Defence and Deterrents
By NORMAN GIBBS* almost unavoidable consequence of the publicity attached to a major government declaration of policy, such as the Statement on Defence for this year, is that it distorts the longer term perspective into which it should fit. 'Deterrent' is, fpr the moment, on everybody's lips. It has become a word of magical, and for that reason unquestioned, significance. In fact, as any government knows, there are some age-old qualities in the present state of affairs; and only by separating the old from the new, the temporary from the permanent, is it possible to begin to understand a situation which, in any case, is inevitably full of uncertainties.
The justification of one's own armaments on the ground that they will deter ,possible enemies from overstepping the line between peace and war is as old as the need to moralise about war at all. What nation in modern times, Nazi Germany Included, has not called its armaments defensive? And the Preparation of defence is always justified in the hope that It will deter attack. What is new today in this traditional approach to the risks of war is, firstly, the revolutionary Power of the weapons with which nations can threaten to fight if attacked; secondly, the ability to use these weapons offensively with an unusually limited power of defence against them; and, thirdly, the technical superiority of one side to the possible quarrel in its new-weapon equipment.
The first of these three new factors is permanent. The R-bomb not only exists, but further developments beyond it are possible. Moreover, the application of nuclear techniques to all forms of weapons is proceeding so rapidly that the use of the words 'conventional' and 'unconventional' is rapidly becoming outmoded, at any rate, with forces equipped for a major war. The second factor, the present superiority of offence over defence, cannot be assumed for the future quite as easily. Whatever the present superiority of the bomber over the fighter, and other forms of defence, the piloted bomber itself probably has a limited life, and the terms of Warfare with guided Weapons are too vague to forecast. The balance between offence and defence may perhaps be redressed. This has regularly happetied in military affairs, and the possibilities of scientific development are too indefinable to argue that it cannot happen again. But the chances, to !ay the least, are not promising. The third factor, however, Is of far more doubtful long-term significance. Even if the West has, as it believes, a present technical superiority in nuclear weapons, it is a very temporary advantage. For, should a technical lead still be retained, nothing can reasonably Prevent the Russians from having soon what we have now, and what we have now is revolutionary by any standards of destruction. Whatever the nature and effects of the 'saturation Point' when it comes, at least no one denies that each side will then possess weapons capable of inflicting mortal damage *Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University. • on the other. The sort of technical superiority the West appears to have now will be no comfort then.
What conclusions can be drawn from all this? In the first place, war in the air has now reached the stage when it effec- tively invalidates the old basic assumption of strategy—that victory depends upon the defeat of the enemy's concentration of armed force. Resources and morale behind the land and sea fighting forces can now be attacked with devastating power, not only by-passing armies and navies, but almost certainly by-passing air defence as well. The struggle for command of the air that we knew in the Second World War need not pre- cede a future air offensive, even though destruction of the enemy's air striking power will be an essential part of that offensive. For, whatever ground the defence may make up, by former standards a ridiculously small number of bombers or guided missiles will be needed to do the damage required —too small a number, in fact, to offer any reasonable hope that the defence can stop them all. It is the nature of the new weapon which outmodes old conceptions and threatens com- plete destruction of the sources of a nation's life.
Secondly, the one element in the present situation which is of advantage to the West is the one element which is almost certainly of very temporary importance. Here lies the first danger if there is any risk of complacency. In other words. the West has the bomb, but Communist countries will soon have it and, when that happens, both will be able to use it against any likely defence.
Do we then sit back in the belief that as long as we keep ourselves up to date we can at least defend ourselves on equal terms, and that the Great Deterrent will eventually produce either a stalemate or a move towards disarmament as the logi- cal consequence of the possession of annihilating force by both sides? Here lies the second danger. The H-bomb, or any variant of it, is not enough. Defence by conventional forms, if not by entirely conventional weapons, is an essential part of the deterrent, a vital part of the cold war which the deter- rent will probably encourage long before it breeds either a stalemate or disarmament, and an important element of the hot war, whatever destruction nuclear weapons may spread.
Here these arguments will be seen only in their application to land forces. Land forces have three jobs to do as their part of the deterrent. In the first place, they are the most obvious expression of the unity of the Western alliance, and in the expression of that unity as much as on the H-bomb itself our immunity from war may well depend. The use of the bomb is, in any case, subject to political difteulties in an alliance of democracies. But outward unity in practice, as well as in the words of our threats, may well deter the Russians from putting those threats to the test. Secondly, at any rate at present, defence in depth is essential for the more vital strategic targets of Western Europe. and the Russians are more likely to believe the threat these targets represent if they see them adequately defended. Thirdly, a strongly held forward defence zone is the best guarantee against the sort of infiltra- tion which might well find NATO governments in two minds about the casus fwderis.
In the cold war land forces have probably an even more obvious place. Already they have played a leading part in Korea, Indo-China and Malaya. Surely the most reasonable assumption about Russia and China at the moment, whatever the future may hold, is that the more effective the deterrent in the case of a major war the more likely it is to lead our potential enemies into every sort of course which falls short of the worst. However much we may long for the end of stespense nothing can justify the belief that this will be the first result of the deterrent. Perhaps it will be the last. And if it be argued that the application of nuclear techniques to what are at present conventional weapons will render likely the transition from limited to unlimited war, then one answer is that the worse the weapons of the hot war become, the more likely we all are to try to stay on the safer side of even a thin dividing line.
The use of armies in the hot war is not so obvious, although it is easy enough to forecast police and civil defence duties. There is no time here for details of future organisation and equipment, except to say that it was disappointing to see so little mention of them in the Memorandum on the Army Estimates. What matters is the problem of whether, even if streamlined, dispersed and equipped as far as possible for self-contained action, land forces could hope to compete in a war of major nuclear weapons. To this the answer must be that, like civil defence and defence by fighters and guided missiles, we dare not assume them to be dispensable. For can we really be sure that the initial all-out stages of a nuclear war by air weapons would altogether prevent our enemies from overrunning at least some of our allies? This is an alliance to defend all, not some. And the present conception of the hot war allows no room for liberations.
Finally, it can be objected, as it often has been, that we cannot afford to prepare for the new and the old, for the future and the present. But the two are inseparable. Moreover, it would be folly to base a defence programme upon one weapon in political conditions where nobody can fairly suppose an unconditional determination to use it. These decisions are not easy for democracies even when, as apparently is the case now, they hold a clear lead. If and when that lead is lost tt will be even more necessary to be provided with alternatives. The cost of the combined burden must be faced if our defence policy is to be complete.
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