THE FOUNDATIONS OF ALLIED STRATEGY
By STRATEGICUS ISIrdominant position as e the basis of Allied strategy. The con- THING has occurred to displace sea-power from its pre-
lied strategy.
of a rivalry between the various arms of Allied striking- power is mainly an illusion, fostered to some extent by outmoded ideas of warfare. It .is abundantly clear that each has its separate role as well as its function in co-operation with the other two. To think otherwise is to confuse the role with the instruments that apply it. The long discussion about whether sea-power has been displaced by air-power cannot survive that distinction. For sea- power means simply the power to operate on the sea ; and this, which formerly depended upon surface-ships alone, has for long involved submarines, and now clearly embraces the use of aircraft, in some conditions pre-eminently, and in all to some extent. Further- more, although these are the instruments by which control of movement on the sea is directly achieved, it cannot be applied without the bases from which the instruments work, and without shipping that makes use of sea-communications. Without bases even the greatest concentration of fighting units could not operate, even for their direct purpose ; since they could not give battle, institute a blockade or defend a country against invasion.
Control of the sea is necessary for the Allies, not only for the transference of fighting units from one place to another, but also for the distribution of the food without which we could not continue to exist, and the material without which the fighting units could not give battle. In spite of the development of air-transport, which enabled the Allies to convey to North Africa "many thousands" of United States troops, there is no prospect of it ever playing anything but a subsidiary role in supply and concentration. The army cut off at Stalingrad is not existing on the supplies brought up by the Junkers 52; and it could not maintain itself on any air-transport system at present known. It is living and fighting on its reserves, which were naturally great, as it was destined for the capture and maintenance of Stalingrad as a base. But if that army, which may now be reduced to between 120,000 and 150,000 men, cannot be supplied by air, it is obviously impossible that Britain could live and operate by that means. It is this that gives the urgency to the submarine problem. For it is not only Britain, but Russia, North Africa, India and Australia that must be supplied. The precise state of this problem, however, cannot be ascertained, since the buildings of German submarines and Allied shipping are both at present. in excess of the sinkings, and the figures are not disclosed.
It is, however, certain that upon the solution of the problem depends the ease and speed with which the Allies can achieve victory, and Hitler's present strategy is reducible to an attempt to hold out till the submarine shall have limited the Allied power to make war upon him. It is, of course, a pis alter, as it was in the last war ; and it is moreover a tacit admission that the initial grand strategy has gone astray. This does not make it any the less imperative for the Allies to discover a means to find a complete, or at least a partial, solution of the problem. It is here, perhaps, that the air-arm may have a decisive and direct influence. It is only in this country that the air-arm is independent, and subject- neither to partition between the older seivices nor to fusion with them ; but it is significant that Major Seversky, who has been mainly concerned with aircraft, has suggested that the United States should have an air force with a similar independence to that of the Royal Air Force. It is also important to note that it was a soldier, General Smuts, who wrote the memorandum which gave that Force its independence ; and it is remarkable how modern and full of sug- gestion his memorandum remains.
Such considerations have been raised afresh by the interview given last week by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder to war corre- spondents in Cairo. Sir Arthur has been appointed Vice-Chief of the Air Staff ; and he comes to that position with an extensive experience and important achievement with the Middle East Command. Sir
Arthur expressly acknowledges that the Army plays its part in air- power, as it must also in sea-power, by securing and safeguarding the bases from which the units operate. If it is inconceivable that land operations should ever again take place without the co-operation of aircraft, it is too little realised that the defence of airfields is a matter for ground forces. Whatever be the administrative arrange- ment for such defence, airfields are essentially land positions, and as such fall as much into the sphere of army operations as any other positions. They are particularly valuable positions ; and our ignoring of that fact has cost us much in the past. The value of aircraft-carriers, which are in effect floating aerodromes, has found much easier acceptance ; and it is their function of mobility that justifies the Fleet Air Arm. The Navy has its own air arm as well as its own ground striking force in acknowledgment of the plain fact that the three arms have their vital interdependence as well as their independent role.
It is in this last matter that Sir Arthur Tedder has developed an argument that bears upon the Allied strategy. We have now secured air supremacy and it is difficult to see how we can ever lose it. Such production figures as those disclosed by Mr. Roosevelt cannot be regarded as of minor importance. "The command of the air determines what happens on land and on sea," says Sir Arthur Tedder. This thesis, frequently discussed by the present writer, is only now beginning to assume full validity. Theoretically it is obvious that command pf the air should not only be capable at limiting, if not destroying, the enemy's war potential, but also of isolating battlefields and immobilising the industrial output. But it seems as if these effects cannot be produced until the command is overwhelmingly supreme. Too often in the past the surface appearance of battlefields has tended to cast a doubt upon the achievement of command of the air. It may, of course, be a complete illusion, since we have no accurate knowledge of the wastage suffered in concentrating a given ground force and its material equipment. Probably the enemy's strength in the past has suffered that attrition in concentration ; and that it has lost no more is due to the effect of a supremacy that has never been wholly com- plete and certainly never overwhelming.
The degree of supremacy the Allies at present enjoy cannot be appreciated from the figures. It must depend upon mobility, which has been more highly developed by the enemy, and upon grand strategy. But now it appears to be certain that a full appreciation of the decisive effect of command of the air will dictate the strategic use ; and we can place no limits to its influence upon the course of the war. At the moment it cannot be ignored that the enemy is losing material at a rate that must excite his alarm, more particularly as the wastage of man-power is calling for a further withdrawal from the German war-factories. The wastage is, therefore, being accelerated in several directions at once. How is it to be made good? There can be little doubt that this will be Hitler's main difficulty, since it is obvious that the Allies will make every use of improving weather, increased range and better technique to destroy the factories that produce war-material and the communications that transport it to the battlefields.
We begin, therefore, to see the outlines of the strategy by which the Allies hope to win the war. Sea-power will give them the mobility which will enable them to strike at whatever part of Hitler's Fortress Europe they choose. Air-supremacy will be used to carry increasing destruction to his factories, his submarine bases, and his transport, as well as to blind his armies on the battlefield, and crush his forward and main bases. It may also be used to outflank, or take in the rear, the defences where they seem the strongest. Parachutists will distract and disperse his forces. By careful selection of his weak points and the cumulative effect of strategic bombing the great German war-machine will be worn down. The process has, in fact, already begun, and we can see in Russia how the dispersion of his force is laying him open to a damage that is wholly new.
There remains the ground-attack without which victory will not be won. Sea-power, aided by command of the air, may allow the Army to secure strategical surprise. Air-power may afford tactical surprise, and give direct support on the battlefield. But without the perfect training of the whole of the Allied armies, victory will come late and wastefully. That this is not beyond our power has been demonstrated by the achievement Of the Eighth Army. The Alamein victory was a great event ; but it is the manner rather than the fact of the victory that most repays study. Whatever the present emphasis upon mechanism, it seems beyond dispute that leadership is still supreme ; and the doubts that have been raised by the slow tempo of the operations in North Africa may concern that vital element. If that be the case, the sooner it is attended to the better. It will be of little use to perfect our mechanical equipment if we have not yet learned how to use the machines perfectly. But given the right leadership, and the wise use of the various arms in co-operation, as well as in their separate roles, victory will come soon enough to enable us to use it with full profit.
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