FRANCE AFTER DE GAULLE

Pompidoulian France and the Market

CHARLES HARGROVE

Paris

The first few months of what has variously been described as the 'Fifth Republic Bis', or 'The Sixth Republic', or again `neo-Gaullism' and the 'Post-Gaullist era' were marked by the academic but none the less intense philo-, sophical controversy over 'continuity' and 'change', between the 'ancients' and the `mod-, ems'; between the Gaullists of the true faith and the advocates of a liberalisation of the doctrine under the attractive slogan of 'ouverture'. The first claimed that only by keeping to the strict line of Gaullist policy could France conserve her stability and prosperity, and the influence she wielded in the world. The others that only by adapting this policy, and diluting it with a strong dose of pragmatism and common sense could these assets be safeguarded. The events of May and June 1968, they pointed out, had shown in any case that all was not well with Gaullist France, and that some serious re- thinking of its' philosophy and attitudes, in domestic matters, was urgently called for.

By temperament and conviction, M Porn- pidou was never cast in mold of strict Gaul- list orthodoxy. The rethinking and the'ouver- ture', which the situation called for came quite naturally to him. They also fitted in quite effortlessly with a conception of his office and of the manner of discharging it which could not be the same as General de Gaulle's, even had he wanted it so.

The May/June 1968 affair had re- vealed glaring weaknesses, abuses, and in- adequacies to be remedied. The contact, the dialogue, between President and people, be- tween the government and local notabilities, which felt directly threatened by the Gen- eral's regional reform that caused his un- doing; between employers (among them the state), and the unions, had to be restored.

It was natural therefore that 'continuity' should be more apparent in foreign policy and 'change' most real in economic and social affairs, M Pompidou's cardinal prin- ciple being, however, in both, to avoid any unnecessary rocking of the boat.

But in foreign policy, a quiet revolution was in fact taking place. The fundamental Gaullist principle of 'national independence' is still proclaimed and the 'force de frappe' remains its concrete expression—but not in the same challenging tones as in the days of General de Gaulle. The notion of a 'Euro- pean Europe' has a less exclusive, Continental ring. It no longer excludes 'Britain, which is an island', as the General once said in a cel- ebrated definition. The 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' which was to have formed a power counterweight to the United States has given way to the notion of a

'Europe open to the outside world, as M Maurice Schumann emphasised, The attitude of the French government towards Britain is the touchstone of the Pompidoulian conception of foreign affairs.

The turning point was, of course, the Hague conference in December of last year. The

basic factors of the international situation,

and of the place of France in it, had how- ever, prepared it. There was the Czech in- vasion, and the sharp setback to the flirtaq tion with Moscow, which, for a time, was used by France as a stick with which to beat the Germans; there was the demonstration of French vulnerability, in the May/June upheavals, and the monetary crisis of 1968; there was the realisation that the European community could make no progress unless the 'British affair' was exorcised one way or another, there was the revelation of the economic, and therefore political, power of the German Federal Republic. France had changed and the world about her had changed even more. The Europe of the Common Market was marking time; it was increasingly crippled by the conflict over Britain's membership. It threatened no longer to give France even those limited objectives in terms of influence and of econ- omic interest which General de Gaulle re- garded as its main function in life. He had begun to draw the necessary conclusions when he proposed to Britain in what became the `Soames affair', bilateral discussions to end the deadlock.

'Political cooperation,' M Michel Debre, then Foreign Minister, told the National Assembly just two years ago, 'would become much more difficult [if the Common Market were enlarged]'. It would no longer be a community but a little league of nations on a European scale. Economically, it is difficult to maintain that on a ten, twelve, or fourteen nation basis, the same free trade, the same hopes of a common economic policy can be entertained as between the Six. 'The problem of Britain's entry represented a 'profound change'. 'We can contemplate it. We shall not maintain the Common Market alone it no one wants it any more.'

Fundamentally different is the approach of Pompidoulian France to the problem. Britain's entry is no longer regarded as a necessary evil, as it had come to be in the last phase of General de Gaulle's reign, but a positive asset, a substantial and essential contribution to the creation of that 'inde- pendent Europe', with a voice loud and strong enough to be heard by the super-powers. Britain's entry would not weaken or water down the existing European community, as General de Gaulle was convinced, but would

strengthen it against the new challenges facing it—from the Ostpolitik of the German Federal Government; from the ideological, if no longer military, challenge of the eastern camp; from the division of the world between Russia and the us. But there is one big fundamental proviso to M Pompidou s changed attitude towards Britain : it is that the advantages so painstakingly acquired in ten years of the European Economic Corn. munity, the organisation and the structures so laboriously worked out be not tampered with or endangered..

Britain must accept the Treaty of Rome and the decisions which had given it prac- tical effect. There could be only one transi- tional period. Britain could not have the advantage of a short transitional period for industry, without the drawbacks of one of equal length for agriculture, he implied. '11 the existing rules are brought into question. the negotiations will no longer be concerned with enlarging the community, but with re- placing it, and consequently destroying it: M Schumann declared bluntly last week.

'We shall accept neither overbidding nor 'dilution,' M Schumann said. 'We shall not tolerate that one shouts at one and the same time, "Long live a Europe federated in a super-state; and long live Britain inside the Common Market," for the sole satisfaction of questioning the French government's motives on two points which cancel one another out.' France, he emphasised, had accepted the enlargement of the Common Market to include Britain and the other can- didates 'without reticence and without after- thought'. But this by definition ruled out the hypothesis of destroying theCommon Market in order to make this enlargement possible.

By temperament and conviction, the French have always been more inclined to take a stricter juridical line in foreign policy than their neighbours. This is true of the Common Market; it is also true for instance of allied rights in Berlin.Where the Common Market is concerned, the French government (and this is as valid for Pompidoulian as of Gaullist France) is convinced it has a clearer conception of what Europe is aiming at and what it must try to achieve. This does not conflict with M Pompidou's pragmatism. It fits in with his conception of both the French and European interest and with his con- viction of the need for an ordered, sound, regulated, basis both for France and Europe.