EVIAN AND PALESTINE
WHILST at Evian an international conference has been considering the plight of the German and Austrian refugees, especially Jews, the land which was earmarked as a national home for the Jews is in turmoil. The Jewish problem has simultaneously reached two crises : What, on the largest possible scale, is to be done with those " non-Aryans " whom Germany has put to flight or is intent upon expelling ? And what, in particular, in the small country of Palestine is to be done about those Jews who have already been settled and are living side by side with a resentful Arab pOpUlation ? The problems are, of course, distinct, except in the broad sense that the Evian Conference is focussing the attention of the world upOn the Jewish question, and is fixing a certain moral responsibility upon every country for the part it is taking in helping or failing to help—whether erring negatively, as Britain in Palestine, or positively, as the Nazi Government in Germany. It is idle to suggest, as has been suggested, that if Great Britain had made a success of the Jewish " national home " policy in Palestine that country would be available as the main asylum for refugees from Germany and Austria. In no circumstances could that small region have been able to receive and contain the hundreds of thousands of Jews whom the Nazis are letting loose upon the world. With Germany behaving as she is behaving, Great Britain and other countries would still have to face a special crisis, and consider today what can be done with exiles deprived of country and citizenship.
But though Palestine could not, even if all had gone well there, have solved the gigantic problem of the Evian Conference, she might at least have made a solid contribution. As it is, the trouble is aggravated. All the proceedings at Evian are in effect an arraignment of Germany ; but Germany is now in a position to retort that while she represses or expels Jews we are not even 'able to prevent them from being the cause of prolonged strife, outrage and terror in Palestine. If it is true that the appeal of Evian is an appeal to the conscience of the civilised world by which it is hoped that even Germany may be shamed into a less immoderate policy, then a special responsibility rests on Britain not only in taking her part in offering asylum to the refugees, but in clearing up the mess in Palestine.
When the Royal Commission made its report a year ago it was generally recognised by those best qualified to judge that the efficacy of the report depended on its speedy application. That report itself was an admission of failure. We had promised the Jews under the terms of the Balfour Declaration to find them a national home in Palestine, and in accordance • with our undertaking under the mandate Jews in large numbers were admitted into the country where, from an economic point of view, they acquitted themselves well. But we had also promised to respect the rights of the Arab majority ; and these two aims, which were at first believed to be perfectly compatible, have gradually assumed the appearance of being contradictory. If Palestine had enjoyed a really strong and experienced administration during the transition period this difficulty would have been no more insurmountable than that of the communal differences in India. Justice would have been enforced ; law and order maintained ; the Mufti of Jerusalem would not have found himself in the position of being a sort of unofficial head of 'a government • within a government, with an organisation capable of keeping a General Strike going, or, if it thought good, calling it off. But the position, instead of getting better with time, got steadily worse. Arab discontents were expressed with violence and outrage ; and a Royal Commission was appointed to find out what was wrong.
The report, recommending partition, must be accepted as an admission of failure. The mandatory Power had failed to reconcile the two aims which it had set before itself—so signally, indeed, that the Commission could see no way out but that of cutting the country into two, or rather, into three parts. Nobody liked this solution— it satisfied neither the Arabs nor the Jews, and was not very welcome either in London or Geneva. But none other was offered. It held the field. It was accepted by the British Government, and, subject to the assent of the League of Nations, it only remained to implement it.
The decision having been taken, for better or worse, it was of the highest importance to act quickly. To the Arabs it undoubtedly seemed that agitation had paid— agitation of a violent kind had secured a radical change in British policy. Any further wavering, whether in contemplation of concessions to the Jews or concessions to the Arabs, or changes in the projected control of Jerusalem, could be counted upon to invite further agitation. When the British Government, having accepted the report of the Royal Commission, thought it necessary to send out also a Technial Commission to recommend methods of putting partition in operation it did undoubtedly affirm that it adhered to the policy of partition, but equally undoubtedly the impression was conveyed that much 'of the original report was subject to drastic modification.
The series of outrages which have occurred during the last fortnight are only an intensification of the disorder which has been going on throughout the year, with this notable difference, that in many cases they have been initiated by Jews. Driven to desperation, wilder elements in the Jewish population, ignoring the prudent exhorta- tions of the leaders of Jewish opinion, have been tempted to use the same murderous weapons as Arabs have used against them. Reprisals have led to reprisals, and terror has reigned in Haifa and many other places. Every day has had its tale of killed and wounded on both sides-4. bomb-throwing, shooting, stabbing—and there have been engagements between detachments of troops and armed Arab bands. Hurried measures have been taken to get reinforcements to Palestine. A warship has landed marines at Haifa, and new battalions of infantry have' arrived along with tanks and armoured cars. The task of the moment is to compel a cessation of violence by the firm use of military power, and to close the frontiers on 'the north and east to incursions of armed bands. The position is such that nothing can be done till order is forcibly restored.
But 'to suppress these violent manifestations of race: hatred' is not to solve the problem. The plots of the Mufti engineered from French Syria, the arming of bands, the murders, all have had political motives behind them ; their main object is to influence the final decision about the government of Palestine. Uncertainty has bred agitation. For this reason it is dangerous to allow a moment to elapse more than is necessary in declaring the conclusion arrived at as a result of the Technical Commission's inquiry. A second-best solution will be better than no solution. A determined policy in accordance with one or both reports, imperfect as it may be, will be better than an irresolute pursuit of a policy believed to be nearer the ideal. At the earliest possible moment the Government should declare the programme which it proposes to adopt ; get it accepted by the League ; and make it quite clear that that and none other holds the field. Success in promoting peace and a measure of contentment—of live and let live— in Palestine will be some contribution at least to the wider problem of Jewry in relation to the world.
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