THE LONDON PARADE AND THE NATIONAL RESERVE. T HE King's message
to the members of the National Reserve whom, to the number of some 25,000 men, he reviewed last Saturday afternoon in Hyde Park strikes exactly the right note. " His Majesty was much impressed with the evidence of the reserve military strength in the London district which this parade has afforded." No one who saw the strong brigades pass- ing on their way to the Park, with a bearing none the less gallant and a step none the less elastic because the men were in mufti, or, again, witnessed the march past of the selected companies, or finally, and most thrilling sight of all, saw the whole division advance in review order, could fail to be deeply impressed. Not only is what has been accomplished by the Territorial Associations of the City and County of London a great fact, but there remains behind it the mass of trained men in the country who are already in the National Reserve or will join it in the course of the next few months. We must remember, however, that this " reserve military strength " of which the King spoke is practically of no use, is, in fact, non-existent when it is dormant, as it was before the National Reserve was organized. To make it effectual wo must not only know the names and addresses of the men trained to arms, but there must also be a skeleton organization in order that the men may be available when they are required. Provision must also be made in time of peace for arming and equipping the men.
We want on the present occasion to discuss the best way of making use of the military asset which has been dis- closed by the formation of the National Reserve, and was so splendidly illustrated in Hyde Park on Saturday rather than to sing paaans over the success of the movement—a movement, by the way, as to which the Spectator and its readers may fairly feel a sense of personal pride, since the ideas which have come to fruition in the National Reserve were set forth in these pages some twelve years ago, and have ever since been kept constantly to the front. Many of our readers have indeed a still closer association with the London Parade, for well nigh one-fifth of the total cost of the London Parade was provided by their generous donations. Before, however, we discuss the future we may put on record one or two plain facts. When, just two years ago, the Surrey Veteran Reserve 'paraded at the Horse Guards' Parade before the Secretary of State for War and a body of distinguished military officers, there were not more than 1,200 members of the National Reserve in the whole of England, and every one of those was under the jurisdiction of the Surrey Territorial Association. When the Surrey Veteran Reserve met at Guildford a year later—i.e., in 1911—to be reviewed by Lord Roberts they numbered over 2,400, and in the whole country there were then some 30,000 members of the Reserve. Now there are over 5,200 in Surrey, and throughout the whole country about 120,000. Of these about 32,000 are to be found in London alone. In other words, in two years the numbers of the National Reserve have been multiplied a hundredfold. But all who know anything about the force recognize that we aro only at the beginning of the movement, and that if other counties and other cities dis- play the same patriotism and organizing capacity which have been displayed on a small scale in Surrey and several other counties, and on a great scale in London, the National Reserve throughout the United Kingdom ought soon to reach 350,000 or 450,000 men. These figures seem astonishing, but it can easily be shown that they contain no element of exaggeration. In Surrey—we take that county because there the National Reserve has had full time to mature—the figures work out at about 1 per cent. of the population, and there is no reason why other counties should not do as well as or even better than Surrey. Indeed, one county — Oxfordshire—has, we believe, already done better, Therefore, with a total popu- lation for the United Kingdom of 45,000,000, there is no reason why the National Reserve in the United Kingdom should not reach 450,000. In truth it is safe to say that if it does not reach these figures it will only be because certain of the Territorial Associations will have failed in their duty to the nation—a duty which it has been proved can be performed without any undue strain or sacrifice.
Taking 450,000 as the ultimate number of the National Reserve, we must next consider what is the military value of the asset thus provided. Primi facie it might be sup- posed that a very large number of these men would not be fit for combative duties, and this no doubt is true for what we may term, in a sense, the most honourable and the most picturesque part of the force, namely, the old war-worn veterans who excited the special attention of the public last Saturday. As a matter of fact, however, a close analysis of the various samples of the National Reserve which we now possess shows that this picturesque element is not large in numbers. The vast majority of the men who have come forward to join the National Reserve are what our Anglo-Saxon forefathers might have called war-worthy. Tho men whose physical force has failed for reasons other than old age do not as a rule come forward to join the Reserve. There is what we may call an automatic sifting of the men who have received a military training. Speaking generally, only men who feel themselves fit, and are fit, to shoulder a rifle apply. In the case of most of the companies of the National Reserve the average age is something like 3G. To put the matter in another way. About 60 per cent. of the National Reserve are not over 45, while about another 20 per cent. are between 45 and 55. Those who are over 55, and are in the true sense veterans, do not amount to more than 20 per cent. If, then, the total numbers reach 450,000, it will be pretty safe to assume that about 270,000 will belong to the first category, that is, will be men of 45 and under ; about 90,000 will be between 45 and 55, and about 90,000 will be over 55 years of age. Both the first and second categories may be assumed to be capable of military work in case of invasion, and these together come to 360,000 men. Let us, however, knock off 60,000 for fear of an " over-estimate." Here, then, is the extent of the raw material which we may assume will ultimately be presented to the military authorities by those responsible for organizing the National Reserve—a body of 300,000 men. It remains for the military authori- ties to decide in what manner that body shall be used and made available for home defence.
