THE SPECTATOR
TAKING ARMS CONTROL WITH A PINCH OF SALT
What is the use of arms control agreements? Those in Washington who question the value of further adherence to the Salt I and II treaties can muster military arguments which are very far from negligible. For a start, the terms of these treaties were already so generous as to make them, in the words of one expert, 'wholly cosmetic' and mere 'registrations of fact'. In the few areas where they do have some real military significance, however, there is growing evidence that the Soviet Union has violated them — as we would expect it to. Its large new early warning radar system at Krasnoyarsk, for example, must be a violation of the ABM treaty, and in the last year it has apparently begun encoding the warhead targetting instructions on its offensive missile systems — another serious violation of Salt terms. Furthermore, it was precisely in the heyday of detente — the Salt Seventies — that the Soviet Union pushed ahead with its mas- sive build-up of strategic offensive weapons and, let it not be forgotten, with intensive research into strategic defence. The arguments for further adherence, by Contrast, are primarily political. Mr Schultz and the State Department know better than anyone else in Washington, that West European opinion — both public and governmental — earnestly requests and requires that the American government shall at least make a show of talking seriously to the Russians about arms con- trol. Indeed, with the controversy about 'Star Wars' following hot on the heels of the controversy about Cruise and Pershing missiles, this may be thought to be essen- tial for the cohesion of the Western Alliance. And if the American government is negotiating in Geneva it does not make much sense for it simultaneously to de- nounce and abrogate the only kind of treaty which is likely to emerge from Geneva. To be consistent it should do both or neither: negotiate, and adhere to the result of its previous negotiations, or not adhere and not negotiate. While the Un- ited States would potentially have an im- mense technological and economic advan- tage in an uncontrolled arms race, Amer- ica's electors would not necessarily support this at the cost of their standard of living. Soviet leaders do not have to worry about elections every four years. Finally, the symbolic business of arms control is an essential part of the broader geopolitical dialogue with the Soviet Union, which is also in America's interest. The Reagan administration's announcement of con- ditional adherence to the unratified Salt II treaty is therefore a good compromise, not just between different factions inside the administration, but between the military and the political arguments. It undertakes to respect the terms of the treaty just as much (or, by implication, as little) as the Russians do. It takes Salt with a pinch of salt, which is exactly how it should be taken. An arms control agreement is not an end in itself; it is a means to the end of mutual security. The question we should ask of any arms control initiative is the same question that we should ask of any new armament initiative (like 'Star Wars'): does it enhance or diminish mutual secur- ity? There may be good arms control agreements which stabilise the balance of terror at a lower level of armaments; but there may also be bad arms control agree- ments, which disturb the balance and thus increase the risk of war. A treaty to which neither side adheres is about as precious as an empty cornflakes packet. But a treaty to which only one side adheres is a time bomb concealed in a cornflake packet.
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