AN APPEAL TO UNIONISTS.
WHETHER the Coalition Government have done a wise or an unwise thing in deciding to bring the Home Rule Act into force in Ireland during the war, time will show. Personally, we believe it to be most unwise. But be that as it may, we acknowledge that, as far as motive and intention arc concerned, the Unionist leaders have acted with a patriotism, a self-sacrifice, and a willingness to subordinate personal and party interests which cannot be praised too highly. And in a special degree is this true of Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Walter Long. It is an open secret that they had greater misgivings as to the possibility of putting the Home Rule Act into operation in Ireland without aggravating the situation both there and here than had their colleagues, and neither of them occupied a Department which was so vitally concerned with the war that he would have been deserting a military post by resignation. Yet in spite of that, they have held by the Coalition. It is now for the rank-and-file of the Unionist Party, alike in the country, in the House of Commons, and in thellouse of Lords, to subordinate their personal predilections to higher interests and to support their leaders, and to them we appeal. Unless they are willing to make this sacrifice, they will not only immensely increase the perils of the situation and jeopardize the successful conduct of the war, but they will bring ruin and disaster upon the only unimpaired unit in our political and Constitutional system—the Unionist Party. The Liberal Party, though it still maintains an appearance of Solidarity, is in truth as rent and torn as Caesar's toga. The Labour Party is in fragments. The Irish Party is in process of dissolution. It is to the Unionist Party alone that after the war is over we can look for a basis for homogeneous govern- ment. If the Unionist. Party is now to be dissolved by internal dissensions, there will be nothing left but a welter of warring groups, distinguished now by the names of party leaders, now by those of particular localities, now by special policies. But that must mean Ministries formed, like those in many Conti- nental countries, out of a combination of groups which, as the American orator declared, are bound together by " the cement of public plunder." The party system has many and great faults, but they are nothing in comparison with the faults of the group system. That is the demagogue's happy hunting- ground. Those are the conditions in which the political bravo flourishes. The virus of the party system can be resisted by the antiseptic of -independence, but against the evils of the group system there is no effective antidote. As our readers know, we are no thick-and-thin admirers of the two-party system, fiut indeed have always urged the duty of correcting it by a reasonable and well-judged independence. But at the moment there can be no question that what we need is political homogeneity. He therefore who at this juncture helps to ruin the Unionist Party is doing his country a very great disservice.
-- But why, it will be urged, did the Unionist leaders allow matters to drift into such a position that they felt themselves obliged to assent to an experiment which is per se so dangerous, and so little likely to have a successful issue, even if all the safeguards demanded arc strictly applied ? The Unionist leaders should have insisted at the very beginning that the Irish moratorium must be sustained. Those who argue thus forget many considerations. In the first place, they forget that we arc not only at war, but at the very crisis of the war. Rightly or wrongly, rightly as we think, the Unionist leaders came to the conclusion over a year ago that the only chance of waging the war successfully was through a united ration--i.e., a nation with its unity reflected in a Coalition Government, a Government which, by reason of its containing representatives of the Liberal, the Unionist, and the Labour Parties, should, as it were, hold the whole British people in its hand, and be able to direct the full energy of the nation to the task of beating our enemies. The Unionist leaders, when the Irish question was raised in an acute form by the rebellion, and when a new departure of some kind had to be taken in regard to the Irish Government, had therefore to consider first of all the effect which the decision to which they came would- have on the Coalition, and so on the conduct of hostilities. They could of course have confronted the Prime Minister, and those who desired to seize the opportunity of the rebellion to intro- duce a modified form of Home Rule by consent, with a mere Van SWUM& But that 'ion possumus would very likely have broken up the Government. Worse still, it might have broken up the Unionist Party, for it is admitted that a section of the Unionist leaders, perhaps the majority, had convinced them- felves that the experiment of applying the Home Rule Act, ith the exclusion of the homogeneous Ulster area and with proper safeguards for law and order, must be tried, and ought to be tried, on its merits, and even apart from immediate war considerations.
