LORD MORPETH'S CHARGE
Alexander Norman explains why
something is rotten in the state of the army
LORD Morpeth may be eccentric. He admits to being a Liberal. It is tempting therefore to dismiss his recent resignation from the army as symptomatic of one or other of these conditions. But the question of whether or not his action indicates a general malaise within our officer corps remains.
Morale is ever the key factor when considering the health of the armed forces. Time and again it has proved the decisive factor in war. Superiority of numbers or equipment is no guarantee of success. Consider the Falklands campaign. Similar- ly in peacetime: when morale is high, early retirement decreases and vice versa. For example, the Premature Voluntary Re- lease rate almost halved from 6,240 in 1980-81 to 3,853 in 1982-83 as a result of our Falklands success. But morale is a liquid commodity. Its level can vary from one unit to the next. Responsibility for morale devolves directly onto comman- ders, but factors outside their control can make the task comparatively easy or vir- tually impossible.
My own regiment, which I have recently visited in Germany, currently benefits from leadership that is both effective and popular, and from the recent acquisition of new tanks. Morale is high throughout the rank structure. This is in significant con- trast to the state of affairs 18 months go. Then, we were smarting from the ini- quitous sacking of the commanding officer, and single officers and soldiers were having to adjust to a net drop in pay equivalent to one month's salary as a result of cuts in the local overseas allowance.
Cuts in defence spending have always been a fact of military life. But the 'salami- slicing' method is the most pernicious of all. Despite record spending (which is currently at Korean War levels as a propor- tion of GNP), cuts continue to be made throughout the defence estate. A great many officers would agree with Lord Mor- peth when he states that it is 'increasingly difficult for commanders at all levels to train their formations and units to the highest standard'. Cuts which on paper look slight, such as a five per cent drop in ammunition allocation, are actually very significant in the field. In this instance, the results might be a whole day less on the ranges. Live firing programmes are already so tight that restraints additional to those already imposed would mean certain tech- niques either not being practised at all or at best insufficiently. Before going up to the ranges a regiment will have invested at least two months' training on simulators in preparation. Officers and soldiers key themselves up to improve on past perform,- ance. It does not take much imagination to work out the morale implications of a sudden cut (for they are often imposed swiftly and without warning).
The question of track mileage is similar. Many training exercises are tediously re- petitive, but nevertheless essential. Nor are cutbacks in training the only end-of- chain effects of expenditure paring. The supply of spare parts is an effective means of curtailing activity. This has its effect even during in-camp routine. B- (support) vehicle fleets are becoming so obsolete and spares so hard to come by that it is nothing unusual for equipment to be VOR (off the road) for months on end. I well remember my Squadron Leader's Land Rover being laid up for the whole of one winter for want of a new differential.
It is all very well for ministers to point to the £2,000 million increase in spending so far this decade, mostly on equipment. But this is to ignore the fact that equipment costs increase not progressively but logar- ithmically. Conventional warfare is expen- sive. (Are we really to believe that either of the opposition parties would be able markedly to increase spending with the pitiful amounts saved by the cancellation of Trident?) Furthermore, expenditure has been uneven. This has tremendous morale implications. What will be the result of a regiment currently converted to the new Challenger tank being made to revert to the obsolete Chieftain on another posting? This may well happen, for there is no intention to replace the entire fleet.
More immediate, however, is the new Land Rover fiasco. They have come into service without a full inventory of spare parts. It is one thing to have obsolete equipment lying idle, quite another to have new ordnance unusable. But even this is as nothing to the overstretching imposed on certain units. The Royal Artillery is having the same difficulty manning its new Track- ed Rapier systems as the Royal Armoured Corps had when given a guided weapons troop per regiment. Happily this innova- tion lasted only a year, but the RA can expect no such swift relief. Mr John Stanley, the armed forces minister, boasts of the increases in the number of armoured regiments in BAOR, but this is misleading. Although there is indeed an extra tank regiment, the number of tanks has not actually increased. It has been created by the simple expedient of cutting the number allocated to each regiment.
Even if the re-equipment programme (desperately behind as it is) did not ne- cessitate cuts in tandem, it would not be without penalty. Higher-technology ordn- ance demands a higher calibre of manpow- er. The majority of entrants to Sandhurst today are graduates. Gone are the days when the army was fit occupation for the family dullard. There is little room now for non staff-qualified officers. Many people fear that as a result, the army will go down the same road as the Navy, which bears so little resemblance to the august institution it was 50 years ago. To get on in the army of the Eighties demands a zeal that would have been considered inappropriate not long ago. It is hardly surprising, then, that the present climate takes its toll on officers such as Lord Morpeth. One officer friend remarked that `to succeed in the army of today requires incessant thrusting and back-stabbing'. While no one would wish to see polo ponies taken up to the ranges so that officers could enjoy sport after the day's firing, as happened only a decade ago, it is a matter for concern that the army seems no longer able to accommodate the traditional all-round officer. The ever- increasing demands on soldiers' time which are partly due to overstretching, partly due to an unacknowledged desire for self- justification, partly to the new equipment requiring higher levels of competence, are likely to produce a reduction in the quality of life. There is less time — and money available for adventure training, for sport, for those simple activities which enhance the bond between an officer and his men. A commander today can guarantee not to see his men together except on exercise. As a result those officers whose strength and interest lie in basic leadership find the present regime increasingly unrewarding. In 1985-86, 190 majors and 160 captains took Premature Voluntary Retirement, almost as many as did so in the worst years at the end of the 1970s. The endless series of debilitating cuts, the lengthening of tours, the declining opportunities are caus- ing many to question their role within the army of the late 20th century.
Alexander Norman was until recently a captain in the 77th/21st Lancers.
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