THE KREMLIN AND KOREA
IF the situation in Korea is no better militarily it is at least no worse diplomatically. In the field the tide still flows one way. In view of the character of the training and equipment for which the Northern Koreans are indebted to their Russian mentors it could do no other, quite apart from the element of surprise which gives every aggressor an inevitable initial advantage. It is well, moreover, in assessing the situation, to recognise that .the Americans, who up to the last day or two have been endeavouring to hold a line with no South Korean support worth speaking of, are outnumbered in the ratio of some ten to one—not by raw Mongolian levies, but by an army considerable in size, well drilled, well disciplined and well equipped. There is no clear evidence of active Russian participa- tion in the present conflict, but every evidence that Russia, during the three and a half years she was in occupation of Northern Korea, devoted herself to admirable purpose to the business, now familiar in many quarters, of building up an efficient local fighting force, capable, again in accordance with familiar practice, of creating the maximum of local disturbance, and quite possibly of extending Communist rule over a large population and a wide area to the general advantage of Com- munist prestige everywhere. That has almost happened. It has indeed to some extent actually happened. A substantial area has already been occupied by the Communist Northerners, and if that does not mean a considerable population also it is only because the population has incontinently fled. Whether more territory will be occupied yet depends on the success of the attempted stand on the line of the River Kum, and the prospects of such success are not to be rated very high.
But if on the short view the Northern offensive may seem to be succeeding alarmingly, on the long, and the only relevant, view it can be said to have already failed. The calculation, both at Moscow and at Pyongyang, clearly was that the whole penin- sula would be overrun before the assumedly slow-moving and ineffective machinery of the United Nations could reach the point even of grinding out paper resolutions. Instead of that, action, by one member of the United Nations which happened to have forces within striking distance, actually by a few hours preceded discussion. That, of course, was perfectly proper and legitimate. When an unprovoked attack is made on any State it is the undoubted right, and not far short of the undoubted duty, of any other which can to come to the assistance of the Victim. This the United States most promptly and fortunately did, and the United Nations immediately endorsed its action. ,Once that had happened the ultimate fate of the Northern aggressors was sealed. The United States had taken a step it was impossible to retrace. The British Commonwealth took timmediate stand at her side. Member after member of the United Nations signified its approval of the Security Council's denunciation of the aggression and its call for the mobilisation of all resources for the restoration of the status quo, till by now over 50 out of the 58 members of the organisation have aligned themselves with the Council, most of the odd half-dozen con- sisting, of course, of Russia and her satellites. In such circum- stances only one of two developments is probable. Either Russia, undoubtedly responsible for setting the Northern Korean troops in motion, will decide to support them nbt only with material but with men, and to fight on soil not her own, as German and Italian forces fought in the Spanish Civil War ; the almost inevitable end of that would be the Third World War. So far that does not look like happening. If it does not happen the Northerners will sooner or later, but quite infallibly, be driven back to the 38th Parallel from which they launched their wanton aggression. The only question is how many Koreans and Americans will have met their death first.
Everything, therefore, is plainly in Russia's hands ; no one doubts that if she sees fit to stop the Korean war she can do it at any moment. She, moreover, is the only State in that position. All the rest of the United Nations put together can do no more than combine to ensure the ultimate defeat of Northern Korea. And, once more, before that happens many men of many nations will be killed.) But Russia's position, even if she should have concluded secretly that the present throw must fail, is not entirely easy. Face must be saved. She cannot be expected simply to tell the Northern Koreans to declare themselves beaten and withdraw, particularly at a moment when they are anything but beaten. On the other hand she does not—provided always that she has decided against a general war—want to wait till they are beaten, as in the end they must be. But diplomacy has its resources. If the Kremlin, in helping to settle the Korean question, could get certain other questions settled simultaneously she might emerge with kudos not diminished and even in some eyes at least enhanced. What are those other questions? Most of them are connected with the United Nations, which Russia, for all her abuse of that institution and for all her paraded absence from the Security Council table, can afford less than ever to ignore. There is the control of atomic energy, a problem not necessarily insoluble because it has so far defied solution. There is the representation of China at Lake Success, a matter of vital importance to Russia because if it is'settled her way there will be two Communist voices among those of the five permanent members of the Council. And there is the question of the veto —if Russia really desires to settle that.
Among these the Chinese question predominates, for more reasons than one, among them the possibility that Russia, instead of sending her own troops to support the Northern Koreans, might persuade, or enjoin, Mao Tse-tung to send his instead. That would not give North Korea the victory, but it might lengthen out the campaign indefinitely. The danger of that happening is one good reason for another attempt to establish a better relationship with China. In her attitude on this question Russia is on no weak ground. To her demand that the real Government of China, not a defeated and discredited Government, with no foothold left on the mainland at all, should be represented on the Security Council there is no good answer.
If a Communist Poland and a Communist Czechoslovakia have places at Lake Success a Communist China has an equal right to one. No one can expect that her presence, initially at any rate, will make for harmony. She is bound to make common cause at first with the other Communist States. That must be faced unless Communisni is to be banished from the United Nations altogether, the nations to be no longer even nominally united and the world to be split in half. Far better to meet Communism in open debate. Far better to end the puerile tactics whereby Russia and her satellites walk out of any United Nations meeting which a representative of the Chinese Nationalist Government attends. There is nothing to fear from Communism in the open. And to get it to Lake Success means getting it outside the iron curtain.
What Russia's actual attitude on all this is can only be surmised, though possibly the British Ambassador in Moscow, after his talks with M. Gromyko, has some inkling of it. The protests and manifestos launched from the Kremlin since the Korean aggression started call for little attention. A nation so inveterately propagandist could do nothing less at such a juncture than let its rhetoricians loose. The arguments about the alleged illegality of the Security Council's action have been effectively disposed of by the Attorney-General in this country and Dr. Philip Jessup in America. There is not a vestige of foundation for the Russian charges, even if a State which had ostenta- tiously washed its hands of the Security Council had any title to lay down the law about Security Council procedure. But in all the spate of forensic argument there is no very markedly belligerent note. There may, of course, be belligerent prepara- tions behind a screen of words, but there is no visible evidence of anything abnormal. It would, on a long view, be to Russia's interest to stop the Korean war now. It would be to her interest to reach a settlement about the atomic bomb, for she must realise that what is happening in Korea must determine America to increase her lead at all costs in the production of this pbtentially decisive weapon. It would be manifestly to her interest to see Communist China on the Security Council. All this must be emphasised, for there is no reason to suppose that Russia would be actuated by consideration for anyone's interests but her own. But in this case her interests may coincide with the world's. And that may provide a basis for negotiation.
Previous page
