THE CAUSES OF THE ZULU WAR.
[TO THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR.']
Sia,—While we are suffering from the disaster at Isandula, it is impossible that the conscience of the nation should not ask itself why we have called this calamity down upon our heads, by engaging in a war of doubtful expediency, and more than doubtful justice. It is generally acknowledged that the annex- ation of the Transvaal was the proximate cause of the war, but for the primary or original cause we must go back somewhat earlier than the date of that enterprise. That cause I believe to have been the project of Confederation, of which we have been hearing so much, and to which, in theory, no objections an be made. Confederation has answered well elsewhere, and is a natural and legitimate operation, by which scattered colonies, pushing forward their boundaries until they meet, coalesce into a powerful dominion. To guide the growth of empire is the work of the highest statesmanship, but to attempt to force it prematurely is the unwisest thing in the world, an -exhibition of the absence of the true instincts of the statesman, and of that highest art, the art of government. It is to the premature attempt of the late Colonial Secretary, Lord Car- narvon, to bring about confederation in South Africa that I trace all these troubles.
No one can read the despatches of the present Colonial Minister without seeing that if the ordinary obligations of our Colonial authorities to the Government at home had been observed, we should have had no war. And still more, that if it had not been for the restraint placed by those despatches upon the policy that caused the war, and the response made to them on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, Sir H. l3ulwer, hostilities must have been precipitated long before, and when we were far less prepared for them than we were when Lord Chelmsford crossed the Tugela. It is also now tolerably certain that the Zulus looked forward to no quarrel with the colony of Natal, and that we might have lived at peace with them for many a day, had we been content to do so. For reasons for coercing the Zulus we must, then, look elsewhere. And I desire to ask whether they may not be found in the instructions with which Sir Bartle Frere was sent to South Africa, and whether they did not amount to the direction that his first object must be to bring about Lord Carnarvon's plan of confederation..
To accomplish this end, the gravest obstacle was to be found in the attitude of the Government of the Cape Colony, where the Ministry was unwilling to undertake the responsibility of distant territories, unless as a condition precedent the Native Powers were first subdued, and above all, the power of the great Zulu State broken by the Imperial forces. To carry into effect this enter- prise there was every opportunity,-.-a cams belli was at hand, and there was an unusual supply of British troops in the Colonies. There were, however, still objections to remove. The questions must have been asked,—Is it just to the Zulus to drive them into this war ? Is it fair to the English people to involve them in such a contest, without their consent ? And. these objections were removed by the following arguments, dic- tated by the upholders of the same policy. Cetewayo was represented as a blood-thirsty and savage tyrant, prepared at any minute to attack us, and ruling so oppressively, that his overthrow would be a blessing to his own people ; while as re- gards the interests of the mother-country, the answer was found in the advice of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, whose belief, expressed to the High Commissioner, was that "the Zulu power would fall to pieces when touched." That the Zulu power did not fall to pieces when touched, but presents the spectacle of a wild people fighting, not without glory, in the defence of their on liberties and country, is our misfortune. As regards Cetewayo himself, the evidence rather points to his friendliness towards ourselves, and that although a savage, he is far in advance of his own people,—a grand and, indeed, comparatively enlight- ened man of his type.
We have here, then, some of the causes which gave rise to this war ; but the volume of the waters which carried away our administrators was swelled by the current of another stream of the same policy, in the Transvaal. That territory had been violently annexed by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the representa- tive of the same Colonial Minister by whom he had been sup- ported and promoted, and from whom his authority had been derived. It would not be difficult to trace the effect of Sir T. Shepstone's rule over the Natives in Natal, as certain to bring us into collision with our neighbours ; but in so doing, I should trespass too long upon your patience. It must be sufficient to point out that the attack upon the Zulus was considered abso- lutely necessary, to meet the strain of polities in the Transvaal, where we are told "that it was impossible to hope for a solution of our difficulties, until the pec-r.la of that country were assured that we had some better reason for abstaining from coercing the Zulus than a sense of our inferiority and weakness."
The annexation of the Transvaal was a step to which no great objection was made in this country at the time, because it was represented that it was necessary for the protection of the Boers themselves, and required to put a stop to a state of anarchy into which they were fall- ing. It now seems that we were misled, as they claim to have been quite able to protect themselves, and that our interference was at least premature, like the whole of the scheme of confederation. All that was required of our repre- sentatives was to do justly and to act in a fair and friendly spirit to our neighbours, and so await the course of events. Had the emigrant-farmers really been in jeopardy, we might have intervened as arbitrators at their request, and should have done so with the consent of the Zulus, who have for years been appealing to us to accept this office. Such a course, as it turns out, would have been attended with singular success. There is no doubt but that as regards the disputed territory, there was a strong and excited national feeling among the Zulus ; but the report of the Commissioners proves that the Zulus were in the right, and a fair award would have been hailed with enthusiasm by them, as the award of Sir Bartle Frere was hailed by Cetewayo, until he received the Memorandum, which virtually set it aside, and amounted to a declaration of war.
As it is, we have succeeded in putting ourselves in the wrong with both sides. To conciliate the Boers, we have espoused their quarrel, and attacked the Zulus ; while their high mighti- nesses are irreconcilable, lamenting over their independence, and leave us to fight the battle without their assistance. If our cause were wholly good, the country would accept the necessity of defending it ; but it is lamentable to think of the misery which is to follow,—of the tears and blood and treasure, and. far more precious human lives, which are to be wasted on so poor an object.—I am, Sir, &c., C. J. RUNYON.
We give our correspondent's letter, on account of his means of local knowledge, but without agreeing with it.—ED. Spectator.1
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