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India: Tragedy at Tashkent

From DEV MURARKA

TASHKENT

KOSYGIN called it 'a beautiful life: President Ayub Khan simply said 'he died for peace.' This is literally true. I recall the last briefing he gave Indian correspondents after the signing ceremony. He was not tense in the least, and looked healthy and full of life. Most of us were anxious to know if Pakistan would honour the pledge to make no w ar on India. and he replied thoughtfully to all our questions trying to allay our fears.

Mr. Shastri wa.-, very Indian. very courageous. His neat tiny figure. mild manners. belied the tough granite of a determined and skilful leader. In the last few months his stature had grown within and outside India as his qualities of decision were revealed. He was not a man to carry bitterness with him and not once did he say anything unkind about Pakistan during his last thks at Tashkent.

The loss to India is still greater because Shastri was the ideal man to preside over the transition from the Nehru era. His own inclinations led him to a middle path in politics and ,he had a deft way of making compromises work. He could be unyielding if he wanted to and in Tashkent he gave nothing away except a position about with- drawal from the Kashmir cease-fire line, after the recent war.

During his first visit to the Soviet Union last May he succeeded in establishing very good relations with the Soviet leaders and both sides regained their genuine admiration for each other during the tough and tortuous negotiations in Tashkent. Shastri's attraction for the Sbviet leaders was all the greater because he felt let down by other powers and knew India was not yet sufficiently strong on her own legs. Shastri's quiet personality impressed even Ayub, who had perhaps underestimated him. In a sense he was the key figure here because without his good- will towards Pakistan the Tashkent declaration might never have been signed.

Strangely, the first impression of Tashkent had been that of an Indian city at the approach of winter—except that it was cleaner. The low buildings, few higher than two storeys, a sprawling continuation of urban areas with walled gardens and the walled back yards, the open drains, all led one to believe that the meet- ing was taking place somewhere in India or Pakistan itself. Its bazaars selling dried chillis and fruits, smelling of shashlik fried in the open, and the curious crowds which stood patiently outside the hotel where the journalists and some of the delegates were staying, displayed the oriental character of the place.

The death of Shastri should not detract from the fact that a new word, a new dimension, has been added to the vocabulary of politics. What- ever view ones takes of the Tashkent declaration —and both the Indian and Pakistan sides seem to have reservations about it as a political document, it is a testimony of the consummate diplomatic skill and patience of the Russians.

To understand the Soviet achievement a little of the background of the actual negotiations is necessary. When the two leaders from India and

Pakistan arrk ed in Tashkent on January 3 their public positions were already clear. Neither of them had much to giN e the other. What Shastri wanted was peace so that no war should flare up again. What A■ub wanted was Kashmir so that peace could continue. After initial contact had been established under the skilful chairmanship of Kosvgin. the two leaders and their advisers began to talk among themsel\ es. They soon reached a stage where progress became impos- sible. There was only one ministerial meeting and contact between Shastri and Ayub was lost.

The Russian: waited a little to see if the ice would break. When it did not. on Saturday and Sunday they intervened and engaged themselves in non-stop activity. carrying messages, using persuasion, making their own suggestions. Whether one calls it mediation or not, the Soviet role was mediatory, except that they reserved judgment on the claims of both sides and took a strictly practical view of the negotiations. Even if India and Pakistan couki. the Russians would not allow failure. They had organised the meet- ing, despite much scepticism, and they alone were determined that it should succeed.

The extremely important fact. then, was the Soviet presence. Since both India and Pakistan want to improve their relations with the Soviet Union, both of them are unable to resist for long any reasonable Russian suggestion. What the Russians wanted was not an immediate settle- ment of all the disputes, which even they regarded as unpractical. but a guarantee that there will be no more war between their two neighbours, opening the possibility of outside intervention.

Ultimately the Russian: won. Nor was their victory a pyrrhic one. The two main points of the Tashkent declaration are that both sides will abjure war, and agree to troop withdrawal. The Indians are rather unhappy about withdrawal of certain sections in Kashmir. The Pakistanis are equally unhappy that there is no firmer commit- ment by India to solve the Kashmir problem. But the declaration will be observed by both sides, since the Russians will keep a watchful eye on it.

This is all that the Russians desire for the time being. But this is not all that they want for the long-term basis. The Tashkent declaration in their view, fully implemented, will lead to a greater degree of co-operation between India and Pakistan. It will thus remove the necessity, particularly for Pakistan. to seek support from more adventurous quarters of Asia.

By virtue of the declaration Moscow has acquired the status of supervisory power on the subcontinent and it will be difficult for both sides to divert Moscow's watchful eye. In itself this can be a source of great power for the Soviet Union. What the Soviet leaders fear most now is a dis- traction which can encourage any of the countries to be forgetful ot the new alignment devised at Tashkent. It was not for nothing that Mr. Kos em went hungry and sleepless during the last period of the conference. He seemed to have stumbled on a great secret. Less. rather than more. contact between the Asian leaders. conducted entirely through the Russians. made the solution easier. The Tashkent declaration is not a treaty', but all the treaty obligations are applicable to it. It has no international sanction except that the Russians will not let either side defy it. But the new Moscow-Pindi-Delhi axis has at last taken shape, however tortuous its future progress may be.