TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE AUSTRIAN TERTIUM QUID. BAITED by Italy and menaced by France, with one kingdoni barely held by an army which consumes twice its revenue, and another only restrained from insurrection by the moderation of its own leaders ; with an army dispirited by the certainty of mismanagement, and a deficit almost as large as the revenue; with a Parliament which can pass laws only for half the empire, and the leadership of Germany almost lost ; with Europe hostile, the people angry, and the dynasty despondingly obstinate, the statesmen of Austria seem to be beaten at last into something which looks like ability. They have, it is said, given up the Non possum:44r and discovered a tertium quid. Hitherto their only course has been an unavailing complaint dictated by a fallacious hope. Something must turn up some day, and till then they would preserve intact the claims born under the arrangement of Villafranca. Napoleon might die, or the priests might upset his policy, or Naples might be given over to brigands, or England and France might quarrel, or there might be a reaction in Prussia, or, in short, any great European calamity might give to the "Middle Empire" one more chance of exacting an ample satisfaction. She is the convict of Europe, and any confusion can but give her a chance. Then, with Sardinia once defeated, a second Novara fairly won, the Grand-Dukes would be reinstated, and Austria, placing a vassal after her own heart on the throne of Naples, might turn on the Magyar race, and perhaps end the quarrel of eight centuries in their final extinction. For this the most despotic House in Europe has agreed to call itself constitutional, and for this it has maintained an army pronounced by its own advisers insup- portably expensive, and has kept up towards Italy an attitude of armed forbearance. The situation, however, has lasted too long. The Neapolitans are defeated, and the Papacy quakes. Napoleon lives, and the Revolution is still restrained. The Western Powers do not quarrel, and, above all, Austrians are slowly wakening to a perception that, calmly observant as she may appear, England in the supreme hour may not bear to see a sixth constitutional Power reduced once again to slavery. Waiting for England's weakness is like wait- ing till the ocean is at rest, and half in despair, half in the exercise of their old cunning, the Austrian Cabinet have suggested a third device. Austria shall give up the Non possumus, abandon the Duchies, throw over the Bourbons, leave the Papacy to the care of the Providence in which it professes to trust, and acknowledge Italy, if only Italy in return will acknowledge Venetia.
It is an enticing bid. The Austrian Government, faithless to its subjects, is usually faithful to foreign Powers, and seldom violates those decorums which secure the peace of Europe almost as much as law. She would probably treat Italy, once acknowledged, better than she treats England, perhaps relax her rule in Venetia and certainly abstain from exciting revolution in an acknowledged State. The tempta- tion to Victor Emanuel, therefore, as a mere dynast, would be immense. He would be the "legitimate" King of Italy, a monarch whose revolutionary title had been forgiven by Europe. All he has gained, and which is now always in jeopardy, would be guaranteed to his heirs. When Austrian support is fairly withdrawn, the Papacy must make terms, the French troops would cease from their occupation of Rome, and the peninsula, from the Mincio to the Mediterranean, would at last be free. The secure sovereignty of twenty- two millions of people,—that is the bribe offered td Victor Emanuel and his advisers. It is one which might make even their subjects pause. With Austria friendly, they would have time for that thorough reorganization which Italy so sorely needs, might bring their army up to its necessary level, might strengthen their fleet, and might prepare a sys- tem of sound and progressive finance. They would be free from the curse of Rome, free from the shadow of France, and able at last to commence the career of physical progress to which their national genius so clearly tends. To Europe, the temptation offered is perhaps even greater. The possibility of war in Italy weighs on all states like a nightmare, increases all armies, burdens all peoples with an endless weight of taxation. France cannot disarm, for there 18 nay to resist. Austria 'cannot disarm for there is Venetia to defend. Germany cannot disarm, for there is armed France glancing frowningly at the flag which waves over the Rhine. England, above all, cannot disarm, for she cannot permit one Yower to acquire a continental prepon- derance, or marshal the "minor marines" to dispute her possession of the seas. With the Italian question fairly at rest, one quarter of their armies, one-fifth of their taxation, might be spared to the peoples of Europe. To Austria, in particular, the change would be like a respite from execu- tion. With no Italian war to dread, she might reduce her army to 300,000 men, and by selling her crown lands, and taxing the