ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.
IF it is tree that England and Russia have come to an understanding on the Eastern question, as the Daily Chronicle asserts, we are face to face with the greatest revolution in European politics since the battle of Sedan. According to the Daily Chronicle, England has under- taken to secure autonomy to Crete and to prevent the destruction of the Christian inhabitants of the island—a crime at which the Powers at one time seemed in their cynical cowardice quite ready to connive—while Russia, by military means if necessary, is to save the remnant of the Armenians. Of course such an understanding as this cannot be confined to the two points we have named. If an understanding has taken place we may take it for granted that it has gone further and has taken into con- templation other aspects of the Eastern question, such as the future of Macedonia. Our readers will not be surprised if we welcome the prospect of an under- standing with Russia with the greatest possible satis- faction. It may be remembered that this time last year we advocated as strongly as we could the formation of an understanding with the Government of the Czar. We ventured then to suggest that many influences were at work to draw us and Russia together, and we hinted our belief that so able a statesman as Lord Salisbury might sooner or later be able to arrive at a conclusion so favourable to this country. If, then, what we have long realised as the true goal of English diplomacy has been reached, we can sincerely say that we believe Lord Salisbury to have achieved the greatest stroke of statecraft accomplished during the present generation.
Our only misgiving (granted, of course, that the Daily Chronicle's news is well founded) is as to whether Lord Salisbury has been bold enough and confident enough in the support of English public opinion to make his understanding with Russia an understanding without too many reservations. We mean by this that we trust he has frankly abandoned all desire on our part to regard the integrity of the Turkish Empire as an English interest, and has let it be known that we should not lift a finger to prevent the occupation of Constantinople by Russia,—provided. only that Russia should enter the city on the eastern side and from Asia, and so should save from absorption the self- governing States in the Balkans. We feel confident that no statesman of Lord Salisbury's genius and insight—if ever man had insight into the true meaning of inter- national relations it is he—can have failed to see that it would be useless to try to make a lasting or effective under- standing with Russia if the question of Constantinople were left out. Lord Salisbury cannot have any illusions as to the real objective of Russia's policy. He must be fully aware that even if for the moment Russian statesmen disclaim any wish to go to Constantinople, they know in their hearts that the Russian people desire above all things to see the cross once more on the dome of St. Sophia. Our only fear is lest he should be too anxious not to advance beyond public opinion,—should, that is, adopt the attitude of, I dare not consider the question of Constantinople at present, for I have no guarantee that the English" people are at the moment prepared to endorse any definite proposal in regard to it.' If perchance this should prove to be Lord Salisbury's attitude in regard to the matter— we have no wish to assert that it is his attitude, and indeed sincerely trust that it is not—we hold that it is entirely mistaken. We believe that English public opinion is fully prepared to back up a responsible Foreign Minister of Lord Salisbury's experience and knowledge in making an understanding with Russia on the Eastern question as a whole, and would have no sort of objection to seeing England abandon any attempt to prevent Russia from taking possession of the position on the Bosphorus which the Turks have so long misused. No doubt the nation would demand that this con- cession to Russia should be accompanied by equivalent concessions to England as regards her freedom of action on the Nile, but these, we take it, would be as it were automatically secured. If it is once understood that we shall not prevent Russia from going to Con- stantinople when she chooses, she will not dream of insisting that we must be prevented from impairing the integrity of the Turkish Empire by remaining in Egypt. We do not believe that our statesmen half realise how complete is the revulsion of public feeling in this country, both as regards Turkey and as regards Russia. In the first place, there is now no serious wish on the part of any important section of Englishmen to preserve the Ottoman Empire. Englishmen for the last five or six years have been asking themselves the question, " Is the Turkish Empire worth fighting for ?—ia it worth our while to support Turkey ? " The answer that they have at last worked out is " No ; it is not worth whil: to support the Turks. The maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire is not a British in- terest." B it we are in the main a businesslike people. Having once arrived at this proposition the country sees that it is futile to go on acting as if it still held that the- occupation of Constantinople by Russia must be a carat belli. When you have once determined to abandon an object that has been in dispute with a neighbour, abandon it thoroughly, and do not get the odium of holding a position which you do not mean to maintain. If you have put your hat on a chair which some one else wants to sit on, and have made up your mind that- you do not want to keep him out of the chair, the sensible plan is to remove your hat at once. Why should you gratuitously be subject to the annoyance of having the man who wants the said chair prowling round you and planning how he can inflict sufficient injuries upon you to make you remove the hat ? That is the principle on which reasonable men act in private life, and that, we believe, is the principle on which the country intends to act in regard to Russia and Constan- tinople. They have determined that they have no rear interest in keeping it unoccupied, and therefore they think that the Power which wants it will be rendered far less disagreeable by being politely told,—" If it is only that old hat of mine which prevents you taking the chair, please do not scruple to turn it off. I have no objection." As we have said, we firmly believe this to be the attitude of the nation at the present moment. Lord Salisbury may, that is, go as far as he likes in making terms with Russia. The country will welcome most cordially any arrangement which his experience and sagacity recom- mend.
If the understanding with Russia can be carried beyond the Eastern question, and can be made to include China and India, there will be still stronger grounds for gratitude to Lord Salisbury. Granted that we withdraw our caveat in regard to Constantinople, we do not see why Russia should not prove eminently reasonable in regard to India and China. If we are willing to- drop our jealousy of a Russian advance in Asia, and. Russia is disabused of the notion that the only way of getting the hat removed from the chair is to make - herself as nasty as possible, there ought not to be any difficulty. In the first place, we ought to acknow- ledge fully the reasonableness of Russia's desire for two things in Asia,—i.e., a straight and convenient route for her trans-Siberian railway, and the possession of a port free from ice in the Pacific. It may not be possible for Russia to get these things instantly, but we ought to understand (1) that she will not be satisfied till she gets them, and (2) that her desire for them is to be treated, frankly as not detrimental to us. Again, we ought to make up our minds as to what attitude we mean to adopt towards the Chinese Empire. That once clearly deter- mined, there should be no difficulty in marking off a- course of joint action with Russia in the Far East which might last for fifty years. Further than that it is useless to look.
We have purposely not attempted to deal on the present . occasion with the external results of the alleged under- standing with Russia. It is obvious, however, that the effect must be great, both as regards France and as regards Italy. The Franco-Russian Alliance was to some extent directed against us. If, then, we come to an under- standing with Russia, it follows that we must also come to an understanding—perhaps not so intimate an understand- ing, but still an understanding—with France. But this would mean a rearrangement of our relations with Italy, and so indirectly with Austria and Germany. We shall not attempt to do more than indicate these facts on the present occasion. We will, however, say one thing. We do not see why an understanding with Russia need affect unfavourably our virtual alliance with Italy, though it might, no doubt, lead to Italy falling out of the Triple Alliance. But this matter cannot, as we have said, be discussed on the present occasion. It is enough to indicate our belief that Italy will in no case be unfairly or injuriously treated by England.
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