THE CONVERSION OF LORD PALMERSTON ON from the risks of
war, even when she herself is a belligerent.
for measures which he now regards as nothing short of an an American war. In such a war great battles on land act of " political suicide" for England. would scarcely be conceivable; great sea engagements are What can have caused this violent change of opinion, and not very likely ; and when won, and completely won, would at the same time the evident indisposition of the Liberal not be at all decisive. America could afford to be beaten at Administration to explain in 1862 the grounds of its aver- sea if her commerce remained unhurt. The most distressing Mon to the same overtures of the American Government naval operation we could undertake would be an absolute which were at least thought worthy of anxious and favour- annihilation of the private commerce of America. And it is, able consideration in 1856? We believe that, did the we suppose, the renunciation of this that Lord Palmerston Ministers tell us their mind honestly, we should find the calls an act of political suicide. With the American com- &lenge mainly due not to a new insight into the abstract mercial marine absolutely paralyzed by the English navy, principles in the background, but to the completely fresh and no rival but France in the carrying trade, we should combinations of illustrative events by which these abstract still keep a large part of our own commerce in our own hands, principles have lately been tested. What Lord Palmerston and rapidly spread fear and bankruptcy through the Atlantic thought wholesome and advantageous for England when the States of North America. Neutral America would do a idea of war brought up before his mind either a blockade of large portion of the carrying trade if we were at war with the Baltic and the Black Sea—or an internecine conflict France, and hence, in the event of such a war, it might have with Prance—seems to him very different now, when the been well if we had recognized all private property at sea. most immediate risks of war are associated with the pro- But neutral France could do little to carry on the trade of ceedings of the Government at Washington, and lead him America, if we were at war with America, and then, there- into a comparison between the American and English man- fore, it might have been desirable to keep the power of time positions in such an event. The prominent danger in striking a blow at them through their private commerce. In the mind of the statesman has changed, and with it has 1856, English statesmen were thinking almost exclusively of changed the estimate he had formed of the working of the England as coping with Powers far more easily injured by abstract principle. An American war, which then was barely the destruction of their navies than by the destruction of considered one of the practical contingencies, is now the their commerce. Now they are thinking of England as possibility which forms the touchstone of every argument, destined perhaps some day to cope with a Power indefinitely and we may fairly consider that the transformation of opinion inferior in navy, but almost our equal in commerce. Of is due to the new criterion by which we try the expediency course, the very different arriere-pensies in the two cases of our international policy, rather than to anything in the give rise to very different impressions. strict justice of that policy. Yet it would be well if our statesmen would still look less to intolerable. They might secure the ends of a Revolution, The matter stands thus. In 1556 it was agreed, with- but use their whole influence only to prepare the means. out Lord Russell's concurrence, which was not then Why is it that Mr. Bright so often fails even when he is in necessary, but with Lord Palmerston's full concurrence, to the right ? Simply because men see in every movement let neutral ships cover enemies' goods. This was, as the and proposal of his a rooted dislike for the aristocratic Attorney-General tells us, a concession all in favour of constitution they are determined not to abandon, suspect neutral .maritime Powers, which may well hope, if not to that a just defence of the North means a desire for Repub- monopolize the whole carrying trade in time of war, at least lican England, and see in a wise attack on conveyancing a to monopolize its largest gains. And if the same nations stroke at the law of primogeniture. The present Liberals were always to be in the same position if the neutral of to- of the French Chamber, honest to folly, brave to admire- day could count on being the neutral Of to-morrow, then no tion, intellectual to a point which may make English county doubt such neutrals would be very unwilling to see us take members sigh with a hopeless envy, are still but so many the further step of respecting all private property at sea Mr. Brights. Not all our pity for their fate, as men who except contraband of war, whether in neutrals or ens- are striving for liberty within an intellectual prison ; not all mies' ships. As the matter at present stands, however, our admiration for the bright wit against which despotism maritime carrying Powers may lose far more by be- is as powerless as steel against electricity ; not all our sym- coming for a time belligerents than they will gain by pathy for the courage which, while a hope of acquittal still a much longer period of neutrality. Their whole carrying exists, dares to satirize the unjust judge, can blind us to the trade is destroyed—or destroyed for all purposes of pro- fact that these men are not statesmen ; that they represent perty—as soon as their ships become liable to capture ; and the Revolution, and not freedom ; that if the Empire falls, it therefore, in spite of Sir W. Atherton and Sir G. C. Lewis, will fall because Heaven and France are weary of successful it may fairly be affirmed that a nation with a great mercan- oppression, not because M. Offivier can laugh down M. tile marine has