War in Korea By PETER FLEMING HE distance between two
parallels of latitude is 80 miles. North Korean forces are now south of the 37th Parallel on all their axes of advance, and in the west, where they have 'so far been making their main effort, they imminently threaten American positions on the Kum River, a fairly formidable but far from impassable obstacle covering Taejon. Taejon, the provisional capital of South Korea, is (or until very recently was) the location of American field headquarters. This is presumably no smaller than a corps headquarters in the British Army, is cluttered up with an abnormally large number of correspondents, photographers and other visiting firemen, has an immense amount of transport and a complicated signals lay-out and feels continuously unhappy about its own. security. In the prevailing situation Taejon is clearly too close to the front line for a military machine so delicate, so unwieldy and so vulnerable to (among other things) sudden flaps ; and if the staff have not pulled out already, they will surely get orders to do so soon.
The temporary setback to efficiency; always occasioned by a prudent move of this kind is seldom nearly as important as its effect on morale ; and to judge from the despatches of American correspondents (who seem less inhibited in this context than their few British colleagues) morale is an extremely important factor in this phase of the campaign. The American field formations so far committed seem to consist almost entirely of young, raw and very inadequately trained troops. The operations in which, up to now, they have taken part have invariably culminated in a withdrawal ; and withdrawals, besides being most disheartening, are extremely difficult manoeuvres, even for seasoned soldiers.
Outside the Mongolian plateau (which has for this purpose many of the amenities of the Western Desert), Asia offers few battlefields on which white troops are not at a disadvantage ; and the rain-swept, wooded valleys of South Korea are a bad place in which to meet trouble. The inferior roads which wind along their valleys are flanked by paddy, disastrously unjeepable at this time of year. Snipers have begun to give trouble on the lines of communications, refugees clutter the roads, and some of them have jurned out to be North Koreans in civilian clothes. What (the troops wonder) is going on in the scrub-clad ridges above us ? What is going on behind the impassive, alien faces that watch us pass ? There are no, or very few, means of finding out. Distrust of the country, distrust of the people—in these sort of circumstances it is obligatory, it never leaves you ; and in the end it is apt to breed distrust of yourself.
When British and Imperial forces fell back down the Malay Peninsula, or retreated up the whole length of Burma, their enemy's virtually undisputed ascendancy in the air (and in Malaya at sea) was a factor of the first importance. It meant, really, that from a long-term point of view our forces had had it—that (as in Norway and Greece) we should have to get out in the end. In Korea—and it is the only hopeful feature of a bad situation—the Americans have complete command of the air, and there is nothing to challenge their navy and ours at sea. So to the other burdens which the front-line troops have to bear there is not added the unpleasantness of being attacked from the air and the sort of creeping paralysis which this often induces in inexperienced troops who are having a rough time of it anyway.. The North Koreans, on the other hand, are being punished severely in the forward areas whenever weather permits ; and it must be said that they are standing it well.
It is, however, not nearly as easy as the infantry would like it to be to knock out a tank from the air, and the claims made earlier this week of the amount of armour destroyed in air- strikes—which sounded extravagant when Tokyo issued them— seem to have made little difference to the scale of effort deployed against the Americans north of the Kum. As far as one can make out, although a few much heavier tanks have been used effectively, it is the Russian T34 which is giving most of the trouble. This is a comparatively old model—the Germans had a healthy respect for it even before their Russian campaign began to go wrong—but it was probably the best medium tank produced by any of the belligerents in the last war. It is as vulnerable as any other medium tank to the hollow charge fired from a bazooka ; but the effective range of a bazooka is (I think) not much more than a hundred yards. It is a close-quarters weapon, which needs a cool man to handle it, and is therefore far from ideal for a situation in which the defenders cannot afford (and do not in the least want) to wait until they can see the whites of their assailants' eyes.
To lay on effective tactical air support is not an easy thing. Any- thing in the nature of a "- cab rank "—i.e., continuous air cover by planes which the ground forces can call down by R/T to attack designated objectives on their immediate front, just as they can call down artillery fire—is presumably impossible, and will remain so until air-strips have been built in South Korea for piston-engined aircraft. The naval superiority which the Americans, or rather the United Nations, enjoy cannot unfortunately be used offensively unless a squadron goes (as perhaps one will) to bombard the North Korean port of Chinmanpo, an operation which will not relieve the present situation in South Korea. Warships have shot up North Korean forces moving down the east coast road, which was blocked by landslides brought down on to it from the cliffs. But no road is ever " cut," except for a very short time, unless whatever cuts it is covered by fire so that it cannot be repaired, and it is doubtful if the North Koreans' advance on their left flank was seriously impeded.
This advance, insulated from the main theatre of operations by the peninsula's backbone of mountains; will, if it is not checked, eventually develop into a threat to Pusan, the Americans' main supply base and only sea-port. The forces carrying it out or part of them, might be diverted inland to attack, or to make a diversion against, Taegu, an important communications centre and—judging from the map—the most likely place for American headquarters to reopen after leaving Taejon. But the possibility has to be faced that, even if the Americans hold their positions on the Kum, the South Koreans in the centre of the peninsula (who at the moment seem to be doing rather well round Tanyang and may be opposed by less well-formed formations than the Americans are) will give ground. This could easily lead to a threat to the Americans' right flank, about which (as a glance at the map will show) they are bound to be extremely sensitive, since ajorce which turned it could cut their diagonal line of retreat towards Pusan.
The transaction known as " Swapping space for time " (which is what, it has been said, the present ckcumstances compel General MacArthur to do) is all very well if—like the Russians and the Chinese--you have plenty of space. But it is not the sort of deal on which (for instance) Home Forces could have embarked with much hope of profit if the Germans had invaded these islands ten years ago ; and, judging by the present rate of exchange, General MacArthur is having to give away more space than he can afford for less time than he needs. He himself, when he flew into Suwon a few hours after the invasion of South Korea started, would appear to have based his subsequent recommendations to Washington on a pardonable underestimate of the North Koreans' military potential and on a less pardonable overestimate of the standard of training of the troops at his disposal in Japan.
Whatever the scale of the reinforcements he is now receiving, he must face the possibility—if indeed it is no more than that—of having to cut his losses and fall back on the Pusan area. There it ought not to be difficult to establish behind a strong perimeter a secure enclave—a sort of Far Eastern Tobruk, but including (in time) a major air-base. It may, of course, be possible to save the situation in Korea by less drastic expedients ; but there is at present no evidence to warrant a more hopeful appreciation.
What the political or strategic significance of a Far Eastern Tobruk, manned by United Nations' forces and lodged on the bottom right-hand corner of a united, partially devastated and thoroughly exacerbated Korea would be it is not (I am thankful tc say) the purpose of this article to discuss.
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