SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S DESPATCH. A DMIRAL JELLICOE'S despatch describing the battle
of Jutland Bank has been read with deep pride and satisfaction throughout the land. It is a thoroughly work- manlike document, and no careful student of it can fail to be convinced that its author is a man of quite exceptional naval who sees things in their true proportion, is cool and collected in his thoughts, and is afraid of nothing but exaggera- tion. Admiral Jellicoe has nothing but praise for his officers and men, and the reader recognizes that he conveys no con- ventional compliments, but writes of them with profound sincerity. The only omission from the despatch is one that Admiral Jellicoe could not have supplied. There is no praise cf Admiral Jellicoe himself. Yet we undertake to say that his name will be joined with the greatest sea strategists and fis!Itters of history. He has won for Britain the most momen- tous sea fight since Trafalgar, and he won it by a magnificent combination of boldness and cautious preparation. The risk accepted by Admiral Beatty in engaging a superior force till the British main Battle Fleet could arrive was justi- fied ; and when at last the superiority of numbers was on our ride it was found that every ship was at the top of her fighting strength, every engine working above its normal power, and every man in the perfection of technical skill and physical fitness brought about by enthusiastic hard work and unremit- ting attention to detail. Strategists of the future will probably give it as their judgment that the manner in which Admiral Jellicoe deployed his Battle Fleet in the spaces of the neces- sarily somewhat confused line of the ships already engaged, in a haze and a tricky light, was a masterpiece of skill. The tattle of Jutland Bank marks an epoch in the war. We are safer at sea than ever we were, and our confidence in the Navy and its leaders is more deeply rooted as a result of the great test.
If we have a regret to express, it is that Admiral Jellicoe's account of the battle should have been delayed so long. Of course, all the facts given in this despatch needed collation and verification. We do not suppose for a moment that such a document as this could have been placed before the country any sooner. But we think that Admiral Jellicoe might have been invited by the Admiralty to convey his general impression of the battle in a brief despatch to be published at once. Such a despatch would have made no attempt at a final judgment—that might have been expressly disclaimed—but it would have gathered up the bare facts, and informed the nation that a victory had been won, that the enemy had fled to his ports, and that the British Navy remained unchallenged in the North Sea. Preliminary despatches with no pretence to be complete were continually sent by Admirals in former days. A Commander-in-Chief would dash off a summary of what had been achieved, so far as he knew it at the moment, rather in the manner in which he might write to his own family. The nation was treated, as it were, as a family whose anxieties ought to be removed at once. For such a despatch as that the brief and inept announcement from the Admiralty was no substitute. It is inconceivable that Admiral Jellicoe would have written in such a way that the nation would conclude he had been beaten. As it was, the Navy knew that it had won a very considerable victory, and the nation for many hours was deploring what it believed to be a very considerable reverse ! A painful situation of that sort ought not to recur, and a brief preliminary despatch from the Com- mander-in-Chief would be the very best preventive. The strategy of the battle was as follows. The Grand Fleet was carrying on` one of i s periodical sweeps of the North Sea, when Admiral Beatty, who was scouting to the south with his battle-cruisers, fell in with Admiral Nipper's five battle- cruisers off the Little Fisher Bank. Admiral Beatty at once intervened between the German battle-cruisers and their base and engaged them. After twenty minutes the British Fifth Battle Squadron arrived to help him. Meanwhile the destroyers of both sides were mingled in a furious combat. Only five minutes later the approach of the German Battle Fleet from the south-east was sitnalled. So far Admiral Beatty had been steaming on a parallel course to the German battle- cruisers towards the south-east, and was therefore approaching the German Battle Fleet and going away from Sir John Jellicoe. It may be asked why he did not, after engaging the German battle-cruisers, direct his course towards Admiral Jellicoe, and try to draw the enemy battle-cruisers after him. The answer is, of course, that he assumed, with absolutely good reason we are sure, that the German battle-cruisers would refuse to be drawn. Their purpose was to fight an action which they could break off when they pleased. Admiral Beatty's purpose was to hold them in a fight from which they could not possibly disentangle themselves before the arrival of the British main Battle Fleet. In order to do this he took a risk which had been nicely calculated, and which in the event enabled Sir John Jellicoe to come into action with every prospect, so far as strategy could ensure it, of sinking the whole German Navy. Only the fog, and the bad light, and the enemy's smoke screens prevented that sensational result from being achieved. But Admiral Beatty's tactics were beyond reproach in bringing the German and British main Fleets together exactly as Sir John Jellicoe had planned.
After the sighting of the German Battle Fleet, Admiral Beatty turned north, and the German Battle Fleet came on to help their deeply committed battle-cruisers, as had been foreseen. The main Fleets of Britain and Germany were now approaching each other. This northerly course was followed for an hour, and then the leading ships of Sir John Jellieoe's Fleet were sighted. By this time Sir David Beatty, who had the speed of the enemy by two or three knots, had placed himself across the German van and com- pelled the German ships to conform to his movements. First he forced them a little to the east. Then he forced them to turn south and west.. This enabled the British main Fleet to place itself to the eastward of the enemy—that is to say, between the Germans and the mainland. Only a good light was necessary for this situation to be developed, and for the Germans to be held off from their bases till they were sunk. But that was not to be. They managed to extricate themselves in the conditions already described. Sir John Jellicoe, willing to take all risks which promised a reasonable return, was not willing to pursue the enemy in the dark among submarines and minefields. All he could do, while he waited for daylight, was to release his destroyers to hunt the beaten enemy home.
The general impression we derive from the despatch is that the British Navy is more than a match for the German Navy at every point of seamanship, gunnery, torpedo work, and in the engineer departments. The loss of our three battle- cruisers in quick succession through lucky German shots was a misfortune for us that would be unlikely to occur again in the same way under the same conditions. Again, the loss of the gallant Sir Robert Arbuthnot's cruisers need not have happened if he had been aware of the position of the German battleships. He was a victim of the mist. Without these losses, more or less through ill-fortune, our losses in ships would have been almost trifling. The German gunnery, good at first, did not in fact stand the strain, and towards the end of the battle our ships enjoyed a comparative immunity from hits. Our destroyer work was marvellous, whereas the later attacks by the German destroyers were not pressed. They seemed to be half-hearted compared with our own. The Germans must also have been dis- appointed with their submarines. Only the Marlborough' was hit, and she was able to continue the fight in great style. As for the officers and men of the engine-rooms, they deserve very special praise. The ships exceeded their trial speeds. After all the stress and ravages of war, t hat was an astonishing performance. Finally, the absolute losses of the enemy were almost certainly greater than ours, though the truth may not be known for a long time. Sir John Jellicoe claims six capital ships (including two which were not seen to sink, but probably could not have reached port), five light cruisers, and nine destroyers (including three which were not seen is sink, but probably could not have reached port), and one submarine.
Previous page