They held, in fact, that, taking all things into account, the lesser evil was the attempt to try Home Rule in thoie parts of Ireland in which it was clear that the local majority desired it, or at any rate demanded it. Further, it must be remembered that the majority of the Coalition Government, whatever may now be the majority in the country, is composed of Liberals and Home Rulers. This is a fact which, pleasant or unpleasant, cannot be got rid of by expressions of anger. In any body of men acting together the opinion of the majority is sure to have its effect, if not necessarily a supreme or imperative effect. The Unionist leaders were of course well aware of this fact when they entered the Coalition Government. That it did not prevent them from entering it is a sign of how grave they thought the need at the moment. But in any case we may be sure that they counted the cost, and recognized that they might have to do things or assent to things which they would dislike, and that no promises of a political moratorium could entirely safeguard them owing to the unexpected and incomprehensible way in which political events are apt to develop. They no doubt remembered also the wise old saying of the City : He who has a partner has a master." The Unionists when they went into partnership with the Liberals in order to beat the Germans cannot have failed to recognize that they had a master, and one who in special circumstances might prove very exacting. Though this fact was clear, it was also clear to the Unionist leaders that unless they were willing to accept this risk we ran the far greater risk of losing the war. We ran the risk of not beinge able to effect that intense concentration of effort which alone could give us victory. Those Unionists, then, who are in a state of revolt against their leaders for, as they say, not having managed somehow or other to prevent the Irish experiment, are in fact, though no doubt unconsciously, rebelling against the force of circumstances, and forgetting that they are asking their leaders to undo the compact of " Union to win the war." If it is asked why the sacrifices in order to obtain unity should come from the Unionists rather than from the Liberals, we can only answer that at the present juncture the proper way to ensure unity is to set an example in self-sacrifice, and not merely to preach it in the abstract. To be unwilling to put it into practice unless you can be sure that those with whom you are acting will be inclined to put down a shilling for every twelve pence that you yourself lay on the table is to play a huckster's part. Great causes were never won in such a spirit. If the Liberals insist on their pound of Unionist flesh, they must have it, save only if it can be proved that to give that pound of flesh will prevent us winning the war. But it cannot be said that under the safeguards which are to be introduced into the Amending Bill we shall run the risk of losing the war, or even make it more difficult to win. The Amending Bill is. no doubt very likely to bring about a second Irish revolt, but it will be a revolt which it will be much easier to put down than the first, even though it may be much more widespread, for we now have in Ireland an. ample military force. Again, it will not necessitate keeping a larger force locked tip in Ireland, for even if we did not put the Home Rule Act into operation in the twenty-six counties, we should have to.keep. just as large a garrison there as we now have.
Having° regard to all these circumstances, we appeal to the Unionist Party, if not for approbation of what their leaders have done; at any rate for the sympathy of comprehension. Let them Look at the situation thoroughly as well as calmly,. and estimate exactly how things stand. If they do that, we are certain that, however much annoyed they may be at the moment, they will ultimately come to the conclusion that they will make things infinitely worse• than they are if- they fail to support their leaders. They have it in their power, if they like, to wreck the Unionist Party, and to wreck it in the worst possible way—by sweeping away all its most trusted leaders. But is it worth while to do this ? If it is not, as we are sure they must determine, then the only sensible thing for Unionists to do is to put their pride in their pockets, cease their grumblings, and admit that we must now try the experiment and make the best of it. The homo- geneous political area formed out of the six counties will be safe. Not merely will its inhabitants be protected from all risk of Home Rule tyranny, but a Unionist citadel and city of refuge will be formed in Ireland which must prove the best possible defence from oppression for the Unionists of the South and West. Further, owing to the system of emergency and war govern- ment created or creatable under the Defence of the Realm- Act, there -will exist side by side with the experiment in Irish ,Parliamentarianism a framework of government which can at any moment be used to put down disorder and to protect the loyalist population from the worst evils of civil, anarchy. We shall have _shifted the ship to very dangerous i and difficult moorings, but at any rate we shall have two strong shore cables intact.
Lettliose who are .now loudest in condemning the Unionist: leaders-remember one essential fact. They should place them- - selves in the position of the Unionist leaders, and then . .ask -how they could have refused acquiescence in an experiment which had received the assent, not only of Mr. Redmond, of Sir .Edward Carson, and of the whole Liberal Party, but also of. a very important section of the Unionist Party— a silent section, no doubt, and numerically small, but still a section whose view can be best expressed in words which one now often hears on Unionist lips : For Heaven's sake let us get rid of this wretched Irish • business. We are sick of the whole thing. Let them break each. other's heads as much as they will, provided only that they stop-bothering us." As soon as the situation developed on lines like these, how was it possible for the Unionist leaders, intent always on preserving national unity for winning the war, to get out of the impasse except by acquiescing in the -experiment, subject always to the maintenance of proper safeguards, and of suitable precautions in case the experiment should end in a conflagration ?
" Does the Spectator really hope and believe that the experiment is going to end. in the pacification of Ireland ? " .Frankly, we have personally no such hopes. In Ireland -polities are governed, and always have been governed, by fashions. At present the prevailing fashion is Sinn Feinism. The old Home Rule Parliamentarianism is utterly Jimmie, and the vague Socialistic Republicanism of -the Sinn Feiners is the only wear for those who want to : be in the movement. That being so, to give Ireland Parliamentary Home Rule just now is very much like presenting an old-fashioned Academy picture to a body of insurgent Cubists who demand the decoration of some public building, and then imagining that they will be satisfied with this old discredited piece of pictorial machinery. Of course e miracle might happen, but what we should expect would be that the Cubists of our fable would treat the gift not as a concession to their demand but as a pure insult. The moment they received it the canvas would be torn into a thousand fragments and scattered to the four winds of Heaven.
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