Church, place herself once again in a solvent position. The Hungarians, deprived of Italian aid, must needs make terms, and the empire, so recently almost dis- solved, would be again prepared to assert that position in Germany which the dynasty values almost more than its Italian sway. It is no feeble proof of the strength of modern opinion, of the obedience which sovereigns are beginning to pay to moral considerations, that we should all feel that this plan, so astute, and in some respects so desirable, is never- theless but a dream. There never, till now, has been a time when a king could feel such an offer not worth a moment's consideration. Even so late as 1815, an ar- rangement of the kind would have been pronounced just as well as wise, and the surviving diplomatists of the older school will still think its rejection the result of a silly sentiment. Yet all men out of Austria feel that it must be rejected. It involves a sale of Venetia, and is ab incepto utterly immoral. With his claim to deliver Venetia, Victor Emanuel would surrender his claim to be King of Italy. He is king, not by descent or by conquest, but by the election of a people, who elected him because he promised to secure, so far as man might secure, the unity and the freedom of the peninsula. With his efforts for that great object his moral right would end. The Italians would once more acquire the fatal belief that a monarch can never be trusted, and from that hour, out of Piedmont, where loyalty is ingrained in the people, he would rule only by force. The willingness which is filling his armies and strengthening Parliament to tax, and providing a levy en masse, under colour of a National Guard, would at once disappear, and with it the unity of Italy. Naples has not submitted to Piedmont, but added herself to Italy, an Italy which, with- out Venetia, cannot even exist. He might as well abandon Rome, and declare Italy constituted, while its capital was held by a foreign soldiery, protecting a separate dominion. The Mazzinian spirit, now dormant, would be at once re- vived, and the task of uniting Italy would be for the second time transferred to the Revolution. There is happily no fear of any compromise of the kind. The King who in 1849 refused an Austrian guarantee for his throne, is not likely to accept one now, or to forget that he has not yet avenged the father who, beaten by these very Austrians, deserted, tra- duced, and broken-hearted, still "did not die as kings die." An idea is for once seen to be stronger than diplomatists, or armies, or statesmen, and Italians will only wonder that Austria should offer such futile terms.
The proposal must be abandoned, but its consideration can scarcely have been infructuous. It is not possible that Aus- trian councillors can have considered the advantage of peace with Italy without considering also how completely peace is within their power. There is not an advantage which such an arrangement would secure which would not be obtained more fully by the surrender of Venetia'. That province once honestly given up, and Italy has no quarrel with Austria. Indeed, a necessity, which is stronger than gratitude or na- tional antipathies, will compel her to turn to Austria for aid against the overwhelming influence of France. The finances of Austria would be at once set right. The army might be re- duced at once to 250,000 men, and the reduction fall on the dangerous Hungarian element. Hungary, with Italy con- tent, must make terms, and if the Emperor had but the nerve to make them with the free Diet, to unite Austria and Hun- gary by an alliance instead of an impracticable constitution, he might remain master of two kingdoms, each entitled to rank as a first-class Power. Venetia at home brings him nothing, except new dangers in Hungary, and abroad yields him nothing except a position which is worthless, except as a menace to the Italy he is ready to acknowledge. There need be no talk of sale. On that one point Englishmen will sympathize fully with the Austrian Court. The Emperor has no more right to sell Venice than we have to sell Bengal. But he has a right to withdraw from a territory which detests his dominion, and can do it without sacrifice of dignity, and with a moral gain which, as the example of Italy shows, is of itself worth armies. The popular idea that the fate of Venetia would be a precedent for the remainder of his territory, is wholly without foundation. The only province held by the same title is Galicia, which has asked as yet for liberty rather than for release. In the remainder of his territories the Emperor, though hampered by promises which he has broken, and constitutions which he has set aside though opposed by parties whose chiefs be has shot, and hated by populations whom he has outraged, still reigns by a right other than that of conquest, and has only to govern justly to obtain from the regard of his people that obedience which even their hatred has not sufficed to destroy. It is confidence which is wanting in Austria, and who would not trust a sovereign who for the sake of a principle gave up a province ?
Previous page
