CORRESPONDENCE.

THE STATE • OF THE NAVY.

V.—RECENT NAVAL "ECONOMIES."

[To THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTATOR:1 SIE.,-" Efficiency combined with economy" is the declared intention of the "series of Reforms that have been undertaken during the past three years" and summarised in Lord Cawdor's Statement. The current Navy Estimates show a total provision less by five millions than the corresponding provision in 1904-5. This reduction has been made in two years ; it exceeds 13 per cent, of the total expenditure in 1904-5, and has naturally commanded public attention. There is, however, reason to doubt whether the means by which lessened expenditure has been secured are fully under- stood, even by Cabinet Ministers ; it is certain that the public generally have not mastered the facts. This imperfect knowledge is not due to lack of explanation. Amongst other statements on the subject, an epitome of facts and figures by Sir William White (Nineteenth Century, May and July, 1905, and April, 1906) may be mentioned. That epitome was based on the Navy Estimates ; it has remained unchallenged, and has been drawn upon freely in the following remarks.

First : as to the, starting-point from which -reduction in expenditure is reckoned. The financial years 1903-4 and 1904-5 were quite exceptional. Two Chilian ships were purchased; their acquisition and equipment involved a non- recurring expenditure exceeding two millions; the Votes for New Construction were consequently swollen. Concurrently, heavy expenditure on ships building and arrears of repairs had to be met. From 1896-97 to 1902-3 the Navy Estimates had risen steadily from twenty-two and a quarter millions to thirty-one millions ; in 1903-4 they leapt to thirty-five and three-quarter millions ; they reached "high-water mark" (36,860,000) in 1904-5; then fell to £33,389,000, and now stand at £31,869,000. The "saving" of five millions is reckoned, therefore, from a period of exceptional inflation. So far as total expenditure on the Navy is concerned, this year is really a return to normal conditions.

Next : as to the details of the five millions. The principal items of reductions made since 1904-5 stand as follow :—

. 1. Less expenditure on new construction about £2,500,000 2. „ PP on naval armaments 660,000 on maintenance, repairs, and

3. PP PP

sea stores for the Fleet ... 1,200,000

4. „ PP on provision for naval stores 500,000. The purchase of the Chilian ships accounts for most of the reduction on new construction ; it is non-recurrent, and ought not to be described as a saving. Lessened expenditure on naval armaments may be accounted for partly. by the same circumstance, or possibly may be due in part to reduced pur- chases of stores ; there is no reason to suppose it can be a permanent saving. Lessened provision for purchase of naval stores involves depletion of stocks. Mr. Robertson admitted this in the House of Common, and expressed the opinion that "the efficiency of the Navy or the sufficiency of the stores "had not suffered. Mr. Robertson is not an authority on this sub- ject; he simply acted as spokesman for the Admiralty. This is not the first time that stocks have been depleted, and expenditure has been reduced temporarily ; but in previous cases this action has been followed by increased expenditure, and probably this will prove true again. The reduction of the Store Vote this year is said to represent a diminution in stocks of fully ten per cent. Lord Cawdor Claimed that this was due to "revision of reserves and clearance of obsolete stock," as well RS the "utilisation of stocks that had Accumulated at the several naval establishments." It is certain, however, from the magnitude of the reduction made in the Vote and in stocks that there must have been either extravagance in the past or an acceptance of risks that sufficient stocks of stores will 'not be available immediately in case of war. So important •is' this matter 'to the efficiency -of the Fleet that it requires to be thoi•onghly investigated; and the public reassured that the reserves' of stores are ample. The reduction of £1,200,000 on repairs and maintenance of ships is even more serious. At any moment the real fighting strength of a Navy is measured by the ships which are com- plete, in good repair, and ready for immediate service. Vessels in course of construction do not count; vessels undergoing large repairs or refits are temporarily non-effective. In a great Service like the Royal Navy some vessels must always be in dockyards undergoing large repairs. The true policy is to perform that work promptly, so as to restore the vessels to readiness for active service at the earliest possible date. Postponement of the work or dilatoriness in executing it are inexcusable. "Lame ducks" in a Fleet cripple its efficiency, hamper its movements, and involve serious consequences. Careful scrutiny of the condition of completed ships is essential, especially in regard to features determining fighting power and real speed. Liberal provision for repairs and maintenance must be made, because its effects upon the available fighting power of the Fleet are immediate. No one will dispute these truisms; yet in practice they are often over- looked, and the danger is greatest when large programmes of

