Piatogorsk. The latter is still over zoo miles from the Caspian ; but it is. 28o miles from Rostov, and this distance has been covered in 16 days. There is no need to exaggerate the rate at which the advance has been made. Up to Nevinnomsk it was about 15 miles per day, and, assuming Piatogorsk reached on Monday, it would be about 17 to that point. These rates compare with the advance in the first phase of the Russian campaign, in which the German armies covered an average of 20 miles per day. What mainly concerns us is the fact that von Bock is pressing ahead towards the Caspian, and it is difficult to under- stand how it is that Timoshenko does not check the advance. The stake at issue has been indicated, and it is of sufficient importance to demand a supreme effort. If he has the reserves, as seems to be established, where is he going to throw them in? If he can check the advance, obviously the situation will at once assume a different aspect.
But the position is serious enough, perhaps, to suggest to Japan that the moment is ripe to transfer her growing threat into action.
It is from this point of view one must consider the moves of the United States fleet in the Far East. Of neither action is much known at the present moment ; and of the Aleutian attack we know little more than the original statement conveyed. It was a heavy price to pay for the brilliant Midway Island victory that landings- should be effected in the Aleutians. Established there, the Japanese placed themselves upon the flank of the communications between the United States and Siberia and towards the rear of Petropavlovsk. They have been allowed the time to strengthen their positions and even to occupy Aga nu, in addition to the two original islands. Now they are being challenged ; and that fact alone intitt influence the Japanese outlook. The naval bombardment last Saturday came as the culmination of an air campaign against Kiska. Considerable damage was done, and it is clear that effective attack in this area might change the face of the war in the Far East.
The operations in the Solomon; however, are of considerably greater importance ; though it may not at first sight be clear how they may affect Russia. It is officially stated that " the operations look to the occupation of the islands in the Tulagi area and the expulsion of the Japanese in order to make use of that area for our own purposes." This is as vague a statement as could well be made, since Tulagi is one of the smallest of the Solomon; though it was the seat of the administration of the British section of the group. What is of importance is the fact that not only marines but also some of General MacArthur's forces are taking part in the operations, though none of the ground forces are Australian, and that a landing has been effected and is being maintained in spite of heavy and repeated Japanese counter-attacks. From these facts it may be inferred that a serious attempt is being made to wrest the possession of the islands from the Japanese.
The Japanese attempt to represent the operations as taken on their initiative in order to break up an Allied convoy can be disregarded, and the highly-coloured original claims compare with those made at the time of the Coral Sea action, which proved so severe a defeat of the Japanese forces. Something very different is afoot, and it reflects the turn of the tide in the Pacific. It is only a week ago that Mr. McCormack, the leader of the majority in the House of Representatives, said that as a result of the Midway Island battle the United States naval forces in the Pacific are " equal, or nearly equal," to those of the Japanese. This operation, which drives a wedge into the heart of the south-eastern extension of Japanese power in the Pacific, is the first-fruit of the change in the balance of power, and it is certain that it will come as an unpleasant shock. The Japanese cannot be expected to cut their losses in this area, and if they are determined to fight it out, they can hardly conduct operations against Russia and India simultaneously. If they transfer aircraft to this area they must risk the weakening of their chance to secure superiority against Russia. If they deter- mine to challenge the occupation by a naval attack, they risk opening the northern Pacific to the American naval forces, which might intervene powerfully against the attempt to assault Kamchatka, at the same time that they might run into ano.lier Midway Island disaster. Up to the present the United States Navy has lost only one cruiser, though two cruisers, two destroyers and a transport have been damaged. It is significant that the Americans do not claim to have sunk any Japanese units, though more information may be forth- coming on this point. If, however, the occupation is made good, the American communications with Australia and New Zealand will be relieved of a continuing threat and the Japanese position will be weakened up to New Guinea. That, taken with the almost certain relief to Russia, will be no small gain.
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