TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION AND THE UNIONIST PARTY. THE close of the Session affords a convenient oppor- tunity for taking stock of the political position as it affects the Unionist party. Strong Unionists as we are, it is impossible for us to deny that th6 party has received a very severe blow owing to the promulgation of " the Cham- berlain policy," and the means that have been taken to place it before the country. The foundation of Mr. Cham- berlain's Tariff Reform League, and its ceaseless activity, necessitated counter-action by the Free-trade Unionists, and this has brought about an internecine strife among Unionists. Not the most optimistic of party men can contend that this is good for the party. It is quite possible, and we believe sound, to say .that moderate differences of opinion within a party are good for it, and that the wise party leader should do nothing to prevent the expression of divergent views. Free discussion is good for the health of a party, while the enforcement of too strict a discipline is bad for it. But between such discussion and the division of opinion now existing within the Unionist party there is a world of difference. At the moment, and until some very great change takes place, it would be idle to deny that the Unionist party is not in a fit state to face the enemy. It could not possibly go to the country just now with that united front which should be shown by a party at a General Election. This being so, all loyal Unionists are naturally asking the question,—" What of the future ? " What are the chances, that is, of reconciliation, and in what state will the party find itself at the end of the holiday truce ?
Several alternative answers present themselves, and are worth, discussing, although it is not possible for persons devoid of the gift of prophecy to say which will prove correct. Let us take them in order. In the first place, it is humanly possible, even if not likely, that Mr. Chamberlain may declare, as the result of the inquiry, that he finds " the Chamberlain policy " is either not workable or not acceptable to the country, and that he therefore abandons it and proposes to return to the status quo. This would, of course, heal the split in the Cabinet, but it is to be feared that it would not heal the split in the party. We fear that, even in the most unlikely case of Mr. Chamberlain admitting that he was mistaken, the bulk of his followers would insist on going forward with his policy. A passive Protectionist section always existed in the Unionist party, but that section, owing to the encouragement it has received from Mr. Chamberlain, has now passed from inertia to intense activity, and it is not to be supposed that it will suddenly agree to return to inaction. It will not rest again till it has made a serious and persistent endeavour to convert the nation to Protection. The next alternative to con- sider is that Mr. Balfour may be able to suggest some compromise which will content both the Protectionists and the Free-traders, and so heal the breach. We fear that this is not possible. You may acquiesce in a policy which you feel you cannot alter, as the Protectionists have done for the last forty years, but you cannot mix two such in- compatible things as Protection and Free-trade, any mote than you can mix oil and water. Mr. Gladstone, according to a famous legend, is said to have declared that you could keep the water on the top of the castor-oil in a medicine glass if you " poured the water very carefully " ; but how- ever carefully Mr. Balfour may pour, he will, we fear, find that no blending is possible. The Free-trader and the Protectionist do not move on the same plane. The Free-trader believes that a tax is meant, not to encourage trade, but to raise revenue, and he makes taxation for revenue only his cardinal principle. The Protectionist, on the other hand, thinks that taxation may be made an actual source of wealth, that instead of being a. necessary evil it may become a. positive good, and that the rock if only struck in the proper way by the rod of taxation will send forth beneficent streams of gold. Between these views there is, in truth, no, compromise possible. One side may yield, no doubt; but it must yield, not on non-essentials, but on something that it deems essential. Thus, even an apparent compromise were devised (which is, of course, not impossible, considering the elasticity of the English language and the willingness of men to believe, for a time at any rate, that words are facts), it would not, in truth, recreate the Unionist party.
That confidence which is the cement of parties would be found to have vanished, and neither side to the compromise would really trust the other again. Another alternative is, of course, that Mr. Balfour, throwing in his lot with Mr. Chamberlain, should frankly adopt " the Chamberlain policy " and make the Unionist party a homogeneous Pro- tectionist party. In that event the split would become as visible as it was deep. The Free-traders in the Cabinet, and in the party as a whole, must come together, and though maintailing the Unionist name and tradition must, for the time at any rate, join the Liberals in opposing the Government. The party would be like the rocks rent asunder in " Christabel." They would " stand apart, the scars remaining," while " the dreary tide " of bitterness and recrimination must flow between. ' A similar rupture must, we admit, happen if Mr. Balfour finally expressed his inability to go with Mr. Chamberlain. In that case, Mr. Chamberlain and his followers of the Tariff Reform League must abandon the Unionist party, and form a Protectionist party of their own.
