THE SITUATION IN EGYPT.
THERE is one point in the present situation in the East, otherwise satisfactory, which we regard with considerable apprehension. We hold—in common, we believe, with most commercial men, all Anglo-Indians, and a majority of the people of this country—that the theory of the sufficiency of the Cape route to India, which is still held by a few leading Liberals, is a delusion. No doubt that route is a fairly good one, and in ordinary times sufficient for our security, but in time of war it might prove insufficient, and our possession of it a sauce of misleading confidence. It is a very long route, even for steamers, and has only one break, and in time of war, more especially of war with any maritime Power, we could not use it except by sending with every fleet of transports an iron- clad fleet as convoy ; that is, without protracting the voyage to India to nearly four months. Cases might readily occur in which reinforcements, and especially reinforcements of materiel, might be delayed by this difficulty until they were too late, a misfortune which actually happened to France while contend- ing through Dupleix for the sovereignty of Southern India. We must have an alternative route through the Mediterranean, and the only one of any value to a maritime Power possessed of station's, like Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden, lies through Egypt and the Suez Canal. Any other route, however advan- tageous in other respects, must lie at the mercy of the Powers through whose territories a railway would pass, and could not be defended withent a land army. Our dominance in Egypt in the lent resort is therefore essential to the. Empire, and this dominance is at this moment seriously menaced.
It will be conceded on all hands that, one of two conse- quences. must arise from this, war to Egypt, and neither of them can we regard with any feeling of security. Either Turkey will make peace, or it will fight on and be destroyed. In the former case, Turkey, under whatever disguise, will be a vassal State, subordinate to Russia, and without motive for attending to English interests, end the ultimate control of Egypt will therefore pass into hands which, in time of war, might employ it against us. In any war, for example, with America, we might find our Cape route harassed and inter- rupted by cruisers emerging from San Francisco, and the Canal suddenly blocked by the " accidental" sinking in it of a couple of Turkish steamers. We could not endure that, and might have to occupy Egypt under circumstances which would make the operation one of nearly insuperable difficulty. The French Government, for example, might be pining for an excuse for war satisfactory to its people, or we might be wholly unable from insurrection to occupy Egypt from the Eastern side. On the other hand, Turkey may go down, and in that event the Khedive would declare himself independent. There is 4 theory held in, many important quarter's that this would suit the interests of this country, because the Khedive would naturally rely for help upon British power, but we fear this is a short-sighted view. The Khedive once proclaimed Sultan of Egypt, will be harassed by now kinds of dim- oulties, one of them being the risk of civil war. He is now guaranteed by Turkey, and protected by the influence of the Kaliphate ; but when independent, he would be at the mercy of any successful soldier in his army, of any popular Prince of his own family, and of any fighting ad- venturer who might arise in Arabia. The tradition of Egypt is not that of orderly government, but of military risings ; the Khedive has no money with which to form a mercenary army ; and his exactions, redoubled under the ()schen scheme, which met every interest but that of the Allah, have made him detested. Anarchy in Egypt would be just as ruinous to us as foreign interference, for each party would apply to England for help under the menace, if refused, of blocking the Canal. There is, and can be in fact no security for us in Egypt, except the possession of the country, and we have no right to possess it without govern- ing it, and so compensating the people for foreign conquest by the vivifying order which our rule invariably produces. Now we want to know, and we believe the country wants to know, whether the Government has considered this situation, and whether it has arrived at any determination as to the course to be pursued. We can see as yet no signs of it what- ever. The Ministers who speak, speak of Armenia, or of Constantinople, or of the Dardanelles ; but they say nothing of Egypt, beyond a remark often made as if it were incidental., that Russia must not " interfere with " the Suez Canal, which of course, in this war at all events, she is not likely to do. None of them acknowledge frankly that England must have a dominant influence in Egypt, and none of them attempt to give reasons for thinking the occupation of the country, even with the consent of Europe, inexpedient. There may, of course, be such reasons. Many politicians aro of opinion that the enter- prise would over-tax us, involving a greater drain of men than we could afford to meet, Many others believe that Egypt, mortgaged as it is up to the lips, would be a costly possession, and many more have a secret idea that the country is in some sort a property belonging to the descendants of Mehemet Ali. None of those arguments, when examined, seem to us to have much weight ; the strength needed in Egypt reducing the strength required in India ; the country, after an arrangement with its creditors, whoSe just rights are very moderate, being able to pay its ex- penses; and the notion of Turks holding their dominions by a property tenure being merely absurd, and inconsistent with the right of Europe to dispossess them for the general advantage ; but still, if these objections, or any of them, weigh with the Ministry, let us hoar them. At present we hear nothing and see nothing, except that the Ministry, while fidgetting about Russian movements in Armenia, and possible demands for the freedom of the Darla- nelles, neglects the Egyptian question altogether, and suffers affairs there to drift, till we may some fine morning find that the future of Cairo is not at our disposal without a, great war. That surely cannot be good policy, especially for a Governs meat which goes about saying that it has no morals, and. is only solicitous for the 4' Interests " of the country. Is Egypt not a British interest ? If it is not,, why does not some Minister stand forward and say so, giving his reasons, and so remove a doubt which worries the public and a hope on which every speculator on 'Change is trading ; or if it ie, why does not the Government show the slightest symptom. of a resolution to act ? This reticence looks as if the, Premier, though unable to assist the Turks as he would like, is re, solved not to assist in the downfall of their Empire, and throws over British interests because, in occupying Egypt, we should release one more country from the sway of Semitic ideas. If he is so devoted to British interests, why does he not attend to the only one of them about which there is no Tie"- Lion, and place the key of India, the only key by which a maritime Power can unlock the door, in British hands 8 Is there any human being not a Turk who would not benefit by Egypt falling under British control ?
Previous page
