The Problem of Peking
There are as yet no signs, either in Washington or London, of how the awkward problem jointly posed by Mao Tse-tung and Stalin is going to be solved. On the question of recognising Peking there is a fundamental, though not necessarily a serious, divergence between British and American interests. For us the issues are far simpler than they are for the Americans. Our commercial interests in China arc bigger than theirs, and our Government has officially encouraged its nationals in China to stay at their posts in the hope that something like normal trading conditions will eventually be restored by the Communists. Communist pronouncements have tended on the whole to justify this hope, but it is clear that until their claim for diplomatic recognition is granted the Communists will not take the foreign communities out of the form of cold storage in which they at present inconveniently and very expensively exist. The British interest therefore lies in taking an ultimately inevitable step sooner rather than later. The Americans, on the other hand, with fewer and less important hostages to fortune (they tended to evacuate where we stood fast), can afford to take a wider view. Though the State Department must be as well aware as the Foreign Office that the new rulers of China cannot be cold-shouldered indefi- nitely, Washington would like to postpone recognition for as long as possible. Morally—or, anyhow, emotionally—America is more deeply committed to the Nationalists than we are, and she views with a distaste which is equal to, and an apprehension which is perhaps greater than, ours the prospect of admitting to the Security
Council a protégé of Russia. The whole question bristles with difficulties. They will have to be faced and overcome, and it is vital that
this should be accomplished by joint Anglo-American action. There is, happily, no evidence at the moment that anything else is contemplated.
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