ENGLAND AND CHINA.
IN the last of an interesting series of articles which he has just brought to an end in the Daily Mail Mr. F. A. McKenzie appeals to Englishmen not to neglect the opportunity which now awaits them in China. "China," he says, "needs a friend among the Great Powers. That friend should be England." The Chinese "know that they cannot yet stand alone." They are under no delusions as to the extent .of the changes which their whole system of government demands, and they understand that while these reforms are in progress they will of necessity be weak externally. Domestic changes are ill carried out with watchful enemies standing round. Mr. McKenzie then passes in review the possible protectors to whom the Chinese might turn. Is Japan of any use ? No, for she is suspected of having designs upon Chinese territory. Russia is open to the same objection. She, too; is credited with designs of making good at the expense of China what she has been forced to yield to Japan: The United States is more disinterested than other Powers—we doubt whether Chinese statesmen believe much in disinterested diplomacy—but the United States is not in favour just now "because of the indignities inflicted upon Chinese subjects in California and elsewhere." Germany is justly hated in China by reason of her seizure of Kiao-chow and of the behaviour of her troops during the occupation necessitated by the "Boxer" outbreak. The other European Powers do not count in the affairs of the Far East ; and in this way, by a process of exhaustion, we arrive at Great Britain.
This comprehensive review omits, we think, one considera- tion of some importance. Mr. McKenzie apparently shares the distrust of Japan which be attributes to his clients. He can give the rein to this feeling without a moment's uneasiness, because his vision of the future presents to him an America commanding a powerful fleet in the Yellow Sea, and a Japan discovering too late that she "never made a. greater mistake than when her representative used threatening language towards the Federal Government at Washington." British interests in the Far East being identical with American interests, we have only to realise and act upon this fact to make Japan know her proper place. It is not quite evident, however, how far this policy would square with the Japanese Alliance. Probably, indeed, the repudiation of that Alliance and its attendant advantages, or what at all events we used not so long ago to regard as its attendant advantages, would be a necessary preliminary to the taking up of our new position. Moreover, if the United States is disliked in China because of the indignities inflicted upon Chinese subjects in California and elsewhere, there seems no immediate chance of this feeling undergoing any change. There is a good deal to be done in the way of -Constitutional amendments and the like before even the Japanese can feel sure of a welcome in the United States ; and there is no reason to suppose that Chinese immigrants will have any better reception, except as indentured labourers,—a position which a regenerated China is not likely to tolerate. Nor is it only in America that this feeling on the part of the white population is calculated to breed trouble. The difficulties in the way of Asiatic immigration which arise out of the relations between the Federal Government and the separate States are likely to have their parallels in the relations between the Imperial Government and the British Colonies. The Colonial Office does not find it easy to get its own way in Natal, even as regards the treatment of British subjects if they are not of the right colour ; and its difficulties would certainly not be fewer if the immigrant were a Chinaman. It seems quite possible that a few years hence we may find ourselves grouped with the United States as the objects of common remonstrance from Japan and China upon the unfriendly treatment which their subjects receive at the hands of American States and British Colonies, and the entire inadequacy of the measures we propose by way of satisfaction. It is conceivable that the strong fleet which Mr. McKenzie urges us to maintain in Far Eastern waters might have something else to do than to protect China against Japanese or Russian aggression.
When we exchange the future for the present, we have much more in common with Mr. McKenzie. The multi- plication of Consulates is always a commercial, and very often a diplomatic, gain. It supplies our own Govern- ment with more detailed information as to trade openings, and as to that local feeling on the knowledge of which the profitable use of these openings so largely depends. Nor do we question the necessity, from the point of view of English interests no less than of Chinese, of discouraging all attempts at further annexation on the part of any European Power. The old principle of the " open door" is as important as ever it was, and its proper working is defeated by nothing so much as by violent acts of aggression. We agree, too, upon the wisdom of restoring Wei-hai-wei to its natural possessor. Fortunately for us, its abandonment would involve no material loss, since it is admitted to be worthless for the purpose for which it was originally taken. To give it back to China would add point to any representations we may have to make in the future on the subject of proposed annexations by other Powers, and, being done under no pressure of any kind, would convince the Chinese—if any- thing will—that we really wish them well, and that our professions of interest in their reforms are not meant to cover any territorial ambitions of our own. There remains the question—which has lately taken on a new importance —of the opium trade. In so far as we forced the drug upon the Chinese people, our action is no longer defended by any one. But in the past the argument for a change of policy, even at the cost of serious disturbance to the finances of India, has been greatly weakened by the suspicion that the Chinese Government have been looking rather to the profits they expected to derive from growing opium at home than to any benefit to their people derived from putting an end to its growth abroad. Mr. McKenzie says quite truly that the question has seldom been fairly argued in England. Those who are opposed to the con- tinued cultivation of opium by the Indian Government usually make a mistake similar to that which the extreme temperance advocates make in regard to alcohol. They deny, that is, that it can ever be employed usefully, or even harmlessly. The two products do not, indeed, stand on the same footing. Even in England the use of opium is not unknown in the Fens, and in the vast swamps of India and China it has probably a positive medical value. But it is not this medical value that gives it the place it holds in Chinese life. There it is a luxury of the very worst type. "It destroys character, it saps energy, and it perverts morals. If the official smokes opium, the district under him goes to ruin ; if the servant smokes, dishonesty and laziness follow ; if the father smokes, the household is often wrecked." This is not, we believe, an exaggerated picture, and from the moment that the Chinese officials show themselves really in earnest in the matter—show, that is, that they are honestly striving to put an end to opium- smoking—they ought to have all the help that our Government can give them. But we may not unreason- ably ask for some evidence that they are in earnest. The cultivation of opium gives employment to a great number of our own subjects, and there is no reason that we should forego our Treaty rights merely to enable Chinese officials to fill their pockets by growing the drug themselves in equal quantities, and possibly of an inferior, cheaper, and still more mischievous quality. It ought not, however, to be beyond the power of our representatives in China to satisfy themselves upon this head ; and when that is done, we are quite ready to benefit the Chinese people at the cost of much inconvenience to India. What we are not willing to do is to cause much inconvenience to India without doing any good whatever to China. If we are to rob Peter, it should at least be with the prospect of paying Paul.
Though we have not been able to go all the way with Mr. McKenzie as regards our policy in the Far East, we are wholly of his opinion that English influence and English commerce have a great future before them in those waters, and that our Governments will not be doing their duty if they leave that future uncared for.
Previous page
