CORRESPONDENCE.
IS THE DREADNOUGHT TYPE DOOMED?
[To THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTATOR:]
Bin,—Within the last fortnight it has been announced in various journals that the Admiralty are about to adopt a new policy of construction for armoured ships. In some cases "high authority" has been claimed for these statements. Possibly they may be mere ballons d'essai intended to test public opinion or to prepare the way for a change which is thought desirable. The present First Sea Lord and his naval colleagues, however, being officers of great experience and ready to accept responsibility for decisions in regard to types of ships, are not likely to favour appeals or explanations to the general public through the Press in regard to action which may be contemplated by the Board. On the other hand, there has been remarkably close agreement in the details embodied in these statements; apparently they have been inspired from a common. source ; and the reasons alleged for a coming change of policy have been practically identicaL In these circumstances it may be of interest to examine what has been said and to ascertain, as far as is possible, whether the scheme is likely to be realized in future shipbuilding programmes.
The main point insisted upon is a speedy reversal of the policy which has been followed during the last six years—since the 'Dreadnought' was designed—of " going one better," and bigger, in each succeeding type of armoured ship laid down. Starting with the 'Dreadnought' of 17,900 tons—and that was in itself an advance of nearly 9 per cent, on the displacement of the largest preceding battleship—within five years we came
(in the Lion class) to displacements of 26,350 tons, and the necessity for greater dimensions was still asserted. The
Dreadnought' has a length of 490 feet and a normal draught of 261 feet ; the 'Lion' is credited with a length of 660 feet and a normal draught of 28 feet. It was alleged that this law of growth was inevitable in its operation for all classes of ships ; and the argument for further increase in size of warships was clenched by the statement that even the 'Lion' mei a small vessel when compared with great passenger steamships like the 'Mauretania' and Olympic,' not to mention still larger vessels now building. When advocates of more moderate dimensions ventured to point out what they regarded as essential differences between the con- ditions of service for warships and those of merchant ships they were treated with scorn. No regard was paid to the fact that whereas passenger steamers are designed to run between certain terminal ports, at which suitable provision can be and is made for their accommodation, warships must necessarily serve wherever circumstances require their presence, and must make use of existing harbours and anchorages in all parts of the world to which the necessities of war service may call them. Even at home ports and at our principal naval bases abroad recent increases of size and draught of water of our warships have already caused serious difficulties. Docking accommodation—especially on the east coast of Great Britain—is confessedly inadequate for our existing fleet, and large expenditure is being incurred on its extension as well as on the construction of the new base at Rosyth. The range of possible service for warships must be greatly limited by such an increase in draught of water as has been made in recent types, and when these ships are fully laden they draw thirty to thirty-one feet. But notwith- standing these generally admitted facts the cry for bigger ships has been kept up, and those who favoured more moderate dimensions wondered whether or when they would get a hearing.
Besides the arguments just stated, which seem in them- selves conclusive, other and weighty objections have existed to this wild rush into extreme dimensions for warship& These objections are usually and conveniently summarized in the proverb that "it is unwise to carry too many eggs in one basket." Like all proverbial sayings this may be pushed too far, and probably has been in some cases. On the other hand, serious dangers undoubtedly attach to under-water attacks delivered against the largest ships. These dangers have been emphasized and deeply impressed on the minds of thoughtful men by the events of the Russo-Japanese War. Strenuous advocates of " monster " battleships have been driven into an admission of the vulnerability of these ships when subjected to torpedo attacks or the action of submarine mines ; and it has been admitted that even one successful attack of that kind would almost certainly put the largest ship out of action even if she kept afloat. These admissions obviously settled the matter so far as the principle was concerned, and made it certain that there would sooner or later come a pause in the rate for mere size and for concentration of great fighting power in each unit of a war fleet. Now an arrest of growth in dimensions of British armoured ships seems to be approaching, and it is devoutly to be desired.
Recent announcements may be summarized as follows :—In the shipbuilding programme for next year the new battle- ships are to be about 400 tons leas in displacement than the 'Dreadnought,' and nearly 9,000 tons less than the Lion class. They are to be armed with six heavy guns (said to be 15 inches in calibre) as against ten 13.5-inch guns carried by our latest battleships and eight guns of equal calibre carried by the Lion.' This reduction in the number of heavy guns mounted in a single ship has been repeatedly advocated by those who favoured more moderate dimensions, and as often it has been set aside as an undesirable change by the Admiralty. The retention of ten heavy guns in our battleships, carried in five twin-gun turrets, has been one of the chief causes of increase in size ; increased speed has also exercised much influence. Nothing is said as to the mode in which the six 15-inch guns are to be mounted in the new ships : if they were placed in triple-gun turrets only two armoured stations would be needed, and considerable economies in weight of armour could be obtained. On the other hand, any breakdor. n due to accident or injury in action of a single turret would deprive the vessel of one-half her heavy gun-fire, and that is in itself
a serious objection to such extreme concentration of the guns.
