Overlord and Thunderclap
The Destruction of Dresden. By David Irving. (William Kimber, 36s.) FOR one whose earliest political memories only go back to the lights of bonfires twinkling from the Wessex hilltops on VE night, the Second World War is merely a matter for historical curiosity : I was neither at the hot gates Nor fought in the warm rain.
Now, nearly twenty years later, perhaps we can begin to ask questions about the war. Its origins, and the failure :3f the peace of 1945, have con- tinuously been the subject of historical inquiry, but about the war itself we make no moral and few pragmatic judgments. It is as though history disappeared into a tunnel in 1939, to reappear again six years later.
Reading these three books, all concerned with the last years of the war when an Allied victory seemed inevitable, the overriding question seemed to be, why was the war allowed to go on so long? Perhaps this is the only question that can be asked about the conduct of a war. In our modern society, peace is regarded as a top priority, and anything which brings it to an end, or retards its attainment, is considered to be wrong. War is recognised to be nasty and brutish; if it is to win popular approval, it must also be short.
Victory in the West describes the planning of 'Overlord' and the first three months of the Normandy campaign. It goes some way to pro- viding the answers as to why there was no short cut to victory. For an Official History it is an excellent book; bare, factual, but brilliantly conceived and constructed Through its attention to detail, one is reminded that this immense structure of planning in itself was one factor which delayed, or perhaps ensured, eventual victory.
A major attempt to shorten the war was envisaged in the project 'Thunderclap,' a plan for a colossal air attack on Germany. It was designed to 'hasten an imminent victory or deter- mine one which seemed in the balance.' Devised in August, 1944, it was placed in cold storage for some months and resuscitated on the night of February 14, 1944. Dresden was the target.
War inevitably raises the problem of respon- sibility. The Destruction of Dresden makes it clear that the British were so ill-informed about the nature of their own atrocities—in this case area-bombing—that they could hardly be called responsible. Few_ people knew of the strategic bombing decisions until after the war. Yet the Germans are often held responsible for the activities of the Nazis, although under their totalitarian dictatorship they had less access to accurate information than the British (although, of course, they might have believed the evidence of their eyes). But it Was this collective guilt of the German people which enabled a case to be made for wiping out the populations of German cities—purification by Allied fire after the Nazi plague. Perhaps this withholding of information, or plain deceit, is inevitable in wartime, as it seems to be today when nuclear strate6 is discussed. Sir Archibald Sinclair lied knowingly when he informed the Commons in 1943 that 'the targets of Bomber Command are alwaYs military.'
In the case of the Dresden raid, the airmen themselves were misinformed about the nature
of the target. Although Dresden was of nn military or industrial significance, aircrews were briefed before the raid and told that it was ,a Gestapo Headquarters,' one of the main suPP4 centres for the Eastern front,' an Important industrial area.' All lies. Mr. Irving also gives us a brief insight into the individual decisions which had to be taken. One airman had refused t° bomb Freiburg on the grounds that he had been educated there; since he had never been t° Dresden, he felt fewer qualms. A Base Comman; der had once been given short change at a hote,' in Dresden; he roped that 'it would be attenden to.'
Different forms ot deceit had camouflaged the strategic bombing operation from the beginning. In October, 1940, Sir Arthur Harris spoke of the accuracy with which our aircraft hit milital objectives as opposed to merely browning the towns.' Yet at that stage British bombing was notoriously inaccurate. Even the airmen's traPs were used for deceit. If the target was to be residential area, hospital3 were clearly marken, for, in the words of Harris's deputy, Sir Robert Saundby, 'this made it possible to get UP in Parliament and say that we marked these things on our target maps.' Reading the Official History of the Normand): Campaign, one is struck chiefly by the fact that the planners knew what to expect and, within limits, what the results would be. The maps drawn by General Eisenhower's staff bef°rAe D-Day, depicting the way in which they expecte' the campaign to develop, proved remarkahl accurate. No such care and forethought seenqi`ne have accompanied the Dresden operation. T,e number of refugees and prisoners of war in tits city was unknown to Bomber Command, perha% unconsidered. The political advantages whicA might conceivably have accrued to the West haus the blow fallen during the Yalta conference "vn1 lost. Yalta came and went. Yet in ternis,.°4 human lives the Dresden attack rated bigL"r1 than the Normandy campaign. Some Allied soldiers were killed in the first throe months after D-Day. In Dresden, 130 Germans were killed in a single night.
Mr. Irving does not really tell us Dresden was destroyed. By February, 154,„ Europe had come a long way from that daY t"ci September, 1939, when Kingsley Wood b3,t refused to bomb the Ruhr on the grounds that was private property. Some explanation is 0ece,0 sary to reveal why we all plunged so rapidly lain the abyss. My own belief is that if you give gnarls groups of people unlimited control over weaPf to of mass-destruction they are bound in the use them to their full effect. Sir Robert Saundu-j; who unnecessarily uses the Foreword to Witco distasteful attack on nuclear disarmers, w°13 probably disagree. The Liberation of Paris is one of those chattYr guidebooks to history which inclines the ren,ride:5 to question all the judgments of the author. 111.., American enthusiasm for the Parisians cloP_ and one is left to ponder why their liberation 11133'e never achieved the emotional impact of Warsaw Rising. I am grateful, however, to `,, Thornton for pointing out the oath which Gaulle took as a graduate of St. Cyr: `,1 shtai abstain from the turmoil of public life • • '
shall never go to the polls.' Goff ARP -
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