POLAND IN FRANCE.

(Fnom OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.)

March 11th, 1863. IN alluding to Lord Palmerston's despatch relative to the insurrec- tion of Poland in 1831, and quoted in my last letter, the Spectator made the remark that "it did not give much hope for the Poles." , How ttue this remark was may be inferred from the following :statement :— "As soon as the news came that Poland was up in arms the , French Government thought at once of bringing the crisis, if pos- .- Bible, to a peaceful issue; but it was naturally deemed of paramount

-4importance, under the circumstances, that the support of England „should be secured. The British Government was applied to ac- , cordingly. What was the result? The British Government - could not be prevailed upon to go beyond a platonic sympathy for the Poles. Austria seemed inclined to come forward on condition that, on the part of England, there should be no straggling, no hanging back. Seeing that this condition was not fulfilled Austria kept aloof. Then it was that the French Government determined to address itself to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and to lay down the question as one to be exclusively solved according to the terms of existing treaties."

If this statement, which derives importance from the fact that M. Emile de Girardin, its author, is one of the confidants of Prince Napoleon, can be relied upon, the old game of 1831 has been resumed ; and, unless Napoleon makes up his mind boldly to depart from the timorous policy of Louis Philippe, the unhappy Poles 'will have again to roll up to the top of the mountain, like Sisyphus, the huge, heavy stone which is continually rolling down.

As matters now stand it appears, or, at any rate, it is generally believed in France, that the negotiations entered upon by the Cabinets of Paris, London, and Vienna, with a view to a combined action, have failed ; that the failure is to be ascribed to Lord Pal- merston's reluctance to go hand in hand with the Imperial Govern- ment respecting Poland ; that the English Minister at Berlin, and the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg, have, indeed, been in- structed to give friendly and confidential advice to the courts at which they are accredited, but separately and irrespective of the concert which had been in contemplation at the Tuileries. Now it is well worth while to consider what are likely to be the consequences of such a policy as regards that amity of the two nations the maintenance of which is, in every respect, so desirable.

From those warm, eloquent, high-sounding protests in favour of Poland with which, of late, both the speeches in Parliament and the newspaper articles were teeming, the French had been happy to conclude that the English Government would be, if not inclined, at least compelled, to give effect to sympathies so generally and loudly expressed. Knowing with what irresistible weight public opinion in this country is brought to bear upon government, and fully aware that England is not wont to allow her feelings to evaporate in empty words, they looked upon the co-operation of England as absolutely certain. How inexpres- sible was their surprise, how bitter their disappointment, on being told that the British Ministers had declined to act in concert with the French Government, and thus to exercise collectively that kind of moral pressure which no power, if acting single-handed, is sure to see crowned with success ! Those who are on the look-out for any opportunity to envenom the feeling of national jealousy that festers in the hearts of the ignorant and the selfish, did not fail to give out that the English outbursts of sympathizing eloquence were smoke without fire, rerba et voces, prEetereaque nihil ; nay, more, that they ought to be re-

garded as a snare laid for France—as a cunning device to coax her into venturing on a war, the burden of which she would have to bear, whilst England, making a catspaw of her, would reap unhurt

the profits of an exchange of blows between two rivals almost equally dreaded.

An article which appeared some time ago in the Morning Post has done much towards confirming these suspicions, by stating, oddly enough, that England would have no objection to the an- nexation of the Rhenish provinces to the French Empire, her object being, above all things, the dissolution of the Russo-French alliance. Whether this article was meant as a joke I will not stop to inquire ; the fact is, it was not at all viewed in that light. Some affected to think, and many thought, there was a settled purpose to bring France to commit herelf rashly, and the effect produced on the French mind was consequently mis- chievous in the extreme. Not a Frenchman, of course, could for a moment believe that England would see the French on the Rhine with unconcern. So unexpected an encouragement coming from so suspicious a quarter was therefore ascribed to their perfidy.

That the organs of the French Government would not be remiss in adding fuel to the flame was to be expected. What could be better calculated to set off to advantage, by way of contrast, the generous policy of the Emperor, even in the event of his con- fining his efforts on behalf of Poland to mere diplomatic representa- tions! Hence all sorts of angry rumours, to be traced to those from whom the semi-official press receives its inspirations, namely, that Lord Palmerston, far from accepting the joint negotiation pro- posed by the French Government, had attempted to undermine it through a counter-negotiation ; that he had gone the lengths of sending secret information to the Cabinet of Vienna, as to the danger of upholding the French policy respecting Polish affairs, and so forth.

