Can Germany Wait ?
ri y ERNST FRIEDLAENDER THE legal status of both parts of Germany, of the Federal Republic west of the Elbe and of the so-called German Democratic Republic east of the Elbe, is highly fictitious. The Soviet zone is nominally sovereign and in reality occupied, Whereas the Federal Republic is nominally occupied and in reality sovereign. But as long as the occupation statute has not been abolished, as long as it has not been replaced by a solemn agreement handing back sovereign powers to the Federal. Republic, true sovereignty simply does not exist in Western Germany. Such an agreement was signed as, long as two years ago but has not come into effect. It has been ratified by the Federal Republic and by two of the occupying powers, the United States and Great Britain. But it has not been ratified by France. Furthermore the Bonn agreements, signed In May, 1952, can only come into effect together with another treaty, signed at the same time, the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. This treaty has been ratified by four of the six signatory powers, the Federal Republic and the three Benelux countries. It has not yet been ratified by Italy and France. No one really expects that Italy would reject EDC after its ratification by France. In reality, both German sovereignty and German rearmament depend upon France and upon France only. This state of affairs has brought up two very pertinent ques- tions. If the French Parliament indefinitely postpones or finally rejects EDC what is to become of both German sovereignty and German rearmament ? How long can sovereignty be Withheld from West Germany after ratification by 'the Federal Republic of both the Bonn agreements and the EDC treaty ? In other words, can the Federal Republic be made to suffer for something which is entirely outside of her own responsi- bility ? It has been suggested that the Bonn agreeMents and the EDC treaty should be separated from each other, so that the former might come into force regardless of the latter. When' Dr. Conant, American High Commissioner to Germany, made a statement to the effect that a way of re-establishing German sovereignty must be found in the very near future, French re- action was highly unfriendly. In point of fact, `no one has as yet explained how German sovereignty could be restored Without French assent. A tripartite agreement between the United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic replac- ing the Bonn agreements.could only apply to the American and British zones of Germany. But is it conceivable that the occupation statute woul be abolished in these two zones and would be maintainedin the French zone ? Bizonal arrange- ment as they existedbefore the Federal Republic came into being must appear highly artificial and out of date under present circumstances. But the question of German rearmament is still more important. Outside of France Western public opinion, except for the Communists and the left wing of the British Labour Party, is virtually agreed on the necessity for a German military contribution to Western defence. The real problem today is not: is Germany to be rearmed ? It is: how is Germany to be rearmed ? And there again Western governments and public opinion in most Western countries believe that EDC is by far the best framework within which German rearmament should and could be accomplished. Every solution other than EDC would mean the re-creation of a German national army. But those who really favour a German national army are few and far between. Within the Federal Republic the four political parties represented in Dr. Adenauer's coalition government all favour EDC and, in fact, European integration as a whole. The only opposition party left in the new Bundestag, the Social Demo- crats, is against EDC but not against a German contribution to Western defence under present conditions. The position of the German Socialists has often been misunderstood. There are, in fact, two such positions, one for the period after the re-unification of Germany and one for the period in which Germany remains divided. A re-unified Germany, according to the German Socialists, should take part solely in a universal system of collective security within the framework of the United Nations, but it should under no circumstances enter into any military alliance with one or other of the opposing blocks, be it West or East. The German Socialists firmly believe that Soviet assent to the re-unification of Germany, based on, free elections, can only be had on such terms. The Soviets, accord- ing to this theory, are fully aware of the fact that the Com- munist vote, even in the former Soviet zone, would be negligible in the case of free elections, and Consequently they must be given an assurance before free elections that the status of a united Germany would be such that it could not in any way endanger the Soviet Union. This more or less neutralist ' attitude as far as a united Germany is concerned in no way applies to the present period of Germany's division. For the Federal Republic the Socialists favour a military contribution to Western defence under three conditions. There must be a fair and even chance of effective defence of German territory. There must be absolute equality of right as far as the German contribution is concerned. There must not be any danger that this contribution could block the re-unification of Germany,. in other words, any such contribu- tion and the treaties providing for it must be revocable in the case of re-unification. Thus, the Socialists want military coalition and not military integration, as everywhere in Euro- pean affairs they want international methods, and not supra- national methods. The Socialists, however, have not yet accep- ted NATO as the immediate type of coalition they want. Apparently they would prefer something like a European military pact, a loose coalition including Great Britain and other European countries besides the EDC countries. How this European pact would work alongside or inside NATO the Socialists have not as yet disclosed. Thus the German Socialists have offered something like an alternative to EDC. They have offered it primarily not because they no longer believe that EDC will come into being, but because they themselves reject EDC. The German Govern ment has strictly and almost adamantly maintained its position that no alternative to EDC is being contemplated. This by no means represents a lack of political imagination. Dr. Adenauer, like everybody else, knows that at present the chances of France ratifying EDC are at best fifty-fifty. He also knows that in talking of other solutions now he will only diminish these chances. And above all he is firmly convinced that all so- called alternatives to EDC are very poor alternatives. What then are these alternatives ? Theoretically there remains always German membership in NATO. In the world of political facts, however, it seems highly unlikely that France after rejecting EDC would accept the NATO solution for German rearmament. Germany could not join NATO without French assent. Germany within NATO would mean a German national army. Can France agree to a German national army ? If one considers the plan advanced by the German Socialists in the light of present military organisations it would come down to a pact comprising all NATO nations except the United States and Canada. It would certainly also mean that this pact would have to be incorporated into NATO. It would mean a German national army. French acceptance of this plan seems again highly unlikely. What remains is a military axis' Washington—Bonn, possibly endorsed by Britain. Of all the solutions offered from more or less irres- ponsible quarters this one seems the least desirable and the least likely. It would antagonise France more than anything else; it would mean the end of Franco-German rapprochement. And all the three solutions mentioned so far would mean the end of Europe, of a United Europe in the near future. It must, in this connection, be stated most emphatically that no solution would -ever be acceptable to Germany which meant neither integration nor a national army but a system of discriminations against Germany, placing German contingents in a coalition army on a footing entirely different from those of other nations.
There may be alternatives. But there are no true, no really good, alternatives. The time to deal with them may come after the decision of the French Parliament. It would be useless and harmful at the present moment to talk of alterna- tives as if there were useful alternatives. The world waits for France. Germany waits for France. It looks as if things might come to a head during June. If on May lath the elders of the French National Assembly fix a date for the parliamentary debate and if the French Socialists reach a decision as to their attitude towards EDC during their party congress on May 30th, the debate might begin early in June, and the final vote might be counted before the end of that month. In that case there would be one more delay until the French Senate had also voted, to say nothing of Italy.
.Taking all in all, 1954 seems to be the last year for a decision on EDC and for continuance of the occupation statute as well. This is by no means an ultimatum. The present situation has become untenable. Untenable situations cannot be prolonged indefinitely. To say this is not an ultimatum but simply common sense.
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