BOOKS.
IMPERIAL GERMAN Y.* IT is greatly to be hoped that Prince Billow's book on Imperial Germany will be carefully studied in this country. It is a most characteristic and also a most important work. It is characteristic because it may confidently be asserted that no ex-Minister, save one of North German nationality, could or would have published such a book. Prince Billow is an ardent patriot, and patriotism is necessarily exclusive and egotis- tical. But a French or English ex-Minister, similarly situated, however deeply imbued with the idea that foreign policy should be dictated by the interests of his own country, would not improbably have endeavoured to throw a more or less transparent veil of cosmopolitan sympathy over any extreme display of egotism. Prince Billow has done nothing of the kind. In dealing with Italy we do, indeed, come across a faint trace of idealism. We are told that although Italy has regarded her relations with Germany from a "common-sense point of view," such has not been at all the case with Germany. The latter Power has allowed herself to some extent to be guided by sentiment. But with this exception the blunt realistic truth is brought prominently forward without the least attempt at concealment. Prince Billow is no believer in emotional diplomacy. He deprecates "exaggerated expressions of friendship." He is desirous to let all concerned know that Germany cannot " be trampled on with impunity," a fact of which the world has for a long time past been very fully aware. But the reader rises from a perusal of Prince Billow's pages without any strong conviction that, should the necessity arise, Germany would
not readily trample on others. It is, at all events, abundantly clear that whenever any German interest is involved no moral obstacles will be allowed to stand in the way of furthering German views by all the resources of a diplomacy which is not over-scrupulous, supported by prodigious force in the background. Thus the
• Imperial Germany. By Mince Bernhard van Halo% Landon; Cassell end Co, (lea net.1
question whether during the Boer War it would or would not have been wise to take "the opportunity of dealing the secret opponent of our [German] international policy a shrewd blow" is calmly discussed. Prince Billow manifestly thought that the proposal was well worthy of consideration; but it was rejected for various reasons, ono, and probably the most convincing, of which was that at that time the German could not hope to compete successfully with the British Navy. Had the decision been in an opposite sense, the morality of the proceeding would, without doubt, have been defended on the ground that in the chequered course of English history greater outrages on public morality had been committed, such, for instance, as Bute's alleged desertion of Frederick the Great in the eighteenth century and the destruction of the Danish fleet in 1801.
The form in which Prince Billow's views are presented is, therefore, somewhat calculated to grate on the minds of those who had hoped that a higher tone of public morality than that which previously prevailed was being gradually infused into international policy. His work is a valuable object-lesson on the theme recently developed by Lord Morley that " the State is force." Germany is quite ready to be friends with other nations, provided that they do nothing to conflict with German interests, but she will not go out of her way to seek their amity. Oderint dum metuant ie Prince Billow's watchword.
Far more important than the form is, however, the sub- stance of what Prince Billow has to say. He may be deficient in international geniality. He is certainly not wanting in frankness, We have here a very lucid and, it cannot be doubted, a perfectly truthful account of present German aims and policy. To all foreign nations, and to none more than to England, this statement should be of the utmost value. It is of far greater value than any similar utterance delivered by an English ex-Minister. If an English states- man, free from the trammels of office, were to write a book of this sort, it would, indeed, attract much attention, but it would be regarded as an individual expression of opinion. We should think it not merely possible, but highly probable, that before long some other equally qualified authority would combat the views which he had expressed. In our undiscip- lined English society there is room for a great variety of opinion—a point which Prince Billow recognizes insuffi- ciently, or he would not have attached such great importance to the somewhat hysterical utterances of a few English news- papers and minor politicians in the past on the perfectly ridiculous text Delenda eat Germania. Far different is the case in Germany. It may confidently be asserted that Prince Billow expresses the opinions of the vast majority of his countrymen, and that, should any occasion for action arise, they will move to the orders of his official successors in support of those opinions with the precision and regularity of is Prussian battalion on the parade ground.
What, therefore, is the corner-stone of German foreign policy ? First and foremost it is based on a hardy belief in the alleged irreconcilability of France. Not only is Prince Billow convinced that the policy of revenge survives in full vigour amongst Frenchmen, but he even contemplates the possibility of "a return to such times as those of Louis XIV. and Napoleon I.," when France indulged in wars of conquest. It is not only natural but perfectly justifiable that Germany should wish to guard against this danger, albeit Prince Billow probably exaggerates its nature. All the evidence available points to the conclusion that the hold on French public opinion of the policy of revenge has been greatly loosened, and that the present generation of Frenchmen are eminently pacific. To onlookers whatever danger exists would appear to arise, not so much from a renewed attempt to adopt a policy of adventure on the part of France, as from the possibility that in some of the minor diplomatic incidents, which must frequently occur in the relations between neigh- bouring States, the German aspect of the case may be pressed with a harshness calculated to sting to the quick a highly sensitive nation proud of its past and confident in its future. The band of German diplomacy is grievously heavy, As regards England, Prince Billow says: "The direction of English policy depends primarily on the way in which the distribution of power in Europe reacts on English naval, supremacy." The fears caused by the rise of the German Navy drew England towards France. The Anglo•Frenoh Agreement of 1904 was, Prince Billow thinks, conceived in a spirit hostile to Germany. This view is certainly erroneous. The origin of that Agreement is to be found in the fact that both nations simultaneously appreciated the danger lest the frequent bickeringe which occurred in Egypt and elsewhere might sooner or later seriously imperil their own friendly relations infer se. They therefore resolved to terminate them. In doing so they, without doubt, incidentally inflicted a check on German policy, for it bad for a long while past been the persistent object of German diplomacy to keep the two Western nations asunder. The case of England is, however, in Prince Billow's opinion, wholly different from that of France. "France," be says, " would attack us if she thought she were strong enough; England would only do so if she thought she could not defend her vital economic and political interests against Germany except by force." Nevertheless, Prince Billow is convinced that no conflict with England will take place. He ridicules the idea that England need stand in any fear of German invasion. He insists on the peaceful intentions of Germany. He holds, as he is perfectly justified in holding, that the trend of the Triple Alliance so far has been to preserve the peace of the world.
