The Long Haul B Y her resolution at the Security Council
last weekend Britain has made it more difficult, but by no means impossible, for oil to arrive in Rhodesia, and that is prob- ably the best that could be done. If pirate tankers had been allowed to discharge their oil for Rhodesia at Beira unchallenged, the whole sanctions policy would have been publicly in ruins. This fate has now been avoided. Oil will of course continue to reach Rhodesia overland from South Africa, and there is very little that Britain can sensibly do about this. But the oil will be expensive and it is doubtful whether it will be in sufficient quantities to enable the Rhodesians to end their rationing. There is an obvious breach in the sanctions programme, but there are obvious successes too.
Thus the effectiveness of British policy on oil is at least in line with its effectiveness on other products. The gaps in the sanc- tions programme in fact are numerous, but none of them need be decisive. All that is affected is the timetable. The Rhodesian economy will not break down by July this year, just as it did not break down by February—an earlier Government estimate. It may not even break down by July of next year, but the slow decline has begun, unemployment is growing, prices are rising and Rhodesia begins to look, even to its favoured whites, rather less than God's own country. If Britain's policy is to persuade the Smith regime to resume negotiations, she must be prepared to be patient. The most urgent task now is to get right away from ideas of deadlines, first in her own mind and then in the minds of others. The Government has to avoid being stampeded either into premature further action or into premature capitulation. If it acts intelli- gently, this should not prove impossible.
The figures alone are impressive. After only five months of sanctions, Rhodesia's exports are reckoned to be down by around 50 per cent. The outcome of the tobacco sales will not be finally known till August: clearly a certain amount of tobacco will be sold, but not even the Rhodesians them- selves expect the results to be very impres- sive—nor the prices to be very high. Rho- desian chrome and asbestos will no doubt go on finding international markets through South Africa, but the output is not great enough to save the economy in the long run. Even if the 50 per cent fall in exports drops to 40 per cent in time, the cumulative effects of sanctions will still be severe.
There are of course flaws, notably in the uncertain attitude of Zambia. Of Rho- desia's estimated remaining £80 million or so worth of annual exports, Zambia is still taking more than £30 million, if anything rather more than she took before UDI. If Zambia were to cut these off at once, the effects on Rhodesia would be immediate, both for the level of employment and for the maintenance of peace. So would the effects on Zambia and the world copper market. It is known that there are powerful voices in Zambia advocating just such a policy—not because it would lead to. Mr Smith's surrender, but because the resulting chaos both in Zambia and in Rhodesia would provide new grounds for pushing Britain into using force, at least to attempt to restore order. There are as yet no signs that this is the policy of Dr Kaunda, but if Britain fails to convince him that sanctions will work in time, then the pressure from his extremists will undoubtedly grow. -To deter this threat of African extremists initiating guerrilla action. Britain will have to make it clear now that she has no inten- tion of being drawn in. We must tell Zambia plainly that we will not be pushed into using force by staged provocations.
Mr Wilson has already had a shot at wrecking the sanctions policy himself by promising premature deadlines. But that was in the days when he had to think about his majority and the Organisation of Afri- can Unity had the semblance of unity. Things are easier now, if only he will see it. He must say with absolute confidence that the Rhodesian rebellion will be ended in time, that Britain can in no way condone it, but that she cannot condone either having her policy dictated to her from Addis Ababa or New York. He must also make it clear that he is goine, to avoid com- pletely the temptation of being pushed into an irrelevant holy war with either South Africa or Portugal. If either of these coun- tries wishes to aid Rhodesia, they will do so, but their aid will surely grow the more they are challenged. At present, there is no reason to think that, if the temperature is allowed to cool, they would want to shore up the Rhodesian economy in- definitely. The Rhodesia question can be solved in time by renewed negotiations. The Government's task is to avoid an escalation of the conflict and see that it is given the time.
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