New Construction are in process of execution. Numbers of • new ships then come forward in succession for commission;

older ships pass into subordinate squadrons, or into reserves; consequently, as the peace squadrons are efficiently constituted, there is a tendency to leave repairs and refits for "a more convenient season." There is undoubtedly an uneasy feeling in the public mind at the present time as to the condition of many ships on the effective Het of the Royal Navy. Good reasons exist for this uneasiness, as any one may discern for himself by visiting the Royal dockyards or studying the naval journals. The Standard has recently devoted much attention to this matter. Unfortunately, the discussion has been coloured by political bias, the present Government being charged with neglect really due to the inaction of their pre- decessors. This subject is not one which should be used for party purposes ; the real responsibility for inaction rests upon Naval Members of the Board who have been continuously in office. Their technical knowledge should have ensured better results. Representations made by them would not have been disregarded.

Arrears of repairs were so considerable five years ago that Lord Selborne had to take special steps, and increase expenditure. The Royal dockyards are pre-eminently fitted for repairing work ; that is, indeed, the chief reason for their existence. Such prominence had been given, however, to new construction in the dockyards that "some congestion" of repair-work (to quote Lord Selborne) had arisen. It was, therefore, decided to obtain assistance from private firms who were better qualified for building warships than repairing them, and would have preferred building-work. In 1902-3 the total amount assigned to repairs and maintenance of the Fleet was about three millions sterling, of which £175,000 was for contract work. Next year (1903-4) over four millions sterling were devoted to repairs, &c., of which £722,000 was spent in private yards. Strange to say, in this same year three battleships which had been shown in the Navy Estimates as "to be built by Contract" were transferred to Royal dock- yards,—bardly the way to relieve "congestion" there. In 1904-5 the provision for repairs, &c., was four millions; next year (as above described) it was cut down by 2650,000; this year a further reduction of about 2540,000 has been made, the total provision being less than £2,800,000, or 2200,000 less than that of 1902-3. In the interval the capital value of the ships of the Royal Navy has been increased considerably ; every one familiar with the management of property recog- nises the principle that the outlay for maintenance should be proportioned to capital expenditure : the Admiralty, however, sets that principle aside without justification.

It has been suggested that the great reduction on repairs is due to " Scrapping " many ships,—a matter to which atten- tion will be directed in the following letter. All that need be said here is that this " weeding-out ". process cannot possibly have produced savings on repairs which account for the large reduction mentioned above,--21,200,000 in two years. When " heckled ' on the subject in the Rouse of .Commons, representatives of the Admiralty had to admit that not even an approximate estimate of these savings had been made. Yet three Cabiaet Ministers in succession alluded to the subject in terms which showed that in their opinion the greater part of the reduction of five millions was due to "weeding-out." Mr. Balfour (at Glasgow, January, 1905) said: "With one courageous stroke of the pen, as it were, these ships have been removed : the cost of their maintenance, the 'cost of *their repairs—I will not give the figure to which it comes, it is a very big one—are all struck off the annual Estimates." Earlier in the speech Mr. Balfour had alluded to "saving so many hundreds of thousands or millions a year,"—" big" figures indeed. Mr. Pretyman, when pressed for information a few months later, declined to claim a saving of even a hundred thousand pounds on account of "weeding- out." This circumstance did not prevent Lord Lansdowne (House of Lords, June, 1905) reminding "their Lordships that the Naval Estimates this year showed a saving of three and a half millions, owing to the courageous scheme of Lord Selborne relating to obsolete warships." Before that speech was delivered the real state of affairs had been made clear in the House of Commons. and by the Press ; but 'Lord Lansdowne, like his chief, had been "crammed" with the belief that " weeding-oat " was the great source, of economy. Such statements, once started, are hard to over- ' take ; their effect is most mischievous ; they are still current. In July last Mr. Haldane—speaking of the action of Lord Selborne's Board in December, 1904—said "they conceived a

