THE AMERICAN SCENE
By REINHOLD NIEBUHR
THERE is a general disposition in Britain, not wholly confined to the Labour Party, to regard America as a kind of wilder- ness of "free enterprise," of buccaneer capitalism, which Britain must be as careful to hold at arm's length as Russian Communism. The recent victory of the Republican Party has served to accentuate, and seemingly to justify, this dismal view of the politics of my country. As one who was not at all pleased with the Republican victory and who is, broadly speaking, in wider accord with the political temper of Britain than that of America, I should like to make a brief report on recent American political developments, which may slightly qualify or alter the rather unfavourable view of our life now held in Britain.
It must be recorded first of all that the Republican bite will probably not be as bad as the bark. A promised 20 per cent. reduction in income tax (an obvious absurdity in a nation which still faces inflationary perils) will come to no more, according to present indications, than a slight increase in family allowances. A threatened abolition of luxury taxes in December was completely reversed in January. The Bill assuring the continuance of these taxes, with a yield of a billion and a-half dollars, has already been passed. A whole spate of restrictive labour legislation was suggested by various Senators in recent months. But Senator Taft, with an eye to the Presidency, has taken the chairmanship of the Senate's labour com- mittee and is intent upon keeping labour legislation mild enough to prevent further alienation of labour, and, if possible, to split the labour vote in the next Presidential election. Taft has, incidentally, established his authority in the Senate more firmly than any majority leader in recent decades. It would seem that the contest for the Republican Presidential nomination will, be between him and Governor Dewey. The latter, a very shrewd but not too adventurous politician, is content to remain silent on many current political issues until he is more certain of the public temper. Not being in Washington, he can afford this position temporarily, meanwhile counting on his thumping victory in New York to remind the public of his "availability."
It would be wrong to suggest that the Republican victory does not imperil certain policies, cherished by those of us who in America call ourselves " liberal " or " progressive " and who mean by that anything to the Left of either Republicanism or the Southern variety of "democracy." There will be some bitter struggles in Washington in the coming months, and some ground will be lost. The political side of our foreign policy is, however, not in danger, and there is no possibility of a return to isolationism. The policy has been genuinely bi-partisan, and Senator Vandenberg, the Republican. specialist on foreign policy, has the ardour of a new convert in his devotion to the policy laid down by Secretary Byrnes. The economic side of our foreign policy is not so secure. It was Senator Taft who came within an ace of defeating both the Bretton Woods agreement and the British loan. He is an economic nationalist ; and his present influence is great enough to cause some apprehension on this score. It is not likely, however, that he will dare to challenge any pro- gramme elaborated by Secretary Marshall.
I understand that some fears about Marshall's possible policy have been expressed in Britain on the ground of his military past. Many Americans were not completely happy about the appointment for that reason. Yet on the whole his elevation to the highest position in our Cabinet was received with wider approval than would have been accorded to any other. People of all shades of opinion felt that he came out of the war with a greater prestige than anyone else connected with the war effort. Furthermore, his year's work in China convinced many of us that he has a balanced view on our relations to Russia, and will abjure undue " toughness " on the one hand and " appeasement " on the other.
Such an observation brings us to the core of the issues beuween Britain and America, at least as they are seen on the British Left.
It seems to be a prevalent view in Britain, at least a view more widely held than merely among the Parliamentary rebels against Mr. Bevin's foreign policy, that it would be much easier for Britain to get along with Russia if American capitalism were not intent upon conflict with Russia. It is slightly ironic that the same type of opinion in America holds that we could get along with Russia if only our foreign policy were not committed to the interests of "British Imperialism."
Some of us believe that both positions are equally untenable, and, furthermore, that they are dangerous in so far as they tend to illusions. Britain and America have a more or less common foreign policy because it is as difficult as it is necessary to "get along with Russia." The inclination to make one or the other Western nation the scape- goat in considering these difficulties is a conscioUs or unconscious evasion of the perplexities which confront us. Since Mr. Wallace is to come to Britain shortly, I should like to express the hope that he will be pressed to explain just what he meant in suggesting to the President that American support of British imperial interests was a hazard to a better understanding with Russia.
Some of us are convinced that if the Western Powers allow Western Europe to fall into economic decay, no amount of strategic firmness will finally save the Continent from further Communist penetration, and that such a development will not make for peace. There is at present a disposition to criticise each other's policy in Germany. In Britain the suggestion is frequently heard that American capital- istic desire to preserve "free enterprise" on the Continent will pre- vent the reconstruction of Continental economy. I think it worth observing that, whatever may be the aberrations of the American mind in the undue identification of free enterprise with democracy, even Republicans who know anything about foreign policy are quite aware that a poverty-stricken Continent will not rebuild its economy accord- ing to the American pattern.
It is more to the point, however, to note that our mutual recrimina- tions are irrelevant, because neither of us has done anything creative in restoring the economy of Germany. The morass of economic misery into which Germany has sunk is an indictment of Western statesmanship. Neither one nor the other partner can gather any credit from the record. We may move toward a solution of the problem if the economic unity of Germany is achieved in the coming Moscow Conference. On the other hand, the Russians may ask such a high price in reparations for the unification that we may have to choose between the alternatives of permanently financing German food-imports or relating Western Germany to Western Europe in a viable economy.
Convictions such as those here recorded have prompted a large group of American liberals to organise a body under the name of "Americans for Democratic Action." The purpose of the organisa- tion is to solidify liberal opinion on both domestic and foreign issues, free of the influence of the Communists, who have had an undue share in the leadership of both middle-class and labour political organisa- tions. The new organisation grew out of the old "Union for Demo- cratic Action," but is already immeasurably stronger. The strong resistance which non-Communists have recently made to Communist influence in the C.I.O. greatly contributed to the success of the new organisation, which, incidentally, also has brought A.F.L. and C.I.O. union leaders together on a common political programme. In addi- tion, a great number of leading followers of Roosevelt, including Mrs. Roosevelt herself, Elmer Davis, Wilson Wyatt, the former housing chief, and Leon Henderson, a former head of the Office .of Price Administration, have given leadership to the new organisation. This may well become the rallying-point for progressive opinion in America. It will engage in no crusade against either Russia or Communism ; but it is determined that American foreign policy shall not be confused by those who regard Russia as a fixed point of international virtue.
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