Defence
Weakened flanks
David W. Wragg
Without the American defeats in South-East Asia and the attempt by the United States to create stronger links between NATO and Spain, the recent so-called NATO summit meeting would have passed almost unnoticed. Indeed, the summit deserved little attention, and can be considered one of the major non-events of the political calendar, since it has left the member countries to muddle along as before, without one positive move taken. A brief look at the state of the Alliance reveals a most unhealthy condition. America reassurances have a hollow sound in the light of events and of the appeal to American public Opinion of isolationist policies. The same old Platitudes about needing to standardise equipment, and so eliminate one of the advantages held by the Warsaw Pact forces, only resulted in decisions which will put standardisation another decade away. The Norwegians are not in the Common Market, but Denmark, Holland and Belgium showed themselves to be good Europeans by deciding to buy American aircraft. Meanwhile, Portugal creeps closer to Communism daily, and Greece and Turkey are more concerned with their own little cold war than the greater threat to all. Meanwhile, the state of the Warsaw Pact improves almost daily, and will improve much With the opening of the Suez Canal, giving the Soviet Navy a short cut from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. In terms of manpower, the quality of equipment and the bases available to it, the Warsaw Pact is making vast strides forward. The length of conscript service has been extended and not infrequently is for periods up to four years, while Soviet aircraft, missiles, Ships and tanks are at least a match for anything built in the West. While the West is Pulling back, the Soviet Union has started on new bases in Libya and Somalia, and has high hopes of Portugal and Madeira. It is generally taken for granted in diplomatic and military circles that some kind of crunch or confrontation situation will soon come. This is a dangerous period. The Soviet Union is anxious to test the American will, and in such circumstances that many in the West will be tempted not to support the United States. On the other hand, the Americans, while desperately anxious not to find any further hot spots in the Cold War, are equally concerned to prove themselves.
Such a confrontation is unlikely to be aimed at the heartland of Europe. A strong threat to West Germany, or West Berlin, would attract a strong response which might be uncontrollable — or even frighten the West into rebuilding sadly depleted defences. It is on NATO's flanks that the opportunities arise. There can be no doubt that Russia would like to see conflict between Greece and Turkey, or alternatively a strong arms embargo which would lessen the effectiveness of both countries in any conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If Greece were to follow Portugal, all would be well for the Soviet Union, particularly with the ending of the British presence in the Mediterranean, which not only provided men and equipment, but, equally important, a strong diplomatic presence to sooth ruffled pride between the emotional politicians in the region. One primary target for Soviet interference must, of course, be Yugoslavia after Tito. The attractions are obvious. Basically a Communist country, Yugoslavia is outside the Warsaw Pact, and yet not a part of any wider non-Communist grouping. A country torn apart by conflicting nationalist and pro-Russian factions could give Russia an excuse to intervene, while the need to encourage the rest of NATO, particularly Italy and Greece, and to prove herself as well as to help Yugoslav nationalists, could provoke an American response. Without any American action, Russian propaganda could allege that the US had written off Europe, but some NATO countries could be encouraged On the other hand to oppose American intervention as brinkmanship and an unjustified interference in Yugoslavia's domestic affairs.
That NATO is not sufficiently behind the United States, and not particularly interested in its own survival can be gauged from the reaction to America's plans for Spanish participation in the Alliance, and by Norway's attitude to the Soviet Union.
Although seldom considered, Norway is the other possible target for Soviet interference, and while less obvious than Yugoslavia, in some ways Norway is a more likely target. Outright invasion of Norway is possible, but unlikely; instead, the object is 'Finlandisation', or neutralisation. A country which has been Tinlandised' is less than neutral; defectors from the Soviet bloc, even if found on the high seas, are returned to whence they came, and films and books likely to offend the USSR are banned.
Norway is already in disgrace with the Soviet Union over its group of islands north of the Arctic Circle at Spitsbergen. The Soviet Union has mineral rights on the islands which date back to Tsarist days, and today Russians outnumber Norwegians at Spitsbergen.
A true liberal might say that this is no bad thing — but unfortunately the Russians have
• told Norway that no private enterprise or non-Norwegian oil companies may search for oil on the islands! The Norwegians themselves are concerned about the risk of confrontation between the US Navy and the Soviet Navy, and do not encourage the United States presence in the area, which has, on Norwegian estimates, some 800 Soviet naval vessels. The Soviet Union has a marine brigade and two mechanised infantry divisions on the frontier with Norway, against one Norwegian battalion!
Russia's attitude and Norway's meek and mild acceptance suggests that little support is likely for the West once the going gets rough, and Russia's approach is always one of implied threat.
In such circumtances, an extra ally would have been useful — and particularly so on one of the flanks. Yet, Europe, which has forgiven Germany and Japan, and, seeks always to forgive Russia, cannot forgive Spain her lesser sins! Spanish support in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic could only be welcome, although arms purchases from France, and astute bases for weapons deals with the United States, have kept Spain from falling into the state of military weakness which affected Portugal, which has been starved of weaponry, even for anti-submarine duties, yet a member of NATO. Spain is, in fact, ready and waiting for a nod of approval, and might even be tempted to forget about Gibraltar in return for arms and kind words.
That the situation is gloomy can be counted an understatement. Concerned with a bureau cratic and undemocratic economic union, too many in Europe have forgotten about defence and the threat from the Soviet Union. This is not so much a question of falling for the Soviet propaganda on detente, but rather one of ignoring the outside, or non-EEC, world altogether. Europe does so at great risk, for at the present rate of contraction, there will soon be nowhere for NATO to fall back on. There will even be an immediate threat of strangulation, since Europe cannot meet its own energy needs entirely, and even if it could, oil rigs would be sitting targets. In truth, the EEC is a part of the world, including NATO and other allies, not apart from it — but do the Europeans know, or care?
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