THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT

Chris Patten, Governor of Hong Kong,

explains why his hard attitude to China is in the colony's best interests

Hong Kong A FEW MONTHS ago, one of Hong Kong's pro-China newspapers published a series of supplements which purported to chronicle Britain's departure from Empire. The authorised Peking version told a story of imperial cunning, in which Britain's whole conspiratorial purpose had been to Prolong her influence through delayed- action detonation of chaos wherever the Queen's writ had once run. Now, allegedly, we are doing the same in Hong Kong.

It's a bizarre view of our colonial history: a history in which we laid down the imperi- al burden with so little fuss and such genial intentions to install and safeguard the insti- tutions of a plural society.

In Hong Kong, we are bringing the story almost to an end. Hong Kong, of course, is unlike our other colonies. Though no one could doubt the capacity of this great city, It has never enjoyed the prospect of inde- pendence. History and geography have spelt out another future, the assumption of Chinese sovereignty in 1997. This has determined and constrained political and Institutional development in the territory. While it has been governed under the eyes of Parliament at Westminster, its own democratic evolution has been limited by its historic destination. In the 1940s and 1950s, proposals that would have given Hong Kong similar democratic institutions to those being established elsewhere in our Empire were rudely halted by noises from the north which warned against any politi- cal course of action which might encourage the community to think that it could deter- mine its own future.

So democracy was never really on the agenda until we came to negotiate the terms of the transfer of sovereignty. At the heart of those negotiations was the promise that, while China's flag would be run up over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, the com- munity itself would enjoy a high degree of autonomy and would keep its way of life. One country, two systems' was Deng Xiaoping's vision — a goal which Hong Kong and Britain could readily share. The Joint Declaration — the treaty signed by Britain and China — spelt out Hong Kong's freedoms and values and the way to secure them. It promised an execu- tive answerable to the legislature, and a legislature wholly composed through elec- tion. Admittedly, it did not say those elec- tions should be open and fair. Could anyone at the negotiating table have thought otherwise? Nor did it spell out how these elections should be conducted.

Here lies the nub of our present ment with China. Some people — includ- ing almost every directly elected legislator here — think we should be arguing with China about quickening the pace of democracy in Hong Kong. I understand why they think this, but do not believe that this would have been a possible option so late in the day. The principle of a growing degree of democracy is already agreed with China, and set out in the Basic Law China's mini-constitution for Hong Kong after 1997. What we are in effect debating is whether or not the agreed process of democratisation should be credible and fair. It was with that aim that we put for- ward, in October 1992, very modest pro- posals (which we were always willing to discuss with China) on the detailed elec- toral arrangements for Hong Kong in 1994 and 1995.

Let me summarise where we are, just over a year after we first put forward these ideas. We did not dream up this issue at the last moment. By mid-1992, the precise voting arrangements for the last elections under British sovereignty had not been agreed, presumably because they were extremely difficult. According to indepen- dent legal advisers giving evidence to the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Commit- tee, our plans are wholly consistent with Britain's agreements and understandings with China. In over 160 hours of talks with Peking, we have offered conditionally to change our proposals but have seen no sim- ilar offer of concession or accommodation from the other side of the table. Now, with time running out and the first of a three- part series of elections less than a year away, we have introduced legislation to deal with the least contentious parts of our plan. Despite Chinese hostility to a course of action which they know is necessary to meet the legislative timetable, we still want to continue negotiating about the more awkward items of the electoral arrange- ments on which, alas, no progress has been made in seven months of negotiation.

Through a year of harsh statements from Peking, the majority of people in Hong Kong have remained calm and supportive of our approach. And opinion in Britain in Parliament and outside it — has remained largely supportive, too. But some criticisms have been raised — as you would expect in an open and free society — both in Britain and Hong Kong.

First, there are those who argue that somehow our difficulties with China all coincided with the arrival of the author as Governor of Hong Kong. I acknowledge that I have a vested interest here, but have to beg to differ. It is no criticism at all of my predecessor to point out that the log- jam of issues in the Joint Liaison Group, and the difficulties over Hong Kong's new airport, pre-dated my hatless disembarka- tion. Indeed, most would say that the cur- rent uneasy relationship with China goes back to Tiananmen Square and the reac- tion of Hong Kong people to that event.

Second, some contend that we should not imperil the wider Sino-British relation- ship — particularly the trade relationship — by disagreements with China over Hong Kong. But Hong Kong is the largest single component in that relationship, and the most important one. Our responsibilities to Hong Kong's citizens must come first. In the longer term, our standing in China and Asia is likely to be strongly affected by how decently we undertake our responsibilities in Hong Kong. There is no reason, in any case, why disagreements over Hong Kong should affect the wider relationship. China would be foolish indeed if, as she seeks to enter the Gatt, she were to choose to dis- criminate against British trade. China's President Jiang Zemin rightly argued to President Clinton at their recent summit that politics and trade should be kept sepa- rate; what's true in Seattle is just as true in Peking.

