THE WAR SURVEYED : THE FINNISH CAMPAIGN
By STRATEGICUS
THE Finnish campaign has now, as I write, been in progress nearly a fortnight, and it is permissible to draw some definite conclusions. The war potential of Finland and Russia has been indicated with sufficient exacti- tude. The possible man-power of the former was deliber- ately given as the absolute maximum which could be recruited, and the Russian figure was left vague, since no one can say what are the exact limits of the number of men (and women) that could be raised. The ultimate possibili- ties were suggested since, at long last, a Great Power embarked on war may reasonably be expected to send into action a number of units bearing some relation to its total potential, and sufficient to meet its weaker opponent at overwhelming advantage. The whole art of war, as all its famous exponents agree, is to mass overwhelming odds against the enemy. Napoleon stated, with a definiteness that leaves nothing to the imagination, that he was guided by that principle on all occasions ; and, even if it should reduce the art of war to the trite, it is certainly the one abiding principle.
It has been made clear, though it should scarcely need statement, that the terrain is some part of an army's strength. In the case of Poland and Holland, it is a factor that diminishes the effectiveness of the armies' resistance. Topography qualifies the terrain as does the weather. In effect, the skill of those who delimitated national bound- aries is not impressive, if they were thinking of a world in which war is still a tragic and not over-improbable possi- bility. But given the frontiers and the weather, it is obvious that nature has notably assisted some nations as it has hurt others. Finland is a land of lakes ; not small lakes only but lakes of such size that one may spend, as did the present writer, 48 hours in the crossing, even in a paddle-steamer.
The Russian campaign against Finland, then, could look to the greatest material resources and the greatest man- power of any nation in the world as opposed to resources of both sorts that were, of necessity, among the smallest in the world. The exceptions to this generalisation were the presumably higher morale of the Finns and the more intractable nature of the terrain. Some parts of Finland are studded with lakes ; and it is obvious that such a country does not offer advantages to the deployment of great numbers. If the lakes were of the same density throughout Finland, as in the Karelian Isthmus, the problem of attack would have been much more difficult of solution. If any country in the world should have known the conditions accurately it was Russia, since Finland was, until 1917, a Russian Grand Duchy ; and Russia had encountered the Finns before on the same ground.
With all the factors known, Russia was expected to prepare a plan for invasion, appropriate in detail to every factor of the defence ; and, in point of fact, some sugges- tion of a plan, skilfully adapted to the situation, can now be discovered. The most important area, the coastal sector, from the frontier to Turku (Abo) was the main objective.'
To such an extent is this true that Russia would have been well content with it if the Finns had agreed to resign control of it. The possession of this area would have assured to Russia the safety of the Gulf of Finland and Leningrad. The second objective was the ice-free port of Petsamo. The Russian invasion had to be designed to secure both ; and such subsidiary operations as were undertaken were designed to assist the capture of one or other objective, either by making the positions selected for their defence untenable or by preventing reinforce- ments reaching the Finns. (It is, of course, obvious that in carrying out operations directed to this latter end Russia would be placing herself in the best position to threaten Norway—and if so desired to seize a port on the Atlantic— and Sweden—and so be ready to seize the mineral resources of that country).
The Russian attack was therefore directed in three columns: one against Petsamo (Petschenga), the northern port ; the second due west towards the Gulf of Bothnia and the Swedish frontier ; and the third against the " Manner- heim line." This last was a sort of two-pronged thrust, north and south of Lake Ladoga. It need hardly be said that the " Mannerheim line " is not a line so much as a deep defensive system, carefully built up on every natural feature of the ground. But all this was known ; and yet, after almost a fortnight, can it be said that the Finnish position ha:, been critically weakened? Certainly not. In the broad, what has occurred is the capture of Petsamo with the Russians penned in and unable to exploit the advantage ; the advance of Russian columns towards the head of the Gulf of Bothnia, but isolated and with the flanks checked ; and an advance in the Karelian Isthmus and north of Lake Ladoga, but no apparent approach to a decision.
It is serviceable to take these thrusts separately. The column operating north of Lake Ladoga has made an advance, but it has been halted west of Pitkaranta, little less than twenty miles from the pivot of the defence in this area. To the south of the lake, in the isthmus itself, the Russians are almost forty miles from the frontier ; but their front now makes a salient towards the west and is held on the flanks, on the south shore of the lake and on the coast. Here, where one would expect the advance to be decisive—since the Russians have a navy which, on paper at least, is fairly strong—the flank is held well to the east of the most westerly point of the advance. The navy seems at first rather foolishly to have exchanged shots with the forts. It is a commonplace of naval experience how disadvantageous is such an exchange ; but the navy might have covered a landing, to turn the main defences. The attempts have all come to grief ; and hence on this main front the essentials of the defensive " line " are intact, atlhough there are more divisions engaged here than on the other two sectors together.
Round Petsamo, three Russian divisions are said to be operating, and the port, having changed hands once or twice, now remains under Russian control. The capture was effected by landings in the fjord from Murmansk ; but the resistance has been as skilful as tenacious, and the Russians have not as yet been able to develop their success. It is, however, the central thrust that looks most interesting and most dangerous. Between Nurmes, on the Oulu (Uleaborg) railway, and Salla (Kuolajarvi), a distance of nearly 140 miles, there are some six divisions, operating in four or five columns. The fortunes of this force have been watched with some anxiety, since they are advancing towards the Gulf of Bothnia and the Swedish frontier and threaten to cut Finland in two, close the Swedish frontier, and prevent Swedish munitions reaching the defence from the other side of the gulf. But Suomussalmi, which is the nearest point to Oulu reached by the Russians, has been retaken. Salla has now been abandoned ; but while the centre and southern flank are checked not too much danger is to be anticipated from the advance west of Salla.
At the moment there seems no immediate prospect of Russia securing a decision ; but what must strike the military student as the oddest feature of this strange campaign is the fact that, though Russia is supposed to have sent some twenty divisions against Finland, nowhere do we read of any signi- ficant numbers. Companies are mentioned ; a few hundred dead have been noted. But these casualties seem to be wholly inappropriate to the numbers engaged. In the Karelian isthmus, where the troops are operating in greatest density, there is no hint of casualties corresponding to the stiffness of the resistance. Finland has, so far, been using not one-third the number of the Russian effectives. It is strange also to find guerilla tactics, carried out by such small numbers, proving effective in checking the advance in the central area.
Indeed, not only does it seem that nothing has gone according to the Russian plan, but the impression is that the plan has not been pressed. The attempt to effect a landing on the shore of the Gulf of Finland was not only abortive: it was crude and badly managed. There seems to have been little real attempt on the part of Russia to take advantage of her immense superiority in the air. There is barely a hint of any unity of direction in the plan ; and though the first attack was made by well-equipped troops the development of the offensive has seen the men ill-clad and ill-furnished for the sort of terrain on which they are operating. Does this mean that Stalin miscalculated the resistance or that the Russia army is as poor as its most severe critics have suggested? Possibly a little of both. We seem entitled to conclude that the new Russian army has all the faults and so far none of the virtues of the old.
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