EARL RUSSELL IN MEXICO.
THE Mexican Blue-book is not by any means pleasant reading, for the pith of it seems to be this : the British Government have adhered to their principles, but have been forced to consent to the very proceeding they deprecated, and to witness unmoved the results against which they had strongly protested. They have helped to forward an inter- vention they did not desire, and must perforce await action in a direction which they admit they do not approve. The idea of intervention commenced, it would appear, with the Spaniards, who were determined to seek redress for incessant insult and outrage. They were resolved also not to delay beyond November, and to proceed, whether France and England consented to the proposal for joint action or not. It was the French Government which, so early as September, 1861, spoke of ulterior measures, such as summoning a free Congress to decide on the future go- vernment of Mexico. The British Government seem from the first to have been afraid of designs hidden under the pretext of seeking redress, and on September 27, 1861, they made the independence of Mexico an "essential con- dition" of their adherence to the convention. Both Powers agreed to this stipulation, Marshal O'Donnell, indeed, repudiating.the idea of conquest for Spain as a design which could only prove injurious to her own welfare. M. Thou- venel, moreover, affirmed that France had no intention "to influence by armed force an arbitration in the internal affairs of Mexico," and only hoped that the better class of Mexicans might take advantage of the intervention to throw off an unbearable tyranny. The convention, therefore, was strictly limited in form, and the British Government had no ground for remonstrance or even displeasure. Their own conduct had been strictly in accordance with principle. They could not abstain from action without serious detriment to British interests, they could not act separately without a certainty of incessant collisions ; and they had strictly limited the extent and the character of the intervention of their allies. There is nothing whatever to charge them with, not even want of precaution.
Indeed, they were over-distrustful. The Spanish Ministry, on October 9th, while still discussing the convention, sug- gested that to come to some understanding with Mexico about a durable government was a duty owed to humanity, and were instantly asked whether they intended to stay there until that duty was performed! They repudiated the idea, but when in December news was received that the Spanish expedition had put to sea, Earl Russell was roused, and a correspondence appears to have ensued, which is not given, but which ended in an intimation that her Majesty's Government could not understand "why the Spanish expedition set out before the arrival of the British and French forces." The French Government could not understand it either, and the Emperor seems to have felt it necessary to act with decision. On 17th January, the Bri- tish Government was informed that the Emperor had re- solved to double the French expedition, and to advance into the interior of the country. The intervention, in fact, from this date took the form of an invasion, and the British Go- vernment seems for the moment to have been thoroughly nonplussed. They could not prohibit action to which they had consented because it was a little too quick. They could not answer the Emperor's argument, that without rein- forcements France might be in a position of inferiority to Spain, and they could not join in an enterprise palpably intended to effect an object they had protested against. Mexican independence, which was now threatened, was the "essential condition" of their adherence to the programme. They were fairly driven into a corner, and were aware of it, and adopted the frankest course. They expressed a firm disapproval, but added that they had no argument to offer, and would content themselves with re- fusing to increase the British quota of force. To Spain they spoke a little' more sternly : "The allied forces are not to be used for the purpose of depriving the Mexicans of their undoubted right of choosing their own form of government." But even to Spain menaces were out of the question. Earl Russell could only maintain the principle and refuse to share in the responsibility. So also with the nomination of the Archduke Maximilian. Lord Cowley was told by M. Thouvenel that such a project was really on foot, but was started by Mexicans only,—a remark which, of course, Lord Cowley knew how to interpret as it deserve& The British Government, however, had nothing to say. If the Mexicans chose to elect an Archduke, "there was nothing in the con- vention to prevent it ;" but this Government "could be no party to forcible intervention for any such object." Nothing can be more decided than the resolution of the Cabinet to let Mexico settle her own affairs, and only to insist on repa- ration for British injuries, and the payment of British debts, and that this resolution covered no secret policy is proved by one single (bet;: Earl Russell exerted himself to the utmost to admit the -United States into the convention, and had Mr. Seward been a statesman instead of a despatch writer, the Federal Government would have had a vote against interven- tion, which, backed by Great Britain, must have been con- clusive. As it is, that Government, which detests the inter- vention so greatly that it offered, in the present state of its finances, to secure the whole debt, remains in a sulky and powerless isolation ; or, to use the expressively inelegant phrase of American editors, is "left out in the cold." The British Government, moreover without an ally in argument, is compelled either to prohibit the action of France and Spain, or to sit silent and bear the probable neglect of the "essential condition" of the convention.
The position is not a pleasant one, but it is no fault of the Ministry. They might have abstained from interference in the first instance but it is certain that if they had done so they would have been accused of neglecting the interests of British subjects,and the desires of the better classesof Mexico. They could scarcely help intervening, and intervention once sanctioned, they could not risk war to prohibit France and Spain from introducing an order which, had it but the consent of the Mexicans, England would see with approval. All that remains to be done is to watch, and if the Mexicans rear a strong Government, make with it some new and final arrangement; or, if a strong Government is imposed upon. Mexico, retire, protesting against an exertion of force which was virtually prohibited by the convention. Inaction is not the role which Englishmen love to play, but in this case we cannot, in common consistency, help to deprive even Mexicans of their right of self-government ; nor can we, for the sake of humanity, prevent France from putting an end to anarchy. We have at least one consolation under a diplomatic defeat. Earl Russell in very difficult circumstances has spoken frankly and maintained a great principle intact, and the Mexicans, whether liberated or only coerced, must be better off than they now are. The despatches are full of proof that the misery of Mexico has as yet been understated. It is a country ruled by hostile gangs of bandits. These despatches throw but little light on the prospects of the allies. Sir C. Wyke, who might be pronounced per- fectly qualified for his post if he were not so fond of putting sly satire into despatches, evidently believes that the situa- tion rests with Michael Pohlad°, who has received absolute power from Congress to make any terms he may deem expe- dient. He mentions too, incidentally, that the whites would be powerless were the Indians united, and that one at least of the ablest and best of Mexicans believed a foreign armed intervention the only hope of Mexico.
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