Pre-War Diplomacy
British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, with the assistance of Lillian M. Penson. Vol. V. The Near East, 1903-9. (1{.M. Stationery Office. 18s.) Ma. RAMSAY MAeDowAtn did a wise thing when, as Foreign Secretary, he ordered the publication of the British diplomatic documents bearing on the origins of the War. The volumes
so far issued—the eleventh, the first three and now the fifth— are admirably edited, profoundly interesting, and above all most creditable to the honesty and good sense of our successive Foreign Secretaries and our diplomatic corps.
The fifth volume which has just appeared is formidable— running to 900 pages—and is concerned with those Near Eastern affairs in which the British public was never able to take more than a languid interest until the War came. Yet it will repay careful reading both for the details and inner history of interminable negotiations, and still more for the light that it throws on the Continental diplomacy of the years 1903-9, The central episode of these troubled years was the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, coupled with Bulgaria's declaration of independence. If there is any more dis- creditable creditable incident in the history of modern diplomacy, we are not aware of it. The Austrian; the German, and the Russian Foreign Ministers distinguished themselves by pre- varication and double-dealing that in private life would have caused them to be shunned by all decent people. Baron d'Aehreathal, having arranged with Prince Ferdinand that he should declare himself King of Bulgaria the day before
Austria annexed Bosnia, deliberately gave our Ambassador to understand that he knew nothing about Bulgaria's intentions
and did not believe that Ferdinand would move. A few days later he assured Sir Edward Ooschen on his " solemn word of honour " that he had not been lying. King Edward's minute on the despatch ran : "I cannot believe in M. d'Aehrenthal's ' word of honour' statement, as facts belie it." The Austrian had at least economized the truth. He was well supported by his friends in Berlin, who professed sublime ignorance of Austria's intention to break the Berlin Treaty and then hastened, after the event, to declare approval and to threaten any Power that dared to question the wrong- doing.
Moreover, it is tolerably clear that M. Isvolsky, then the Russian Foreign Minister, was also playing a double game. He had negotiated privately with d'Aehrenthal and had apparently agreed that Austria should have Bosnia if in return Russia gained the right to use the Straits for her war vessels—another infraction of the Treaty of 1878. But the Austrian was too clever for him and never meant that Isvolsky should get anything. The British Government was evidentlY annoyed by Isvolsky's duplicity, and a certain coolness in the relations between London and St. Petersburg made it all the harder for the Western Powers to take any action when Austria and Bulgaria, backed by Germany, flouted the conscience of Europe. Our ambassadors sent some candid reports on the too ingenious M. Isvolsky, whom M. Poineartl; as he relates in his Memoirs, afterwards had much reason to distrust. Isvolsky's invariable line of defence was to argue that Great Britain and France ought to help him to keep in office, for if he fell he would be succeeded by a reactionary Government that would enter into a German alliance and leave England and France—or perhaps England alone— isolated in face of a German-controlled Europe.
Those who criticize Sir Edward Grey (as he then was) and the Liberal Ministry for not doing more to maintain friendly relations with the Central Powers before 1914 fail to realize the difficulties, the chief of which was bad faith at Vienna and at Berlin. Underlying all these tortuous negotiations was the determination of the German Foreign Office to break up the Triple Entente, to detach Russia from England and France, and, if possible, France from England. In a significant document printed as an appendix and dated 1909 we find Sir Charles Hardinge discussing the possibility of war. He assumed a reactionary Government coming to power in Russia and asking Sir Edward Grey whether England would help Russia in a war with Germany and Austria. The answer, he concluded, should be in the negative, if only because English public opinion detested the Russian reaction- aries. But he felt that the alternative policy of coming to terms with Germany on the lines laid down by Prince Billow would be " a trap " to be sedulously avoided, since it would make Germany overwhelmingly dominant.
There is much else in the volume to interest. The murder of the King and Queen of Serbia in June, 1903, led to a severance of our relations with that country. Three years later King Edward informed Sir Edward Grey that he was " perfectly ready to agree that a British representative should be sent to Belgrade " if it were made clear that the five regicide officers were removed from office, and if an under- taking is given that they will never again be employed.". " The King has no great confidence in Serbian statesmen, and it would be very awkward if the regicides were recalled as it might necessitate the withdrawal of the Minister:', Sir Edward Grey informed the Serbian Government that the re-employment of the murderers would in fact entail the withdrawal of our Minister. The crime discredited Serbia for years in the eyes of Western Europe, and facilitated Austria's designs for weakening and eventually absorbing her hated little neighbour. Many pages are devoted to the Macedonian reform scheme and to the Turkish revolution of 1908-9. It is pathetic to look back on the vain efforts to induce Abdul Hamid to give Macedonia a decent administra- tion. As Germany and Austria never meant the reforms to come to anything, and as Russia was half-hearted about them, it is hardly surprising that the wretched Christian peasantry continued to suffer while diplomatists talked and composed futile despatches. Nothing could be done until the Turk was expelled, as he was in the Balkan War of 1912-13.
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