much more to gain than to lose by sacrificing Baroche. the special monopoly which it may have in a time of war, if she secure instead for her private ships a practical immunity THE CONVERSION OF LORD PALMERSTON ON from the risks of war, even when she herself is a belligerent. BELLIGERENT RIGHTS.. How is it, then, that this gain, which Lord Palmerston esti- MHE Government was singularly ineffectual, and unwilling mated at its true value in 1856, is so lightly appreciated now ? to grapple with the real point at issue, in the debate on Because, though in her commercial marine no maritime nation Tuesday night on Mr. Horsfall's motion. The Attorney-Ge- like England could fail to gain by the extension of the prin. neral limited himself to explaining, with prolix digressiveness, ciple of immunity to all private property at sea, it is certain the principle of international maritime law recognized by Eng- that in special cases this would involve a loss in the destruc- land before her accession to the Congress of Paris, and to tive opportunities of a naval Power. In case of a war with repudiating in the name of those unknown variables—if we Russia or France this loss would be far more than cancelled may be permitted a mathematical phrase—called "neutrals," by our own gain. If we mutually gave up the right of in- the unselfish wish to surrender the monopoly of the carrying tercepting at sea private property, unless contraband, or service in time of war, which the Treaty of Paris virtually unless striving to break a blockade, we should give up little conferred. Sir George Lewis—whose speech was chiefly and gain much. France is nearly equal to us in naval signalized by the bon mot that a conquered Government is power, and infinitely our inferior in both the magnitude and the most powerful "instrument of plunder" over the con- the area of distribution of her commercial marine. She quered nation — devoted himself to the terminology of would have far more opportunities of injuring us than we Mr. Horsfall's motion, and to a proof that "private pro- should of injuring her through attacks on private property perty" is not, and never has been, protected, even on at sea. Our carrying trade is infinitely greater than that of land. Lord Palmerston, with the youthful elasticity of any other European nation, and we should evade by this intellect for which he is so remarkable, administered a concession the danger of transferring suddenly to the United knock-down blow to his own profession of faith in 1856, and States a trade on which our prosperity to some extent depends. administered it with almost as much candid ardour as he And we should give up very little. As Lord Palmerston would have displayed in demolishing a tenet of Mr. Disraeli's. said, in the famous Liverpool speech, which he now recants Lord Russell's obstinate him to the same views was proved by with more than Cranmer's ostentatious penitence, "If we a quoted despatch showing the same "conspicuous absence" of look at former periods, we shall not find that any powerful reasons which characterized the speeches of Sir George Lewis country was ever vanquished bylosses sustained by individuals; and the Attorney-General. None of these gentlemen really it is the conflicts of armies by land, or of fleets by sea, that addressed themselves to the substance of Mr7Horsfall's argu- decide the great contests of nations." And that, no doubt, ment ; none of them explained the remarkable revolution of is true, if we are thinking of a war with any European Power. conviction which has taken place at least in some of their Unfortunately, if also true, it is far from so obvious, if we minds since 1856, when the Premier freely avowed his wish are thinking, as we have been within the last few months, of special contingencies, and more to the real justice of the case. We have formally resigned the right to injure our enemies through a neutral commercial marine—if at least, as may soon happen, all the nations possessing such marines should accede to the Congress of Paris ; but we cling to the right to injure any nation which wants and yet cannot hire the services of an adequate neutral marine. Would it, indeed, be "political suicide" to renounce that right in return for its renunciation by other nations ? Is it really so essential that we should be able to "plunder at sea," as Sir G. C. Lewis thinks it, in order to reduce even such an enemy as the United States ? We believe the right of blockade to be in such a base one of the most powerful instruments of naval war. But as far as mere retail plunder at sea goes, which we have already repudiated so far as any nation can secure a neutral go-between that has signed the Paris contract, we believe that, to renounce this wholly is about as much an act of "political suicide" as was the sacrifice of the last rag of protection. In any European war it would be a vast gain of general maritime power. In a Transatlantic war, it might entail a slight loss of maritime power; but it is at least as extravagant a piece of hyperbole to call it "political sui- cide," as it would be to use such a term if the present Ministry were to renounce that double-edged weapon of wrath to the Irish Ultramontanes, through whose ambi- guous aid they are winning verbal victories in the House of Commons and losing elections in Ireland. In both cases alike they would sacrifice a powerful instrument of attack, but in both cases, also, a weapon which is rather more likely to enter into their own bosoms than into that of their foes. No deliberate judgment would consider such a sacrifice as suicide.
Let us earnestly urge upon Mr. Cobden who is to resume the debate on Monday, the desirability cd prudence. If he confines himself to the advocacy of Mr. HorsfalPs principle, he may make a profound impression on the country; if he goes in for the abolition of the law of contraband and blockade, he will deeply injure his own cause.
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