Shall I speak of the feelings of the Palais Royal ? They have unmistakably vented themselves in an article of the Opinion Nationale, denouncing with measureless violence what the writer calls the "duplicity" of England.

Nor are those less incensed against the English Government whose love of Poland is mingled with a decided aversion to any- thing of a nature to lead to war ; for, according to these men, the only means to assist Poland without endangering the peace of Europe lay in the combined action of the Cabinets of London, Paris, and Vienna. They feel convinced that, if France, Eng- land, and Austria, had come to an understanding, Herr Bismark, in spite of his presumption, would have been but too glad to get out of the scrape, and that Alexander II. would have found it utterly impossible not to yield to a demand made collectively by the three greatest Powers of Europe, speaking, as it were, in the name of mankind. But suppose the arduous task of remonstrating somewhat seriously to be left to Napoleon alone, the English and Austrian Governments taking care beforehand to declare them- selves either incapable of going beyond a tame expression of their wishes, or unwilling to do so, who can tell the consequences? What if the Czar, encouraged by the disagreement of the three Powers, were to take it into his head to stand upon high ground and say, as Nicholas did in 1831, when he sent back to Tesierski the memorial laid before him by the latter :—" I am the King of Poland, and I will thrash her—je /a roulerai t" What, if in his tarn, Napoleon were to frown, and to reflect that he has the debt of his uncle towards Poland to pay, great sins to atone for, the most ardent of the aspirations of the French people at large to gratify, a nation which he has enslaved to dazzle, an immense army to employ ; and that fortune, by a 'wonderful favour, affords him an opportunity of attempting all this by fighting the battles of justice and setting up as a sort of providential vindicator of oppressed nationalities ? Is it not already asserted that Prussia has ordered a considerable concentration of troops upon the frontiers of Poland? Are not reports current in Paris that the reply of the Czar to the last note of the French Emperor has arrived, and that the Russian Autocrat decidedly refuses to listen to any representa- tion till the insurrection is subdued? On the other hand, are not guns allowed to be sent to Poland from Paris ? Has not M. Vavin, who was the President of the Polish Committee in 1831, been allowed to revive that Committee, and to set it in motion? Well may the lovers of peace be uneasy, and charge the English Government with having called upon the Imperial sword to cut the knot which France, England, and Austria, closely united, would, in their opinion, have been able to untie.

As for the Liberal party, it grieves them to the very heart that the ungenerous policy of Lord Palmerston should thus estrange France from England, and that the veteran statesman should use his best endeavours to justify the charge of selfishness which the inveterate enemies of this country are never tired of bringing against the British Government.

But from another point of view the wisdom of such a policy may, perhaps, be questioned.

For, of two things one ; either Napoleon will shrink from attempting, unassisted, what he seemed ready to undertake, if backed by England, in which case he will, with much show of reason, shift off to England the responsibility of the fresh mis- fortunes which may befall Poland and the odium attached to the fact of having sanctioned by heartless indifference the greatest public crime on record ; or Napoleon will boldly step forward, in which case he has every chance of realizing the most fondly cherished dreams of his ambition, at the expense both of the political influence of England and of the moral influence of free- dom, which it is the boast and the honour of England to represent in the world.

Freedom would be more than ever jeopardized, because many would accept in France a compensation for the loss of their liberty in the shape of military renown, and also because the readiness of a despotic government to vindicate a just cause would bring into strong relief the selfishness, if not the impotence, of a government resting on free institutions. The political in- fluence of England would be seriously damaged, because territorial conquest would follow in the train of military glory.

It is very well for M. de Montalembert to urge the Emperor to attempt the liberation of Catholic Poland in a mood of perfect disinterestedness. But M. de Montalembert's enthusiasm is tinged by religious opinions which are not likely to have much sway over Napoleon's mind. He is not the man to care for the Poles, on account of the Poles themselves, still less on account of the Pope. The annexation of Nice and Savoy has unveiled the real meaning of the Imperial sentence, "to wage war for an idea ;" and the meaning of the Imperial sentence, "independence for Poland," might turn out to be "the Rhine for France."

Is England prepared for such a contingency ?

