The Rhineland and Sir Austen Chamberlain T HE question of withdrawing
the occupying troops from the Rhineland and the problem of Repara- tions—whether these things are quite unrelated, as Germany says, or only accidentally related or essentially related, as others say—are occupying all the attention of the League Council at Lugano. Now that the legal meaning of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to the occupation of the Rhineland has been defined by Sir Austen Chamberlain, there is no hope of inducing the Government to change their mind upon that subject ; all that we can hope and work for is a speedy settlement of the Reparations problem in order to enjoy the sequel of an early withdrawal from the Rhineland. We know exactly what Sir Austen Chamberlain himself desires— the earliest possible withdrawal—but it has been his fault or his misfortune that he has seemed to admonish those of his friends and followers who were doing their best to forward his policy.
The different interpretations of the relevant passages in the Treaty of Versailles make a painfully interesting study. Last week we quoted Article 431, upon the meaning of which controversy has been concentrated. This article says—" If before the expiration of the period of fifteen years Germany complies with all -the under- takings resulting from the present Treaty the occupying forces will be withdrawn immediately." Sir Austen stated in the House of Commons last week that the Government were advised—by their lawyers, we sup- pose—that this article meant that there could be no withdrawal until Germany had " completely executed and discharged the whole of her Reparation obligations." We should have thought that the words might mean that there would be a withdrawal when Germany had pledged herself to full payment. Indeed to many people that seems the more natural interpretation.
We do not forget that when the Treaty was in the making the statesmen of the Allies probably had in mind for their guidance the last settlement of a great war-debt- the settlement of France with Germany after the war of 1870. France then paid what was considered a huge sum with unexpected promptitude, and therefore the statesmen of 1919 may have looked upon fifteen years as a comparatively long time. Even so, we cannot suppose that they took it for granted that Germany could pay all that she would owe within fifteen years, and it follows in that case that they cannot really have wished— at least the British representatives did not—that the Allies should occupy the Rhineland for an immense number of years. On the interpretation of the Treaty which Sir Austen accepts the Allies might well stay in the Rhineland for at least thirty years and perhaps for more than sixty years.
Sir Austen's purpose in making his statement was, to our minds, pretty clear. He wanted to emphasize the extraordinarily drastic significance of the Treaty only to topple it over by pointing out that there was a political question as well as a legal question, and that the political question was much the more important of the two., Unfortunately he does not excel in that -imaginative power which is required to foresee how such a balanced statement of law and intention .will appear to those who stand to suffer from his supposed policy. His expositi9n of the law was much more impressive than his exposition of how Great Britain wished to improve upon it. The result was that Germany jumped into a mood of alarm_ and annoyance which has not. yet spent itself. _ Although. Sir Austen's desire to get: out of the Rhineland is as keen as that of Mr. Lloyd George or of any of his critics, he has been widely understood to have said less than, was actually said by Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson and M. Clemenceau in the very unforthcoming days of 1919.
On June 16th, 1919, the following joint British; American, and French declaration was made, " The, Allies and Associated Powers did not insist upon making the period of occupation last until the Repara- tion clauses were completely executed because they assumed that Germany would be obliged to give every proof of her good-will and every necessary guarantee before the end of the fifteen years' time.", How can that declaration be reconciled with Sir Austen's definition of the law ? His answer — and it would be useless to try to get round it—is that the declaration was one purely of intention and had nothing to do with the wording of the Treaty. The Treaty was what it was, and must necessarily remain so. Although we are not ourselves convinced as to the meaning of the Treaty, we must admit that some critics who are more friendly to Germany in all respects than we are ourselves agree with Sir Austen that the Treaty does. mean that there shall be no withdrawal until the last penny of Reparations has been paid. Naturally they wish the law to be surmounted ; so do we ; and so does Sir Austen; Our disappointment therefore is concerned only with Sir . Austen's habitual unwillingness or inability to show unequivocally what his policy is. As a matter . of fact, though this has been obscured, it is what the vast majority in this country patently desire.
The British people, as a whole, hold that the Rhineland ought to be evacuated directly Germany has agreed to the total amount of her indebtedness and that an agree- ment ought to be reached, and could be reached; within a few- months. It is gladly assumed that Germany could not possibly expose herself to such a- shattering loss of credit as she would suffer if she defaulted. Even to-day many Frenchmen who are determined to make Germany pay to the uttermost do not want to insist upon the extreme legal view of the Treaty. M. Tardieu, for example, would be satisfied if Germany raised a loan or marketed bonds of a sufficient amount to guarantee the position.
The whole situation has been changed since the Treaty of Versailles was signed. Concrete meanings have been given to the Covenant; Locarno has guaranteed the safety of both France and Gerniany ; and, finally, there is the Kellogg Pact which pledges the signatoriee never to use war as an instrument of policy. What nearly all Englishmen desire is that the gm- und should be made good ; that these significant facti should not be left hanging in mid-air. And one of the first and most obvious proofs of the desire to make the Kellogg Pact a' reality is to bring t6 an end the inconvenience, or provo- cation, to Germany of the continued occupation of the Rhineland.
Last week at the Pilgrims' Dinner Sir Austen exhorted the PresS not to make more difficult the work of " peace- loving and peace-minded statesmen." But the truth is that Sir Austen was not quite peace-loving enough for his friends—or rather, for this is the point, did not seem to be. And our doubts were increased when we .meditated upon Sir Austen's complaint that " directors of the Press " had sometimes said to him that they could not help themselves because they " hid to give the public what the public required." What sort of newspapers ? We wonder.
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