Apart from the question of distribution of the heavy guns that. of their increase in calibre raises serious doubts, and it may well be asked why this stag should be taken. It has been pointed out. that in this respect history is only repeating itself ; the reasons now given for adopting larger calibres are, in principle, the same as those which led us on to 110-ton guns nearly thirty years ago, only to return to 12-inch guns of half that weight after experience had been gained with guns of the larger calibres. One of the apologists for the proposed action. said recently that" the Admiralty trust to the greater range, penetrating, and smashing power of the new gun," but as the I2-inch and 15.-inch guns previously used have been proved effective at the longest ranges likely to be required under ordirery conditions at sea, what good reason ean there be for further increase in calibre? This step, if it is really contemplated, will be taken. before the first modern ship armed with 135-inch guns has been completed, and the public may naturally inquire what has happened in the interval since 13-5-inch guns were introduced which has led to the proposal to use 15-inch guns. If it. is the better weapon why not have passed thereto directly from the 12-i neh ?
Another interesting feature in the description of the new ships is found in the statement that they will carry "a corn- Funtively heavy anti-torpedo armament." What this may mean exactly no one can tell ; but some guidance may possibly be found in the debate on the Shipbuilding Vote a fortnight ago. It was then, pointed ont by several speakers that recent British ships were relatively weak in their secondary arma- ments, and that the Dreadnought type had not been eopied in that particular by foreign navies. Mr. McKenna then said that "the Board of Admiralty recognized" that a 4-inch gun might not be a "sufficient answer to a destroyer carrying torpedoes with a range of many thousand yards," and added : "In that case we should requiee a gun with a range sufficient to enable it to destroy a destroyer before the latter could get within range with its torpedoes." Possibly this may mean that 6-inch guns are to be included in the armaments of our next. ships ; if so they will be available in. action against other fleets as well as for defence against, torpedo attacks ; and if that result is obtained there will be reason for much satisfaction. Existing British ships built during the last five years. are undoubtedly inferior in their secondary armaments to foreign. ships of the. same dates.
As to speed, it is asserted that the new vessels "will be designed to develop a speed hitherto undreamed of in capital ships." One writer gives the speed as "in the neigh- hourhood of 30 knots "; another says "those who are concerned with the designs for the new vessels are confident that 34 or even 36 knots can easily be attained," adding that internal-combustion engines win not be used, but a combina- tion of reciprocating engines and steam turbines similar to that adopted for some of the great passenger steamers, including the Olympic.' and the 'Titanic? It is unnecessary to criticize these somewhat loose statements, which may be presumed to mean generally that the new vessels will have very high speed.. It cannot be an easy matter to attain speeds "in the neighbourhood of 30 knots" in vessels of the size and armament described, in association, with armour-pro- tection of a satisfactory nature good fuel supplies, and any available system of propelling apparatus. Neither can there he doubt that for the attainment of high speeds turbines have been proved superior to any combination of turbines and reciprocating engines.. It is notable also that the 'Lion' class., which are reputed to be designed for speeds of about 00 knots, are of 26,340 tons displacement. and have turbine engines of about 70,000 horse-power, although they carry only eight 135-inclt guns and a light secondary armament. But such technical details are not of primary importance for present purposes, because there remains a much larger question. Is it desirable to aim. at such extreraely high speeds in capital ships intended to act as units in fleets? To that question many of the highest authorities on naval strategy and tactics reply in the negative, and their objections are not trivial or negligible, seeing that. high speed is such a costly quality and involves serious increase in size. One eulogist of the new departure says "it is contended that two of the new ships could be built
for less than one super-Dreadnought and. in much quicker time." This statement is obviously both incorrect- and absurd. While the reversion to more moderate dimensioas and cost is much to be desired, there is good reason to believe that, if the qualities described were really associated in a new ship her size and cost must considerably exceed that of the 4Dreadnougbt ' if she were constructed under similar condi- tions.
The problem to be solved is how to produce a war fleet which shall assuredly maintain British sea supremacy ; ef which the units shall be as secure as possible against known forma of attack. In addition to a sufficient number of capital ships to secure victory in fleet actions, an adequate supply of cruisers for scouting and protection of trade routes, and ample strength in destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels, must be provided. Large expenditure is inevitable in face of foreign competition, but it is wise to make the unit cost of each type as low as it may be con- sistently with the possession of adequate fighting power in each vessel, and to secure superiority in aggregate offensive power by means of a preponde.ance in numbers. The hest- mentioned conditions should receive due consideration from the authorities before a decision is reached to commence vessels of the type described above.—I am, Sir, &a, Cease.
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