It is true that Napoleon has, just at present, many impediments in his way. The expedition to Mexico continues to be a thorn in his flesh. The French finances are at a rather low ebb. The Orleanists having come to the resolution of ceasing, in the words of M. Thiers, d'enzigrer l'interieur, and being determined to enter the electoral lists, the Government may possibly have to deal, before long, with a formidable array of opponents. More- over, the letter of the Emperor to Marshal Pelissier, insisting on the expediency of making the tribes permanent proprietors of the lands held by them, that is, of substituting an Arab kingdom for a French colony, has generated amongst the French colonists a feeling of discontent so widely spread, and so violent, that it constitutes one of the intricacies of the situation, and one scarcely less perplexing than the expedition to Mexico. These circumstances must, undoubtedly, be taken into considera- tion. But the question is precisely whether the unfurling of the French flag on behalf of Poland would not be for Napoleon the very best means to sweep away those impediments. What more honourable pretext could he hit upon to make peace with Juarez, and to disentangle himself from the Mexican business? The state of finances would be a difficulty, but not one insuperable. When France is once roused, no one can fix the limits of her resources, as was dearly shown by the great French Revolution ; and there is no doubt that, in the cause of Poland, she should be lavish of her money and of her blood alike. As to internal opposition, no system of terror would be needed to disarm it, so long as the honour of the French flag was at stake.

It is for England to consider whether, by declining to interfere, when intervention is for her both glorious and safe, she does not run the risk of having to interfere at a later period with infinitely less honour and security.

That the undertaking is one of uncommon magnitude it would be vain to deny. Nothing short of the reconstitution of Poland as an independent state can set the question at rest. What Poland wants, and is entitled to ask, is something more than gentle treat- ment, more than a distinct administration, more than a certain amount of freedom : all this was guaranteed to the Poles by the treaties of 1815; all this was granted to them, first by Alexander I., then by Alexander II.; and all this was soon found absolutely incompatible with the very nature of things. The Czar could not be at the same time the autocratic ruler of Russia and the consti- tutional Bing of Poland. The constitution became a dead letter ; no guarantee remained untouched, no liberty unassailed. Poland was taught by tyranny that what she wanted was simply : TO BE.

A diplomatic intervention aiming only at the maintenance of the political existence of Poland, as established in 1815, would, therefore, have no other value than that of a delusive palliative ; and the difficulty, if approached at all, must be stared boldly in the face.

Is, after all, the power of Russia what it has so long appeared to be? In 1831, General Lamarque, in one of his most impassioned and most remarkable speeches, expressed himself as follows :— "The Czar must know that Sweden still thinks of Finland ; that Turkey is always ready to recross the Danube ; that Persia would soon return to the Arum ; that the Circassians, the warlike tribes of the Caucasus, the Tartars, who are chafing under the yoke, long for the moment when they may fly to arms ; and that if England and France would interfere conjointly, a few ships of the line and a few frigates, passingthroughthe Dardanelles andthe Bosphorus into the Black Sea, would carry terror along its coasts, and destroy Sebastopol and its squadron, Odessa and its magazines."

Was ever a prediction more completely felfilled?

Besides, the question is,—would the prize be worth the cost? This much is sure, that no nation on earth is more deeply interested than England in setting a bound to the encroachments of Russia. It was to England, as well as France and Austria, that was addressed in 1831 that Polish manifesto which touched the hearts of every European nation, and which it is not out of place to record here :— "Convinced that our liberty and our independence, far from having been hostile to bordering States, have on the contrary served in all times as an equipoise and a buckler to Europe, and can still be more useful to it than ever, we appear before sove- reigns and nations with the certainty that the voices alike of policy and of humanity will be lifted up in our favour. If Providence has destined this land to perpetual servitude, and if in this last strug- gle the liberty of Poland must sink under the ruins of her cities and the corpses of her defenders, our enemy shall reign only over deserts, and every good Pole will have this consolation in his dying hour, that in this battle to the death he has for a moment shielded the threatened liberty of Europe."

Certain it is that Poland, such as Nature designed her—not such as she was made by perfidious contrivances and the abuse of might—with two great rivers for herllimits, and backed by the coast of the Baltic, would be the most powerful barrier against Russia, and would hinder her from ever overflowing the West.

Will the necessary task be performed by a despotic government alone, so as to throw into the shade, for a long time to come, the principle of free governments ? The result is one which no votary of freedom can contemplate without fear and sorrow.

A FREEMAN.