Nor should we think that there is an arithmetical relationship between diplo- matic harmony and economic benefits, desirable as both may be. From the mid- Eighties until last year, we actually saw a steady fall in our exports to China and a rise in China's exports to Britain. A surplus for Britain has turned into a two-to-one surplus for China. In 1993, at last, our exports actually started to rise sharply again. Third, some people suggest (a touch undiplomatically) that China is capable of behaving thuggishly if she doesn't get her own way; and that we should therefore do whatever she wants after a suitably deco- rous effort to put our own point of view. If necessary, we can always mask retreat on a matter of substance with some gracefully opaque form of words. You don't have to summon from history craven examples of this attitude to reject it. We have responsi- bilities to Hong Kong. They are incorporat- ed in the Joint Declaration. When ministers signed the Joint Declaration and Parliament endorsed it — they took the view, reasonably enough, that it meant what it so eloquently said. The gradual development of democracy in Hong Kong has been a consistent aim of the British Government since 1984. As Richard Luce put it in the House of Commons in Decem- ber that year: 'We all fully accept that we should build up a firmly based democratic administration in Hong Kong in the years between now and 1997.' Or as Geoffrey Howe expressed it in 1989: 'We have always sought to develop representative government in line with the wishes of the community as a whole and to ensure that what is achieved under British administra- tion is firm and durable.' I take that view too, and am trying to make sure this treaty, to which Britain put her name, is imple- mented — to the letter and in the spirit.

Fourth, it is argued that if only we weren't having today's argument with China, all in Hong Kong would be peace and harmony. But how much stability would we have earned ourselves through a rotten deal which compromised Hong Kong's electoral arrangements? We could have spent our last years of sovereignty defending the indefensible against every pro-democracy politician in Hong Kong and against critical or cynical opinion at Westminster and world-wide. Events between now and 1997 would have made life increasingly uncomfortable for a gov- ernment which would have lost its authori- ty.

Fifth, there is the patronising argument that people in Hong Kong are only inter- ested in money; that they don't care about democracy; and that clean elections are irrelevant to Hong Kong's long-term pros- perity as her economy converges with that of the Chinese hinterland.

Naturally, Hong Kong families want peace and quiet, like families everywhere else. But whenever they have been given the chance they have voted for more democracy, not less. Their aspirations are modest and they are moderately expressed, yet they clearly recognise that what makes Hong Kong special, what makes it unique, is the rule of law and the freedoms of a plural society. A decently elected legisla- ture is a part of that fabric. If there is no level playing-field for the legislature, what chance of a level playing-field elsewhere in business, for example? The promise that Hong Kong people will run Hong Kong after 1997, with a substantial degree of autonomy, hardly squares with efforts to install an electoral system which would give Peking tight control.

We hear one other argument against behaving decently. It tends to come from 'And may the Lord add his blessing to this mixed marriage.' those who used to. urge Britain to stand taller for democracy, until, that is, China started to shout the odds. What matters, we are told, is freedom not democracy freedom of speech, freedom of economic choice, freedom under the law. Standing up for fair elections may risk these freedoms.

But what sort of freedom would Hong Kong have if its citizens didn't have the freedom to make a real choice in the polling-booth? What fair economic choice is there when there is no fearless legislative opponent of corruption? Can we really expect freedom of speech and of the press to survive long if there is no freedom to express political views in a fairly elected legislature? It is not the argument for democracy which these critics regard as a step too far, but the determination to stand up for Hong Kong.

We will continue to try to persuade the Chinese to return to the negotiating table. If we fail, we shall have to work out with the people of Hong Kong, through the Legislative Council, the best arrangements for securing limited democracy. We won't be able to go further than they are pre- pared to go, but nor should we go less far. Of course, it is true that we could put in place arrangements for the 1994 and 1995 elections and see them cast aside by China after 1997 in its first act of sovereignty. Peking officials last month once again threatened to do precisely this — in blatant contradiction of their own post-1997 consti- tution for Hong Kong. But the argument that China may act against Hong Kong's interests (and its own) in the future cannot be a persuasive argument for us to do the same today. Moreover, if we have a credi- ble system, why should China want to remove from elected office in 1997 men and women who will have been elected by their fellow citizens? This is hardly the best way of winning hearts and minds.

Hong Kong has been a spectacular suc- cess story — largely the result of Shang- hainese and Cantonese entrepreneurialism combined with the values of a plural soci- ety. Provided this combination survives the transition through 1997, Hong Kong should be uniquely placed to contribute further to China's successful opening up to the world.

Hong Kong should be able to play a similar role for China at the beginning of the next century to that played by New York for the United States at the opening of this one. It is set to be the merchant bank and the business centre for the region; if, that is, China learns to trust Hong Kong and not to treat it with truculent suspicion.

In the next three and a half years, we still have to try to dispel that cloud of suspicion while China itself is going through a period of accelerating change. That task will not be easy. I believe we can do it, so long as we are prepared when necessary to stand up for Hong Kong and not assume that its interests in either the short or long term are best served by bending to every wind from the north.