The problem is no doubt a difficult one, but surely not beyond solution. We do not profess to be able to pro- duce a perfectly satisfactory solution ourselves, but at any rate we may venture for the purposes of discussion to propose a specific plan. If the present writer were the Secretary of State for War what he would do would be something of this kind. He would propose to the men on the register of the National Reserve, when that register is complete, to undertake a very simple form of obligation. He would ask them to consent " to place themselves at the disposal of the military authorities of the country for purposes of home defence if during a, war the Government should issue a proclamation declaring the nation to be in imminent peril of invasion." Here we may note that the making of the obligation only operative after such a special proclamation of " imminent national peril " is designed to free members of the National Reserve from all fear of being called out except at a time of gravest peril, which is the time in regard to which they have in effect offered their services. Members of the National Reserve, who are all men who have already done military duty for their country, very naturally feel that they ought not to be called out except in ease of supreme danger. It would not, for example, be fair to ask them to come for- ward merely because the Regular Army had been mobilized, or, again, because the Territorial Force had been embodied. Such actions take place at moments of national strain and danger, but these are not the occasions when it would be reasonable to ask the members of the National Reserve to leave their wives and families and give up their civil employment. They could only be asked to do that in the last resort. They would regard a Proclamation of " imminent peril of invasion" as a safeguard. They would know that no Government would resort to such a Proclamation unless its issue could be fully justified.
We believe ourselves that the great bulk of the men of the National Reserve would accept such an obligation as we have sketched without reward or payment of any kind, but nevertheless we hold that it would be much fairer and much more satisfactory to make the men some return, though it must necessarily be a comparatively small one. Accordingly to every man who accepted the obligation described above wo would give a retaining fee of £2 a year, or 10s. per quarter. From this sum, however, he should provide himself with a simple khaki uniform of the regulation pattern—tunic, trousers, and cap, an outfit which he could obtain through his Territorial Association for 15s. This uniform should last him five years, since the occasions on which he would wear it would not occur more than five or six times a year. He should be required to parade in his uniform at least once a quarter, but at each of these four obligatory parades he would receive a sum of 10s. Provision, of course, would be made to prevent men wearing their uniform except when the force was paraded. No doubt there might be difficulties in the case of a small number of men in regard to keeping the uniforms neat and in good order, but this is not an essen- tial difficulty. The County Associations, through whom, of course, the money would be paid, should have little trouble in seeing that the uniforms were kept in proper con- dition. As an alternative the uniforms might, in the first year of a man's membership, be supplied gratis by the Associations and remain their property, and the pay of 10s. per quarter might only begin after the man had been in the force a year. For ourselves, indeed, we prefer this plan.
In any case the management of the payment and the uniforms should be in the hands of the Associations. They would perform the work very much better than any central body. The War Office would simply pay £2 a year for each man on the register under 55 years of age. The total annual cost to the country would this not be over £600,000. We are by no means to be counted among those who think that an expenditure of £600,000 is a, matter of no importance. We hold, however, that if it placed so large a body of trained men at the disposal of the military authorities in case of the need of meeting invasion, it would be money well spent. It would then remain for the Government to provide rifles, bayonets, ammunition, and other combative equipment for the men. We venture to suggest that the rifles and bandoliers should be stored in the armouries of the Territorial Force.
We are, of course, well aware that 300,000 men would be of little military use unless they were organized for fighting purposes. The Army Council would then have to consider what would be the best way in which they could use the National Reserve. In our opinion the first use should be to provide a stiffening for the Territorial Force. Over 100,000 could be usefully absorbed in this way. The next would be to provide certain garrison units which might be used for holding fixed positions or for guarding railways and so forth. Thirdly, we would make provision in other ways for the wastage of the human material in case of war within these islands. There remains to mention one other use for the 300,000 men. Though they would be under no sort of obligation ever to offer their services for oversea war, we feel sure that in the case of an oversea war, if an appeal were made for volunteers from the 300,000, at least ten per cent. could be skimmed for such service. But the obtaining of 30,000 volunteers of such quality might prove of the greatest possible value in case we had an expeditionary force in the field on the Continent.
We have dealt elsewhere with the picturesque side of Saturday's parade in Hyde Park, but we must also say here how very greatly we hope that those Territorial Associations which have not yet taken up in earnest the work of raising a section of the National Reserve will now do so. Let them strike while the iron is hot and while the example of the Capital is before them. Let them determine that this time next year they will be in a position to ask his Majesty to inspect a parade of repre- sentatives of the National Reserve throughout the United Kingdom which will eclipse even the magnificent spectacle which was presented in Hyde Park last Saturday. Why should there not be next June a National Reserve Parade, say, at Windsor, not of 25,000, but of 100,000 National Reservists, consisting of representative contingents drawn from every part of the United Kingdom ?
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