As we have seen, every one of these alternatives must prove, in a. greater or lesser degree, to be a source of injury to the Unionist party. Come what may, that party must be weaker than before, and so less capable of doing national service along the lines on which the party was formerly agreed to move. It is not perhaps much use to attempt to apportion the blame of a result so disas- trous. Mr. Chamberlain is naturally accused by Free- trade Unionists of having broken up his party, or, at any rate, of having dealt it a deadly blow ; but Mr. Chamber- lain may fairly reply that having honestly come to the conclusion that our fiscal policy was unsound, he had no alternative but to strive to get that policy reversed. Again, Mr. Balfour may be blamed for not having either openly joined Mr. Chamberlain at once or else openly rejected his proposals. If Mr. Balfour intended all the time to go with Mr. Chamberlain, we think it was certainly his duty to say so at once. If, however, Mr. Balfour was unable to agree with Mr. Chamberlain, we think his action much more intelligible, and also much more excusable. In that case he would have argued:—` As a Unionist Prime Minister, I have two duties,—to carry on the King's Government, and to keep the Unionist party together. When, then, the ship was struck by the fiscal tempest, I felt that before anything else I must get through the great and important legislative proposals on which Parliament was engaged, and that next I must try to pre- vent the Unionists fighting among themselves. I could certainly do one of these things—i.e., pass my Bills—and might possibly do the other—i.e., prevent the party from splitting—by calling a truce and insisting on inquiry. While the inquiry was proceeding Parliament could at any rate do its work, and it was also just possible that at the same time the fiscal storm would blow over, and the split be prevented. Things could not be made worse, and might be made better, by waiting, and so I determined to wait.' Of course, we do not know whether in fact Mr. Balfour has argued thus, but if he did he certainly would have largely justified his action. The Irish Bill is passed, M. Loubet's visit to London and the King's visit to Ireland have proved great successes, and the war within the party is no worse than it would have been had Mr. Balfour allowed the Protectionists and the Free-traders to come to grips four months earlier than they now will. But though we understand, and to a great extent sympathise with, this view, it does not alter our main point, which is that in any case and whatever happens the Unionist party has received a crushing blow. Let things go as well for our section of the party as they possibly can, it still remains a fact that the party has been shaken to its foundations. Those Protectionists who, in fact, desire to found a new party may regard such a result with indifference. We who respected and were proud of the old Unionist party as we have known it under Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour cannot profess to feel anything but the greatest sorrow and disappointment at the result.
We presume that we have now six weeks' time, before the curtain lifts and lets us see exactly how things stand. What will it reveal? We admit that we know no more than the rest of the world, and have no desire to, prophesy. We may point out, however, that as yet there is no evidence that Mr. Balfour will, in the last resort, throw in his lot with Mr. Chamberlain. Nothing that Mr. Balfour has said or done can be taken as a positive proof that he has been converted to Protection. No doubt it can be asserted that in the various wrangles which have taken place in the House of Commons he has often seemed specially willing to defend Mr. Chamberlain, and to come to his assistance. It may be pointed out, however, that an absolutely fair and impartial Judge often annoys eager men who watch a case he is trying by seeming in his remarks throughout the trial to be obviously taking the wrong side. Yet when judgment is given it is seen that it was not a mistake on the points at issue, but only a specially keen sense of impartiality, that influenced him. That so it may prove is our ardent hope in the case of Mr. Balfour. May complete disillusion- ment overtake those who now imagine that he really thinks that the nation may be taxed into prosperity, and that the way to make people happy and prosperous is to force them to buy dear and sell cheap !
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