A LuU in Korea Mr. Attlee's guarded expression of confidence
in the United Nations' forces ability to "maintain themselves in Korea" is symptomatic of a return to realism. Like similar statements made a few days ago by General MacArthur, it is inspired less by military developments than by the lack of them. Against weakening Chinese opposition the encir'cled elements of X Corps have fought their way to the east coast port of Hungnam with great gallantry and deter- mination; but on the 8th Army's front, isomewhere in the region of the 38th Parallel, there has been virtually no contact with the enemy. Meanwhile the American Intelligence Staff in Tokyo continue with an air of relish to tot up the mounting Chinese order of battle, to which the latest addition is two divisions of Mongol cavalry— identified, presumably, by low-flying ethnologists, for in winter uniform a Mongol on a pony is not readily distinguishable from a Chinese. What this large army intends to do, and whether it will be able to carry out its intentions (a smaller invasion force has not yet achieved decisive results against General Winter in Tibet ; and General Winter has no air force), is still anybody's guess ; but what It has so far failed to do is to exploit an initial success which was perhaps only partly deserved. This is encouraging, as far as it goes ; but our forces are in Korea for a purpose more ambitious than the avoidance of defeat, and the first step towards achieving that purpose is to wrest the initiative from the enemy.
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