There need not be the smallest hesitation in accepting Prince Billow's peaceful assurances, or in believing that the German Navy has been created, not for aggressive purposes, but "as a means of national defence and to strengthen our [German] national safety." More than this, there is every reason to suppose that so long as German policy is guided by statesmen who exhibit the adamantine, albeit somewhat frigid, common-sense displayed by Prince Billow, no serious risk of a conflict will occur. Apart, however, from the fact that Anglo-German cannot be considered altogether apart from Franco-German relations, and that an unprovoked attack by Germany on France would almost certainly draw England into the struggle, it is impossible to feel completely assured as regards the future.
In the first place, it is to he observed that the political con- ditions under which the two countries are governed differ very widely. In England public opinion is supreme. Its liability to change affords in itself an ample justification for Prince Bismarck's reluctance to conclude en English alliance. Bet there is one point on which the opinion of the modern English democracy is absolutely fixed. It desires above all things peace. No Ministers, however power- ful, and no Press campaign, however skilfully conducted, would reconcile the present electorate of the United Kingdom to an unprovoked attack on another nation. Far different ie the case in Germany. The German, Prince Billow tells us, "has always accomplished his greatest works under strong, steady, and firm guidance, and has seldom done well without such guidance." Which constitutes the greater danger to the peace of the world—the undisciplined nation which stubbornly refuses to be guided, or the disciplined people who yield implicit obedience to their guides P From a mere academie point of view, it may be difficult to give a confident reply to this question. In the one case, there is a risk that a wave of popular passion may sweep away the soruples of a peace-loving Minister, as happened to Lord Aberdeen in 1854. In the other case, the peace of the world is made to rest on the very un- certain basis of the wishes and judgment of one or more highly placed individuals. It is, however, probable that those who, on the one hand, realize the very pacific; tendencies of the present British democracy, and who, on the other hand, have watched the vagaries of German militarism, as displayed, for instance, in the recent Zabern incident, would look to the former rather than to the latter system as en efficient antidote to ultra-warlike proclivities.
In the second place, it is worthy of special note that the attitudes from which questions involving peace or war are generally regarded in the two countries lie as the poles asunder. It is futile to exhume the musty records of eighteenth and early nineteenth century diplomacy in order to make a forecast of the course which, in any given circum- stances, England would now pursue. A vast change has since those times come over British public opinion. The immense majority of the English people hold, apart from any consideration based on the material advantages of peace, that war is wholly unjustifiable save as a last resort to remedy Sews specific cause of grievance occasioned by the action of a
foreign Power. A wholly different view is apparently enter. tained in Germany. Not quip is it a fact that an extreme school of German militarists Maintains that even an un- necessary war is from time to time desirable to strengthen the virility of the nation, not only does militarism of one type or another reign supreme and ie supported by a strong and learned body of civilian opinion, but also the principle is recog- nized that war can and ought to be made on some foreign Power, not by reason of any special cause of grievance which it may have occasioned, but to attain some object connected with internal policy. It is admitted, almost in so many words, by Prince Billow that the Franco-German War was created by Prince Bismarck in order to secure the unifies.- tion of Germany. The necessity, from the German point pf view, need not in this case be challenged. The diplomacy may have been in the highest degree astute. But the fact in itself gives cause for reflection on the part of other Powers. Prince Billow tells us that "there is absolutely no ground for the fear which the building of our Navy has aroused, that with the rise of German power at sea the German love of battle will be awakened." That tide statement is made in all sincerity cannot for a moment be doubted. Nevertheless, with the experience of the past before us, we cannot feel any very strong assurance that the incidents of German internal policy will not again necessitate an attack on some foreign Power. Should that necessity arise, it cannot be doubted that an adroit diplomacy could and would manufacture occurrences tending to show that the war was forced on the reluctant and peace-loving population of Germany.
Such being the state of affairs, the obvious duty of this country is, whilst sparing no efforts to maintain peace, to prepare for the eventuality of war. To reduce the British Navy, with Prince Billow's ruthless but perfectly rational code of international morals staring us in the face, would be an act of madness. "Little-Navyitea " might with great
advantage read Prince Billow's book. CaoMEa.
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