THE ANGLO-ITALIAN ALLIANCE.
WE cannot sympathise with any of the arguments which, greatly, we confess, to our amazement, are being produced against the Anglo-Italian alliance. The prospect of this alliance has so delighted the Italians, that they are ready to undergo considerable sacrifices to make it strong ; and so far from being daunted by the fall of Khartoum, are ready to offer 15,000 men to assist in retaking it. This, they say openly, is Cavour's opportunity over again. They have already occupied Massowah ; and are willing, if the English desire it, to send a strong column, vid Kassala, to the Nile, and so threaten the Mandi from the South. They have not made this offer formal, fearing to wound English susceptibilities ; but it has been made in every informal way, and with every expression, not only of amity, but of cordial respect for the Power which, as the Italians see clearly, is upholding the banner of civilisation in North-Eastern Africa. Thereupon the English journalists, instead of responding heartily to such an expression of goodwill made by the one Power which can balance France in the Mediterranean, murmur that the acceptance of aid would be undignified, that England must do her work alone, and that allies are no more required in the Soudan than in India. This seems to us not only ungracious, but foolish. That England, with all her resources still uninjured and her prestige unimpaired, should not go begging for alliances because of a disaster by no means of the first-class, is true enough ; but this alliance was arranged before the fall of Khartoum, and to accept armed assistance would be in full accordance not only with our history, but with our permanent foreign policy. We have fought nearly every considerable war we ever waged in combination with allies. Marlborough's splendid victories were won at the head of composite armies, and by the aid of Governments who often worried him to death ; and would, but for his exceptional serenity of temper, have driven him to despair. Wellington waged war in the Peninsula with the aid of whole brigades of Portuguese, and with the assistance of Spanish Generals, who, though they were often punctilious and troublesome and ungrateful, still lent us material aid, and secured all by themselves the victory which so hurt Napoleon, the great capitulation of Baylen. We went to the Crimea with France, and rejoiced in the aid of 15,000 Piedmontese ; we entered Pekin by the side of Count Palikao and his army ; and we landed in Mexico—though we retired immediately—in conjunction with Frenchmen and Spaniards. We certainly should not fight upon the Continent without an ally ; and, indeed, the whole idea of our Army, the argument by which its deficiency in numbers is so often extenuated, is that it serves as a spearhead to a strong, but less carefully welded, weapon. There is no discredit whatever in accepting Italian aid, and would be none even if we were fighting solely for our own interests ; but this is not the case. We shall reconquer Khartoum if we do•reconquer it on behalf of Europe and civilisation, both of which are threatened by this strange recrudescence of aggressive Arab power ; and Italy, in offering us assistance, is but performing a duty which in other ways falls upon all Europe. But, it is said, Italy will not work for nothing ; and to pay her price will expose ourselves to danger, and perhaps obloquy. She wants a slice of Africa which, if she succeeds in establishing herself there, will, if we take Egypt, make her our Southern neighbour ; and if we do not take it, will threaten our present easy control of the Red Sea. The answer to that objection is that we must have neighbours, and that Italy is the least dangerous we could have. She will be intent on reducing her own dependencies into quiet, industrial States, and will have neither motive for opposing nor power of menacing an ally whose good-will must in such circumstances always be invaluable to her. Massowah in Italian hands will be no more formidable to Aden than Ceuta in Spanish hands is to Gibraltar. That Italy has no right to a slice of Africa, and that it is immoral to help her to one, is a different argument, and one which at another time might be heard with a certain respect ; but at present it does not 'lie in our mouths. We have consented, and are consenting, to an agreement of Europe, the basis of which is that the Continent of Africa must be civilised and made useful to the world by a period of European administration. The negro, and negroid, and Arab tribes, are to be deprived for a time for their own benefit of their natural right to freedom, they having possessed and misused that right for a thousand years.. It is upon the basis of this agreement that Europe sitting in council at Berlin is distributing Western and Central Africa, and assigning to Power after Power huge morsels of the great river valleys,—morsels in which, on any other theory, we should be merely buccaneers. It is on this principle that Europe is establishing that strange new Power, the International African Association, and delimiting its territories, which are not yet occupied, with such anxious and scientific care. And, finally, it is on this principle that we are all, England included, snatching large cantles of territory all round the coast of the Continent, half of which, at least, will be found before long to be disagreeable burdens, and will consequently be negleoted. To say, under these circumstances, that to admit Italy into Massowah, and, therefore, ultimately to the control of the country behind.Massowah, is morally wrong, is gross hypocrisy. Europe either has a right to assume the guardianship of Africa, or Whim not. If it has not, then all our recent annexations are wrong, and our assent to the proceedings of the Berlin Conference is immoral, and our signature to the document acknowledging the African Association and assigning to it au unconquered territory, is a direct act of wickedness ; and if it hes, then there is no reason either for ahutting Italy out, or for raising objections as to the particular districts which she desires to administer. She will govern-well enough, far better than France or Portugal ; she has material force sufficient for the work ; and her children have not the chronic dread of heat which restricts English colonisation to certain climates. For ourselves, as we have recently stated, we believe that the total failure of all tribes in Africa, except the settled Arabs of Egypt Proper, to establish even rudimentary civilisation, justifies a vivifying conquest ; and if it does, there is every reason why Italy should do her share. She is the one Power with whom we could establish a secure modus vivendi, and could work for years without a latent dread that she entertained projects of far-reaching ambition, and would ultimately throw off the mask. If Italy could make of Massowah a Bombay, and accrete to herself from thence an African empire, the British position in Asia would be more secure, while Africa would be indefinitely the gainer.
But Massowah belongs to the Sultan ? So does Cairo in the same sense; but in neither case is the sense one which Europe is bound to respect. If that objection is to be raised, everything that has been done for the last twenty years,—the enfranchisement of Bulgaria, the liberation of Bosnia, the enrichment of Montenegro, the addition made to Greece, the annexation of Cyprus, the occupation of Tunis, the invasion of Egypt are alike illegal and immoral. Every one of those acts was done and sanctioned upon the principle that the Sultan has only an imperfect right to his territories, and must consent to be deprived of them whenever Europe can secure a better and more efficient custodian. Thessaly, in particular, had never been entered by a foreign soldier when it was given away, and Cyprus wasclutched without even an informal European consent. If the Sultan thinks he can fight for Massowah, let him fight ; but for the very men who advocate the permanent occupation of Egypt, which is undoubtedly his, to resent on his behalf the occupation of Massowah, which is not certainly his, is a little too ridiculous. The Italians are not stepping an inch out of the regular course ; and to deny the right of the Arab in 'Massowah, and admit the right of the Turk, is to throw the whole African question into a confusion, amid which all that is evil may be done, while nothing that is good may be so much as attempted. The moral right of Europe to distribute Africa is a disputable question, and one on which we are amazed that more voices have not been raised ; but of its right to distribute the whole if it may distribute part, we have no doubt whatever. There is no State in Africa, if it be not Egypt Proper, which, under the theory of the right of Europe to propagate civilisation, has any claim to independence ; and certainly Italy is not the Power against which such claim would be most valid. At all events, her right is as good as ours, and to reject her alliance upon that ground is hypocritical ; while to reject it on the plea that our dignity requires us to act alone, is a most unbusinesslike proceeding. English dignity can take care of itself very well if English policy succeeds ; and if we could secure a hearty alliance with Italy, a grand step would have been made towards success.
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