plan, I think an admirable plan for eliminating useless and extravagant vessels from the Navy These vast changes, which resulted in the reduction of the Naval Estimates by five millions, and sweeping away many ships, were accomplished by a stroke of the executive pen." Mr. 'Haldane doubtless believed what he said: he necessarily rested on authoritative statements ; presumably made by Admiralty officials : he was misinformed. The public ought to be told who originated the same misconception in the minds of three Cabinet Ministers, all of whom, doubtless, would desire to state the simple truth. •

Lord Cawdor's Statement of 1965 contains an estimate for future expenditure on repairs and maintenance of "the entire fleet except ships building." The annual amount is fixed at £3,105,000; and the £5,000 gives an appearance of exactitude which, unfortunately, is not justified when the figures are examined. It will be noted that the actual provision (for maintenance, &c.) this financial year is about 2300,000 (nearly 10 per cent.) less than the amount fixed by Lord Cawdor as necessary for the upkeep of the Fleet. But even £3,105,000 would be altogether inadequate for a proper . performance of the service, according to the judgment of competent authorities. Sir William White (in July, 1905) .stated that at least four millions is required annually "for the efficient maintenance of the Fleet and for a certain amount of reconstruction." He pointed to the fact that when the capital value of the Fleet in completed ships was about one- third of its present amount, about a million was spent annually on repairs, &c. ; when the capital value had risen *(1898) from thirty-seven millions to ninety-seven millions, and the aggregate first cost of completed ships had increased pro- portionately, an annual expenditure on repairs, &c., of about one and a half millions proved inadequate, and work fell into arrears. Lord Cawdor admits that under the "former organisation" the provision should have been £3,950,000 per annum, which is in close agreement with Sir William White's figure. This is much below the provision made in former Navy Estimates, and accounts for the condition reached five years ago. Lord Cawdor also claims that the "new organisa- tion," notwithstanding a largely increased capital value of the Fleet, will effect a saving of 2845,000 per annum on repairs, &c. This is a preposterous estimate, and an explanation of its basis and method should be required by Parliament.

During this year the provision for repairs has proved insufficient, and will be exceeded, if statements made in Parliament by Mr. Robertson are accepted. Yet our naval ports are full or ships needing repairs ;- not a few ships in full commission notoriously reqdire thorough refits. Ships nominally undergoing repairs have been in band only inter- mittently as men were available ; as a result they have been on the ineffective list for long periods. Many ships "in Com- mission in Reserve "—which Mr. Balfour described (no doubt on Admiralty authority) as ready to go to sea and fight in a few hours—are defective in features essential to fighting efficiency and in the condition of their propelling apparatus. These are "open secrets"; no official, optimism, can hide, the serious loss in fighting strength which is involved. Large

discharges of workmen have been made from the dockyards without proper consideration of requirements for the upkeep of the Fleet. The capacity of the dockyards for repair work has been diminished simultaneously by the decision to build two of the three new battleships at Portsmouth and Devon. port, instead of assigning all these vessels to private firms. A vigorous effort and large expenditure are needed to bring completed ships available for further service into a state of full efficiency. It is an urgent requirement, and brooks no delay. No cry for economy must be allowed to interfere with the readiness of the Fleet for war.—I am, Sir, &c., Civis.